Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms An Institutional Analysis by Wilkins, David B. & Gulati, G. Mitu
 
Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms An
Institutional Analysis
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation David B. Wilkins and G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few
Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms--An Institutional
Analysis, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 493 (1996).
Published Version http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol84/iss3
/1/
Accessed February 16, 2015 7:31:07 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13548823
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAACalifornia Law Review
Volume 84|Issue 3 Article 1
May 1996
Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate
Law Firms--An Institutional Analysis
David B. Wilkins
G. Mitu Gulati
Follow this and additional works at:http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the California Law Review at Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in California Law Review by an authorized administrator of Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
jcera@law.berkeley.edu.
Recommended Citation
David B. Wilkins and G. Mitu Gulati,Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms--An Institutional Analysis, 84 Cal. L.
Rev. 493 (1996).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol84/iss3/1California Law Review
VOL.  84  MAY  1996  No. 3
Copyright 0  1996 by California Law Review, Inc.
Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers
in Corporate Law Firms?
An Institutional Analysis
David B. Wilkinst
G. Mitu Gulatitt
TABLE  OF CONTENTS
Introduction .....................................................................................  496
I.  Defining the Problem .................................................................  501
A.  Are Blacks Underrepresented  in  Corporate Firms? ........ ....... 502
B.  Why Study  Institutions and Incentives?  .................. .............. 506
1.  Differential Abilities ......................................................  506
2.  Lack of Interest .............................................................  508
Copyright © 1996 California Law Review,  Inc.
t  Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law and Director, Program on the Legal  Profession,  Harvard
Law School.
tt  Law clerk to Judge Sandra L. Lynch, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
The authors wish to thank  Ian  Ayres, Lee  Buchheit,  Janet  Bauman, Elizabeth  Chambliss,  Steve
Choi,  Sarah  Cooleybeck,  Howard  Erlanger,  Laurenn  Edelman,  Richard  Epstein,  Marc  Galanter,
Bryant Garth,  Gibson  Gayle,  Robert  Gordon,  Lani  Guinier,  Andrew  Guzman,  Terence  Halliday,
Gloria  Howard,  Mark  Ramseyer,  Richard  Revesz,  Steven  Shavell,  Patrick  Shin, Reva  Siegel,  Cass
Sunstein,  David Thomas,  and  Tim Wilkins  for  their generous  comments  on earlier  drafts.  We  are
particularly  grateful  to Professor  David  Charny, not only for  his insights  upon  which  many  of  our
theories are based, but also  for his continuing encouragement of this ongoing project.  We  also  thank
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton for giving Mr. Gulati both encouragement and time to work on this
project  while he  was  an  associate  there.  In addition,  Professor  Wilkins  thanks  the  University  of
California at Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law, Morrison  & Foerster, and the Robert  D.  and  Leslie
Kay Raven Trust for their generous  support of the lecture series at Boalt Hall where these ideas were
first presented.  Richard  Kilbride,  Yan  Senouf,  and Maura  Kelley  provided  invaluable  assistance.
This article is dedicated to the loving memory of Professor John R. Wilkins,  who was a member of the
Boalt Hall faculty from 1964 until his death in 1976, and to Albert  Maule,  whose  keen  insights about
the problems faced  by blacks in corporate firms  advanced our thinking  immeasurably.CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
3.  Racism ...........................................................................  509
4.  Preaching  to the Unconverted ........................................  511
C.  Affirmative  Action ...............................................................  512
II.  The Model:  Monitoring  Among  the Human  Capitalists ..............  514
A.  Discrimination  in High-Level Jobs .......................................  517
1.  Subjectivity  and  M onitoring ..........................................  518
2.  W hen It's Cheaper to  Overpay .......................................  518
3.  Tournament  Theory ......................................................  519
4.  "Efficient"  Discrimination ...........................................  520
B.  M aking Elite Law Firms .......................................................  523
1.  Good Lawyers are M  ade, Not Born ................................  524
2.  An Efficient Model  in an Age  of Opportunism ..............  530
a.  High Salaries ............................................................  530
b.  Pyramiding ..............................................................  534
c.  Tracking  and  Training .............................................  537
III. The Application:  Mapping The Racial Law of Averages .............  542
A.  Recruitment .........................................................................  545
1.  The Process ...................................................................  546
2.  Signals and  Signaling:  Stocking the Pipeline and
Protecting  the Franchise .................................................  549
3.  Race and Recruiting .......................................................  554
B.  Retention, Promotion,  and Survival .......................................  564
1.  Monitoring,  Mentoring,  and  Marketing:  Getting
on the Training Track ....................................................  565
2.  Concrete Ceilings and  Slippery Floors: The Black
Experience  in  Corporate Firms ......................................  568
a.  M entoring  and  Irrationality ......................................  568
b.  Visibility and  Tokenism ...........................................  571
c.  Bringing the Outside In ............................................  572
d.  Rational Strategies  in the Face of Reasonable Fear  .... 574
i.  Low-Risk Strategies ............................................  574
ii.  High-Risk Strategies:  The Litigation  Trap ..........  577
e.  The Revolving  Door  .................................................  580
f.  Unequal Partners ......................................................  582
i.  The  External M arket ..........................................  582
ii.  The Internal Market:  Getting  the Franchise ........  583
IV. The Solution(s)?:  Finding Efficient Responses  to Efficient
Discrimination ...........................................................................  584
A.  Anti-discrimination  Law .......................................................  585
B.  Institutional Reform .............................................................  590
[Vol.  84:4931996]  WHY ARE THERE SO FEW  BLACK LAWYERS  495
C.  Diversity Training ................................................................  592
D.  Stimulating  Dem and ............................................................  595
E.  Affirm ative Action ...............................................................  598
1.  Standards .......................................................................  600
2.  Effort: Lowering the Price of the Ticket
to the Tournam ent .........................................................  602
3  Stigm a ...........................................................................  604
Conclusion:  Choosing a New Path ....................................................  605
Appendix .........................................................................................  615CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers
in Corporate Law Firms?
An Institutional Analysis
David B. Wilkins
G. Mitu Gulati
Although  the  number  of  black  students  graduating from  law
schools has increased significantly in recent decades, blacks still make
up a very small minority of the lawyers working in large corporate law
firms.  Available data indicate that these firms hire few blacks, and that
those they do hire are more likely  than  their white peers to  leave  the
firms before becoming partners.  Conventional explanations blame  the
underrepresentation  of blacks in corporate  firms on either the racism of
firms and  their clients, or a  shortage of qualified,  interested black
candidates.  While acknowledging that in some instances these factors
may  help  to explain  the  problem,  this Article looks  behind  them  to
examine  institutional factors  that  tend  to  perpetuate  the  existing
underrepresentation.  Specifically, the Article shows how  the  ways  in
which large corporate  firms recruit  and train lawyers tend both to shield
discriminatory choices between  black and white  candidates from  any
competitive disadvantage, and to  discourage black  law  students  and
lawyers from investing in skills that will enable them to  succeed within
corporate firms.  Thus,  the  Article argues, firms' hiring and  training
decisions both shape and are shaped by  the strategic choices of black
candidates,  with the net effect of keeping all but a  few blacks from being
hired and succeeding in the firm setting.  Finally, this Article explores
the implications  of these incentives for  five commonly proposed tools for
diversifying corporate law firms:  anti-discrimination  laws, race-neutral
institutional reforms, diversity education within firms, demand-creation
initiatives, and supply-side initiatives to encourage hiring and promo-
tion of black lawyers.
INTRODUCTION
This  Article  addresses  what  for  many  is  an  uncomfortable  real-
ity:  Despite  a substantial  increase in  the  number  of black  students  at-
tending  law  school  over  the  last  forty  years,  African  Americans  still
constitute only  a tiny percentage  of the  associates  and  partners  working
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in the nation's largest corporate law  firms.'  Given the legal profession's
role  in  championing  the principles  of non-discrimination  and  equality
of opportunity,  this  reality  is particularly  troubling.  More  generally,
however, the fact that  blacks  have had  little  success  breaking  into  the
upper echelons  of the elite bar  is emblematic  of a deeper  and  more  in-
tractable  set of problems  facing  those  interested  in  workplace  integra-
tion.
Forty years  after the Supreme Court's landmark  decision  in Brown
v.  Board of Education, 2  society  has  made  substantial  progress  toward
eradicating the kind of overtly racist  policies  that excluded  blacks  from
virtually  every desirable sector of the economy.  For many  blacks, these
changes  have produced  a dramatic  growth  in income  and  opportunity.
In recent  years,  however, it has  become  painfully  clear that simply  dis-
mantling  America's  version  of  apartheid  has  not  produced  economic
parity between blacks and whites.'  Although poor blacks have benefited
the least from  the  civil rights  revolution,  "high  level"  jobs  in business
and  the professions  have  also proved  surprisingly  resistant  to  change.4
The fact that blacks  have made  so  little  progress  in  breaking  into  the
corporate  law firm  elite-particularly  at the  partnership  level-fits  this
larger  pattern.
Commentators  generally  offer  one  of  two  explanations  for  this
"glass  ceiling"  effect.  The  first, generally  proffered  by firms, posits  a
shortage  of black applicants  with both the qualifications  and  the interest
necessary  to  succeed  in  the demanding  world  of  elite  corporate  prac-
tice.5  The  second,  most  often  articulated  by  blacks,  blames  the  slow
progress  on  continued  racism both  inside  corporate  firms  and  among
the clients upon whom these entities depend for their livelihood.6
As we argue  below, both the "pool  problem"  and  continuing  ra-
cism against blacks play important roles in determining the employment
opportunities  available  to  African  American  lawyers.  Standing  alone,
1.  See infra Part I.A.
2.  347 U.S. 483  (1954).
3.  See,  e.g.,  WILLIAM  J.  WILSON,  THE  DECLINING  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  RACE:  BLACKS  AND
CHANGING  AMERICAN  INSTrrIUTIONS  (1978)  (arguing  that  poor  blacks  have  benefited  less  than
middle class blacks from the civil rights movement).
4.  We borrow the phrase from Professor Bartholet,  who was the first  in the  legal  literature to
identify this problem.  See  Elizabeth  Bartholet, Application of Title  VII  to Jobs in High Places,  95
HARV.  L  REV.  945  (1982).  For  an  extensive  evaluation  of  this  phenomenon,  see  FED.  GLASS
CEILING  COMM'N,  U.S.  DEPT.  OF  LABOR,  GOOD  FOR  BUSINESS:  MAKING  FULL  USE  OF  THE
NATION'S CAPITAL  (1995)  [hereinafter  GLASS  CEILING  REPORT].
5.  See, e.g.,  Vance  Knapp  & Bonnie  K. Grover,  The Corporate  Law Firm-Can  It Achieve
Diversity?, 13 NAT'L  BLACK  L.J. 298, 305-06  (1994) (examining and critiquing the argument  that the
pool of qualified  law  graduates  of color  is small);  Valerie  Fontaine,  Progress  Report:  Women  and
People of Color in Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 6  HASTINGS  WOMEN'S  LJ. 27, 35-36
(1995).
6.  See,  e.g.,  Knapp & Grover, supra note 5, at 303.
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however, each explanation begs  important  questions.  The  "pool  prob-
lem"  explanation  begs  the  question  of whether the existing  hiring  and
promotion  criteria utilized  by elite  law firms  to  determine  who  is in  the
pool fairly  and accurately  predict future  productivity.  The racism  story,
on the other hand, fails to explain  why  firms  that discriminate  by  refus-
ing to  hire or promote qualified black  lawyers  do  not  suffer a competi-
tive  disadvantage  when  those  workers  are  employed  by  their
competitors.
In order to arrive at a more  thorough understanding, we must move
beyond this familiar dichotomy.  We do so  by taking  a closer  look  than
either of the standard  explanations  at how corporate firms  structure,  and
are structured  by,  the relevant  markets for labor and  clients.7  Our  inter-
est in  this neglected  institutional  dimension  is the product  of our prior
work on race, professionalism,  and markets.  One of us is engaged  in the
ongoing  study  of  the  legal  profession  with  particular  attention  to  the
experiences  of  black  lawyers.8  The  other  is  studying  how  particular
market conditions  allow  firms  to  insulate some  kinds  of discriminatory
decisionmaking  from  the  disciplining  effects  of  competition."  In  this
Article, we seek  to  combine  these  two  perspectives  by  offering  a pre-
liminary  account  of how  corporate  firms  recruit  and  retain  lawyers  and
why  these  practices  may  adversely  affect the  employment  prospects  of
black lawyers."
7.  In this respect,  our account  is connected  to recent  "structuralist"  theories  of  workplace
discrimination.  See, e.g.,  ROSEBETH  M. KANTER,  MEN  AND  WOMEN  OF  THE  CORPORATION  (1977);
Martha  Chamallas,  Structuralist and  Cultural  Domination  Theories  Meet  Title  VII:  Some
Contemporary  Influences, 92 MICH. L.  REv.  2370 (1994); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories  About  Women
and Work: Judicial  Interpretations  of Sex Segregation  in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the
Lack of Interest  Argument, 103  HARV. L. REV.  1749 (1990).  As will emerge  below,  however,  there
are important  differences between  these  approaches  and  the account  that we  defend  here.  For an
insightful  discussion  and  critique  of  the  limits  of  traditional  structural  accounts  in  this  field,  see
Elizabeth  Chambliss,  Organizational Determinants  of Law  Firm  Integration  (Am.U.  L.REv.,
forthcoming  1996).  Our thinking on these issues has been greatly influenced by Professor Chambliss'
work.
8.  See,  e.g., David  B. Wilkins,  Introduction: Race in Context, in ANTHONY  APPIAH  & Amy
GUTMANN,  COLOR  CONSCIOUSNESS:  THE  POLITICAL  MORALITY  OF  RACE  (forthcoming  1996);
David  B. Wilkins,  Social Engineers or Corporate Tools?  Brown  v. Board  of  Education  and the
Conscience of the Black Corporate  Bar,  in RACE,  LAW,  AND  CULTURE:  REFLECTIONS  ON  BROWN  V.
BOARD  OF EDUCATION  (Austin Sarat ed., forthcoming  1996)  [hereinafter Wilkins, Social Engineers];
David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment:  Should a Black Lawyer Represent the Kit
Klux  Klan?, 63  G.W.U.  L  REV.  746  (1995)  [hereinafter  Wilkins,  Race,  Ethics,  and the  First
Amendment];  David  B.  Wilkins,  Two  Paths to  the  Mountaintop? The Role  of Legal Education in
Shaping  the Values of Black Corporate  Lawyers, 45 STAN.  L.  REV.  1981  (1993)  [hereinafter  Wilkins,
Two Paths]. Professor Wilkins is currently writing a book on black corporate  lawyers.
9.  See  generally  David  Chamy  &  Mitu  Gulati,  Efficiency  Wages,  Tournaments  and
Discrimination:  A  Theory of Employment Discrimination  for "High  Level" Jobs, John  M.  Olin  Center
for Law, Economics,  and Business, Discussion Paper No. 182,  Harvard Law School  (March  1996).
10.  See  Edward  L.  Rubin,  The New  Legal  Process, the  Synthesis  of Discourse, and  the
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109  HARV.  L  REV.  1393  (1996)  (suggesting  a  similar methodological
synthesis).
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Our argument proceeds  in five parts.  Part I briefly  summarizes  the
available  data on blacks in corporate law  practice and defends  our  claim
that an  institutional  analysis  is a necessary  component  of any  plausible
explanation for these numbers.  We also set  out  our reasons  for initially
bracketing  (to  the extent  possible)  the impact  of  affirmative  action  on
law firm hiring and promotion  practices.  We return  to  this issue in  Part
IV.
In  Part II,  we present  a  stylized  model  of the  contemporary  elite
corporate  law firm.  The  model  is premised  on two related  features  of
professional  work:  the  inherent  subjectivity  of quality  assessments  and
the difficulty and  expense  of monitoring.  In response  to  these  realities,
we  posit  that  it  is  efficient  for  firms  to  adopt  the  following  tripartite
strategy:  high wages  to  create a large  pool  of available  workers  and  to
motivate those lawyers who  are hired to work  with relatively little  super-
vision;  a high  associate-to-partner  ratio,  thus  further  encouraging  asso-
ciates to  work hard in the hopes  of becoming partners  while at the  same
time allowing  the firm  to  spread  legal  work  among  many  lawyers  with
varying levels  of knowledge  and  skill at the  lowest possible  cost;  and  a
tracking system whereby  the pool of associates is divided  into those  who
will receive  scarce  training  resources  and  those  who  will work  on  rela-
tively  undemanding  assignments.
These  three  institutional  features  of  contemporary  elite  firms,  we
assert, disproportionately  disadvantage  black  lawyers."  Two tendencies
contribute  to this result.  First, because  firms  hire  a large  number  of as-
sociates from  a pool  that has  been  artificially  inflated  by  high  salaries
and ask many of them to do relatively undemanding  work,  these  institu-
tions  have  little incentive  to  invest  in  obtaining  detailed  information
about the quality  of potential  employees.  Hence,  individuals  within  the
firm can use race as a factor in their decisionmaking  without hurting  the
firm's bottom line.  The same  goes for retention  and promotion.  Deci-
sions to invest scarce training resources  in average whites as opposed  to
average  blacks  will not hurt  the firm's  chances  of producing  the small
number of high quality partners  that it needs to  guarantee  its productiv-
ity  in future  years.  As a result,  firms  have  little  incentive  to  root  out
employment  decisions  that, either consciously  or unconsciously,  preju-
dice blacks or favor whites.
Second,  because  firms  have  no  incentive  to  stop  these  practices,
black lawyers in firms (as well  as those contemplating  joining  firms)  are
more  likely to choose  human  capital  strategies  that,  paradoxically,  de-
l1.  It is important to make clear from the outset that we  do  not claim  that these  practices  only
disadvantage blacks.  Quite to the contrary; many whites are  also disadvantaged  by this system.  Our
point simply is that blacks  as  a group  are  more  likely to bear  the brunt of these  practices  for  the
reasons discussed in Part III.
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crease  their  overall  chances  of  success  in  these  environments.  Since
blacks  reasonably  believe  that  they  face  an  increased  risk  that  their
abilities will be unfairly devalued  or  overlooked,  they  have  an  incentive
to overinvest  either  in  avoiding  visible negative  signals  or  in  obtaining
easily observable positive signals that clearly identify them as  superstars.
Both  of these  strategies,  however,  are  potentially  counterproductive  to
the extent that they  diminish  a black  lawyer's  opportunity  or  incentive
to obtain  the skills upon  which  success  at the  corporate  law  firm  ulti-
mately  depends.
In  Part III, we test our  model  against  the  limited  amount  of  cur-
rently  available  empirical  and  anecdotal  evidence  on  black  corporate
lawyers  and our own preliminary  research on black Harvard Law School
graduates.  This data is far too  tenuous  and  incomplete  to  prove  defini-
tively the institutional dynamic we posit.  Nevertheless,  what  information
there is points in the direction  predicted  by our  model.  Although  these
institutions  spend  a  considerable  amount  of  time  and  money  on  re-
cruiting,  firms  rely  on  a  small  number  of  easily  visible  and  rankable
criteria at the initial  screening  phase,  while at the  same  time  relying  on
subjective  judgments  about  "personality"  and  "fit"  (as  opposed  to
other easily obtainable  indicia of quality)  during the less  visible parts  of
the process.  This  combination  of  objective  and  subjective  decision-
making disadvantages  black applicants  by falsely  conveying  the  impres-
sion  that the visible and rankable  criteria  that firms rely  on  are  tightly
correlated with quality, while simultaneously  allowing individuals  within
firms to  discount  a black  candidate's  signals based  on  subjective judg-
ments about personality  and  fit.  Similarly,  when  selecting  associates  to
mentor and train, partners  rely on a combination  of a  few objective  sig-
nals and  their  own  subjective judgments  in  order  to  determine  which
associates are likely to have the kind of viable long-term careers  with  the
firm that make them good training prospects.  Once again,  the data  sug-
gests that blacks  are  less  likely  to  be  selected  to  receive  this  essential
good.  Finally,  as our model predicts, black  students and  associates  often
react to these  heightened  barriers  by  choosing  human  capital  strategies
that further diminish their chances  for success  in this environment.
Part IV  examines  the  implications  of our  analysis  for  five  of  the
most  commonly  proposed  solutions  for  diversifying  corporate  law
firms:  anti-discrimination  laws  such  as Title  VII,  race-neutral  institu-
tional  reforms  such  as  formal  training  programs  and  associate  review,
educational  initiatives such  as diversity training,  demand-creation  initia-
tives designed to  encourage  corporate  clients  to hire  black  lawyers, and
supply-side  initiatives  that encourage  firms  to  make  affirmative  efforts
to increase the number of blacks they hire  and  promote.  Each  of these
mechanisms  has  the potential  to improve  oppotunities for black  lawyers.
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The  structural characteristics  of the elite firms described  in Part II, how-
ever, make it difficult for this potential to be realized.
Part  V  therefore  concludes  by  briefly  examing  why  elite  firms
might change these strucural  impediements.  Although we  claim the ex-
isting structure  is efficient,  the argument  that it is the  only efficient  re-
sponse  to  the  problems  of  subjectivity  and  monitoring  ignores  both
historical contingencies  that produced  these  practices  and  the  unpreci-
dented  volitility of the market for elite firm  services.  Ironically,  we be-
lieve that the sense of crisis  that currently  pervades  not only  elite firms,
but the enitre legal  profession,  offers  a unique  opportunity  to  chart  a
new path that will enable there institutions to move closer to the ideals  of
fairness  and  equality that constitute  the best part of this country's  legal
tradition.
I.  DEFINING  THE PROBLEM
As the Article's  title implies,  two  assumptions  underlie  our  analy-
sis.'
2  First, we assume that blacks  are  underrepresented  in  corporate  law
12.  Two additional preliminary  points are in order. First, by limiting our focus  to the problems
of black  lawyers,  our  analysis  departs  from  the  growing  tendency  among  both  academics  and
practitioners to treat these issues as merely a subset of the problems  faced  by  all  "minority"  lawyers,
or, even  more  generally,  as  part of an  investigation  of "minorities and  women"  in  the  profession.
See,  e.g.,  Carrie  Menkel-Meadow,  Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in the Law: Changes in the
Economics. Diversification  and Organizing  of Lawyering, 44 CASE W.  RES.  L.  REV.  621,  638  (1994)
(discussing  whether  "women  or  other  previously  excluded  groups"  are  likely  to  make  unique
contributions  to the profession because  of  their  status  as  "outsiders");  Rita  H.  Jensen,  Minorities
Didn't Share in Firm Growth, NAT'L  L.J., Feb.  19,  1990,  at  I;  Frederick  H.  Bates  &  Gregory  C.
Whitehead,  Do Something Different: Making a Commitment  to Minority Lawyers,  A.B.A.  1,  Oct.
1990, at 78.  Although  there are important similarities between the experiences  of black  lawyers  and
others  who  historically  have been  denied  full  participation  in  the profession,  important  differences
nevertheless  remain-differences  that  are  likely  to  affect  black  advancement  in  the  law  and
elsewhere.  See, e.g., ANDREW  HACKER,  Two NATIONS:  BLACK  AND  WHITE,  SEPARATE,  HOSTILE,
UNEQUAL  5-28  (1992)  (discussing  the  persistence  and  pervasiveness  of  racial  stereotypes-
particularly  those concerning intellectual inferiority-directed  against blacks as  opposed  to members
of other groups).  Empirical  studies of the legal  profession  that disaggregate  data  for  women  and
various  minority lawyers  confirm this supposition.  See,  e.g.,  Chambliss,  supra note  7  (discussing
several  significant  differences  among women,  blacks,  Hispanics, and Asians);  1 REPORT  OF  THE
NEw  YORK  STATE  JUDICIAL  COlM'N  ON  MINORITIES  74-113  (1991)  [hereinafter  N.Y.  REPORT].
Nevertheless,  because much of the data discussing  diversity issues in this area is not disaggregated  by
race or gender, we  are  sometimes  forced  to rely  on  statistics  about  "minorities"  as  a  surrogate  for
information  about blacks.  See,  e.g.,  infra notes  19,  391  and  accompanying  text.  This aggregation
makes it particularly  difficult to investigate the unique experiences  of  black women.
Second, by  focusing on the problems of blacks in corporate  firms, we do  not mean to  convey the
impression  that these institutions are either typical of, or more important  than,  other settings in which
black  lawyers  work.  See  BARBARA  A.  CURRAN  &  CLARA  N.  CARSON,  SUPPLEMENT  TO  THE
LAWYER  STATISTICAL  REPORT:  THE  U.S.  LEGAL  PROFESSION  IN  1988,  at  21  (1991)  (noting  that
firms of more than  100 lawyers comprise less than  10% of the profession);  Wilkins,  Two Paths, supra
note 8, at 1991-92 (noting that corporate law may not be the best arena  for  black  lawyers  to pursue
social justice).  Instead, we simply assert  that, given that these  institutions  sit atop  the economic  and
status hierarchy of the profession, society ought to care whether  blacks  are  systematically  less likely
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firms.  Second,  we hypothesize  that  this  underrepresentation  is  due  in
part to the way in which  the structural  characteristics  of corporate  firms
shape the strategic choices  of black lawyers.  In Sections A and  B of this
part, we justify both assumptions.  In Section C, we explain why  we have
chosen as  a preliminary  matter  to  bracket  questions  regarding  affirma-
tive action.
A.  Are Blacks Underrepresented  in Corporate  Firms?
One's  feeling  about  the  progress  made  by  large  corporate  law
firms in hiring  and retaining black lawyers  is  likely  to  be  influenced  by
the time frame one  selects  to  examine  the  problem.  Looking  from  the
perspective  of the corporate  bar in the  late  1960s,  the  numbers  might
look  relatively  good.  Thus,  when Erwin  Smigel  conducted  his famous
study of Wall Street firms  in  the  1960s,  he reported  that "[i]n  the year
and  a half that was  spent  interviewing,  I  heard  of  only  three  Negroes
who had been hired by large law firms.  Two of these  were women  who
did  not meet the client."'3  Integration  did  not  come  much  sooner  in
other  parts of the country. 4  Compared  to  this  dreary  portrait,  recent
numbers  seem  impressive.  For example,  the National Law Journal  re-
ports that as of 1995 there were  more  than  1,641  blacks  working  in  the
nation's 250 largest  firms, of whom 351  were partners. 5
Viewed against  the rapid  expansion  in  corporate  firms  during  the
last twenty-five  years and the dramatic growth in the  number  of women
lawyers  working in  this area, the foregoing  numbers are  a good deal  less
inspiring.'6  Thus,  although  there  has been  a  significant  growth  in  the
absolute number  of black  lawyers  in  corporate  firms,  the  percentages
remain  microscopically  small.  The  same  1996  National Law Journal
survey reveals that blacks constituted just 2.4%  of the  lawyers  in  corpo-
rate firms, and, more importantly, just over one percent  of the  partners. 7
These  percentages  have  remained  relatively  constant  for  the  last  15
13.  ERWIN  0.  SMIGEL,  THE WALL  STREET LAWYER:  PROFESSIONAL  ORGANIZATIONAL  MAN?
45 (1969).
14.  See GERALDINE  R.  SEGAL,  BLACKS  IN  THE  LAW:  PHILADELPHIA  AND  THE  NATION  215-
16 (1983)  (reporting that  before  the  mid-1970s,  only  a  handful  of black  lawyers  worked  in private
firms).
15.  Ann  Davis,  Big Jump in Minority Associates, But.... NAT'L L.J.,  April  29,  1996,  at  1;
Claudia MacLachIan  & Rita H. Jensen, Progress  Glacial  for Women,  Minorities,  NAT'L  L.., Jan.  27,
1992,  at 1, 31  (reporting that in 1991,  there were  1,311 black lawyers of 287 were  partners).
16.  On the growth of large law firms,  and  possible reasons  for  this growth,  see  infra note  109
and  accompanying  text.  For  a  comparison  of the  progress  of  women  and  blacks,  see  Jensen,
supra note 12, at I (comparing limited progress by minorities with substantial  progress by women).
17.  Davis,  supra note  15,  at  1;  see Robert  L. Nelson,  The  Futures of American  Lawyers: A
Demographic  Profile of a Changing  Profession in a Changing  Society, 44 CASE W.  RES.  L  REV.  345,
379  (1994) (reporting that among 250 largest law firms only 2.2% of associates and  0.9% of  partners
were  black).
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years."  Moreover,  these percentages  lag behind those achieved by other
legal  employers.  For example,  minorities  constitute  17.2%  of the  law-
yers  employed  by  federal,  state, and  local  government  agencies  in  the
Chicago metropolitan  area, as compared  to the 3.6%  of the attorneys  in
large  Chicago  firms. 9  At higher  levels,  the  comparison  is  even  more
lopsided.  Minority  lawyers  occupy  19.5%  of the supervisory  positions
in these government offices  as compared  to  1.6%  of the partnerships  at
large Chicago  firms. 0  Indeed,  although the contrast is less dramatic, law
firms  have also  failed  to  equal  the  success  achieved  by  some  of their
corporate clients.  Blacks  occupy 2.5% percent of all of the executive  or
management  level jobs  in private  sector industries-still  well below the
percentage  of blacks  in  the general  population,  but  more  than  double
the percentage  of blacks who are  partners in  elite firms.2'  In  certain  in-
dustries, black men and  women have done  significantly  better.  For ex-
ample,  in  the  communications  industry,  black  men  hold  3.7%  of  all
executive,  administrative,  and  managerial  positions,  while black  women
occupy  an  additional  4.9%,  bringing  the  total  black  participation  to
8.6%. 2
Standing  alone,  however,  statistics can  not  answer the  question  of
whether  blacks  are underrepresented  in corporate  firms.  To  reach  an
informed  judgment  on  this issue,  one  must  have  some  idea  about  the
number  of blacks  in the pool  of  people  who  are  qualified  to  become
corporate lawyers.  Once  again,  one's  vantage point  is key.  For exam-
ple,  if the relevant  pool  is all law school  graduates,  there is little  doubt
that blacks  are  seriously  underrepresented  in  corporate  firms,  particu-
larly  at the partnership  level.  Since  the mid-1970s,  blacks  have consis-
tently constituted  more  than  six percent  of the students  enrolled  in  law
school-a percentage far higher than the current  African American  rep-
18.  In  1981,  the  percentages  for  black  associates  and  partners  were  2.3%  and  0.47%
respectively;  in 1989, 2.22% and  0.91%.  Jensen,  supra note  12,  at 28.  In  1991,  the corresponding
percentages  were  2.0 and  1.1.  MacLachlan  & Jensen,  supra note  15,  at 31.  Elizabeth  Chambliss
reports  comparable  numbers  for  her  sample  of  large  law  firms  between  1980  and  1990.  See
Chambliss, supra note 7, at 76.  Given the increase in the size  and  number of corporate  firms  during
this  period, one might have  expected  more than  a  proportionate  increase  in  the  number  of black
lawyers,  particularly  given their stark underrepresentation  in the past.  See Knapp  & Grover,  supra
note 6, at 302-03.  As we argue below, the percentage increase between  1991 and  1995 is most  likely
due to the adoption of goals  and  timetables for  minority hiring and  promotion in several  cities.  See
infra  notes  32-33, 403-404 and accompanying text.
19.  Harvey Berkman,  Government Tops Firms  in Building Diversity, CHI.  LAW.,  July 1993, at 1.
This is one of many examples  where the data on minorities is not disaggregated  by race.
20.  Id.
21.  See GLASS  CEILING  REPORT,  supra note 4, at 77.
22.  Id. at 79.  Blacks  in  the  insurance  and  business  services  industries  have  also  reached
executive  or managerial  levels in greater numbers  than  their counterparts  in  corporate  law  practice
(in insurance, 6.2% total, 3.2% for black men and 3.0% for black women;  in business services,  4.0%
total, 3.5% for black men and 0.5% for black women).  Id.
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resentation  among  law firm  associates and  partners  cited  above, even  if
one  adjusts  for  the  time  it took  for  these  newcomers  to  enter  the  sys-
tem.23
Many  would  assert, however, that the population  of all  law  school
graduates  is not the relevant pool.  Traditionally,  corporate  firms  have
hired  most of their incoming  associates from  elite  law schools,  such  as
Harvard and Yale. 4  In addition, those who secure jobs  in this sector  of-
ten  have  other  traditional  signals  of  academic  success,  such  as  high
grades, law review  memberships,  and judicial clerkships.5
As we indicate  in Part II,  the claim  that  law firms  have  always em-
ployed a set of meritocratic hiring  criteria  that limit the eligible  pool  to
elite law school  graduates  at the top  of their  class  is belied  by  the  his-
torical  record.26  Even if one accepts  this  basic  definition  of the  relevant
pool, however, blacks may still be underrepresented.  Thus,  Robert  Nel-
son reported in  1988  that the percentage  of minority  students  attending
the leading law  schools from which corporate  firms generally  recruit "is
considerably  higher  than the proportion  of minorities  among  even  the
youngest  cohorts  of lawyers  in  firms."'27
More importantly,  whatever the  traditional  patterns  of law firm  re-
cruitment  were, the tremendous  growth  in  the  size of  these  institutions
during the last twenty-five years  has  resulted  in a significant  expansion
in the schools from  which firms  interview  and recruit.  For example,  in
Nelson's  study  of  Chicago  corporate  firms,  only  18.4%  of  incoming
23.  See Ken Myers, Statistics  Show Minorities Have Bigger Share of Lower Enrollment, NAT'L
LJ.,  Mar. 22,  1993,  at 4  (reporting that blacks  constitute  6.7%  of law  students);  see also Lewis  A.
Komhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Legal Education and Entry into the Legal Profession: The Role of
Race, Gender, and Educational  Debt, 70 N.Y.U. L.  REV.  829, 862-63  (1995)  (reporting  that  "in  1991
African-Americans  and Latinos  were still only 4.3% of associates at elite law firms, even though  they
comprised  8.7%  of individuals  graduating  from  law  school  between  1984  and  1990 ....  [T]he
underrepresentation  was even starker among partners.")  (footnotes omitted).
24.  See  MARC  GALANTER  &  THOMAS  PALAY,  TOURNAMENT  OF  LAWYERS:  THE
TRANSFORMATION  OF THE  BIG  LAW  FIRMS 24 (1991);  ROBERT L  NELSON,  PARTNERS  WITH  POWER:
THE SOCIAL  TRANSFORMATION  OF THE LARGE  LAW  FIRM  131-33  (1988).  Needless  to say,  exactly
which law schools qualify  for this designation  is a  matter  of some dispute-particularly  among  law
schools themselves.  Although  no list is therefore  uncontroversial,  for  purposes  of  this  study,  we
consider the following eleven  law schools to be elite:  Harvard, Yale, Stanford,  Boalt Hall (University
of California  at Berkeley),  University of Michigan,  New  York  University,  University  of  Virginia,
University of Chicago,  University  of  Pennsylvania,  Columbia,  and  Northwestern.  Cf  Chambliss,
supra  note 7, at 58 (using a list of thirteen schools).
25.  GALANTER  & PALAY,  supra  note 24, at 24.
26.  See infra notes  172-174 and accompanying  text.
27.  NELSON,  supra  note 24, at  131.  For example. Chambliss reports that minority  students  made
up  12%  to  18%  of classes  graduating  from  thirteen  elite  law  schools  between  1980  and  1990.
Chambliss, supra  note 7, at 80.  Neither Nelson nor Chambliss breaks  this information  down by  race
or provides data on class rank or other academic credentials.  Nevertheless, it is  clear  many  of these
students are black.  For example,  the  percentage  of blacks at Harvard  Law  School  increased  from
7.9% in  1980 to  10.5% today.  Leigh  Ann  Mort  and  Milton Moskowitz,  The Best  Law Schools for
Blacks, J.  OF BLACKS  IN HIGHER EDUCATION, Summer 1994, at 58.
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associates between  1970 and  1974 graduated from local or regional  law
schools."  Between  1975  and  1988,  that number had more than doubled
to  37.5%.29  Today, the hiring needs of elite corporate firms are  so great
that their demand  probably  could  not be  satisfied  if they  hired  every
graduate  in  the top half of the class from  the  nation's  top  twenty  law
schools."  A  definition  of  the  pool  that  includes  only  those  with
"traditional"  credentials,  therefore,  understates  the  relevant  employ-
ment market.
Finally,  even  if we could  accurately  identify  the  criteria  that  law
firms  actually  employ  in choosing  among  prospective  applicants,  these
criteria would  only  define the pool  of qualified applicants  (as opposed
to the pool of applicants with a realistic chance of being  selected)  to  the
extent  that  there  is  a  relatively  tight  correlation  between  these  signals
and  the skills that are necessary  to perform  the job  proficiently.  It  is
precisely this linkage, however, that many critics bitterly attack.3  In Part
II, we argue that there is merit to  this  criticism,  albeit for reasons  differ-
ent than those generally  advanced.  As a result, we assume that the pool
of "qualified"  applicants  is larger  than  current  hiring practices  would
lead one to believe, and,  correspondingly,  that blacks  are in  fact under-
represented.
Although  our  assumption  that blacks  are  underrepresented  cannot
entirely be separated from the merits of our theory, it is consistent with  a
broad array  of recent initiatives  designed to  increase  the number  of mi-
nority  lawyers in corporate  firms.  In  1986,  the  American  Bar Associa-
tion formed  the Commission  on Minorities  in  the Profession.  One  of
the  Commission's  central  goals  has  been  to  increase  corporate  law
firms'  hiring and retention  of minority  lawyers,  whom  the Commission
asserts are seriously underrepresented  in this sector.32  In  the intervening
decade,  at  least  thirteen  state,  county,  and  municipal  bar  associations
have launched  similar efforts.3
28.  NELSON,  supra note 24, at 133.
29.  Id.
30.  Howard I. Bernstein,  Does a Hiring Crisis Threaten the Profession?, NAT'L U., Dec.  28,
1987-Jan. 4,  1988,  at 20  (reporting that approximately  3,040  students  graduate  in the top halves  of
their classes from top-twenty law schools each year, while  in  1987,  4,807  associates  began  work at
the top 250 law firms).
31.  See, e.g., Knapp & Grover, supra note 6, at 305-06.
32.  See Bates  & Whitehead, supra  note  12, at 78 ("The ABA  Commission  on Opportunities  for
Minorities  in  the  Profession...  has  indicted  the  legal  community  for  its  failure  to  give  minority
lawyers  significant  roles  in  large  firms.");  AMERICAN  BAR  ASSOCIATION  COMMISSION  ON
MINORITIES  IN THE PROWSSIoN,  FIVE YEAR  REPORT (1991); see also Wilma J.W. Pinder, When Will
Black Women Lawyers Slay the Two-Headed Dragon: Racism and Gender Bias?, 20 PEPP.  L  REV.
1053,  1060 & n.16 (1993).
33.  See  COMMITTEE  ON  MINORITY  EMPLOYMENT,  THE  BAR  ASSOCIATION  OF  SAN
FRANCISCO,  1993  INTERIM  REPORT:  GOALS  AND  TIMETABLES  FOR  MINORITY  HIRING  AND
ADVANCEMENT  37  (1993)  [hereinafter  S.F.  REPORT]  (listing the following  organizations  as  having
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In the absence of definitive information  about current  practices and
the relationship  between  those  practices  and  the  substantive  qualifica-
tions  for  being  a successful  corporate  lawyer,"  it seems prudent  to  ac-
cept the opinion of these knowledgeable  insiders that a problem  does  in
fact exist.  This  is particularly  so in  light of the  fact,  as we  explain  in
Part II, that the underrepresentation  hypothesis  is  consistent  with  what
one would expect  to see given the institutional  structure and  practices  of
large  firms.  Before  presenting  that  analysis,  however,  it  is  necessary
briefly  to  examine  three  competing  explanations  for  the relative  short-
age of blacks  in corporate firms  that would  minimize  (or in  some cases
deny) the importance of the institutional features  we discuss.
B.  Why Study Institutions and Incentives?
One can  usefully  divide  the competing  explanations  for  black  un-
derrepresentation  in  corporate  firms  into  three  categories:  (1)  that
blacks and whites  have differential  abilities;  (2)  that blacks  are less  in-
terested in corporate work;  and (3)  pervasive racism on  the part of indi-
viduals within the firms  or of the firms  themselves.  Although  each  of
these theories  advances  our understanding  of  the  variation  we  see  be-
tween the success  rates  of blacks  and  whites  in  these  institutions,  each
begs important  questions  that must  be  answered  if one is to  have  a full
explanation  of this phenomenon.  The institutional perspective  we advo-
cate helps to fill in  these crucial  gaps.  It also  responds  to  the concerns
of those scholars and  policy  makers  who  are  skeptical  that race  contin-
ues to be  a significant obstacle for black  Americans,  and  who  doubt  the
efficacy  of group-based  policies to promote workplace  integration.
1.  Differential  Abilities
Those who emphasize  the importance  of the  traditional  credentials
for being hired by a corporate  law firm  often  implicitly  rely  on  empiri-
cal assumptions about the differential  abilities  of black  and  white appli-
cants.  These  arguments  come  in  two quite  different  forms.  The  first
claims  that blacks  are inherently  inferior  to  whites  in  terms  of  one  or
established  hiring  and  promotion  goals:  New  York  City  Bar  Association,  San  Francisco  Bar
Association, Boston Law Firm Group, Chicago Bar Association,  Cleveland  Minority  Partners'  Group,
Colorado  Law  Firm Group,  Connecticut Law  Firm  Group,  District of Columbia  Bar,  Hispanic  Bar
Association  of  Houston,  Los  Angeles  County  Bar  Association,  New  Jersey  Law  Firm  Group,
Philadelphia Bar Association,  and  Arizona  State  Bar).  In  addition,  at  least  thirteen  states  have
established task forces  to study racial  and  ethnic  bias  in their court systems.  Suellyn  Scarnecchia,
State Responses to Task Force Reports on Race and Ethnic Bias in the Courts, 16  HAMLINE  L  Rv.
923,  923  &  n.2  (1993)  (listing  Arizona,  California,  Connecticut,  Florida,  Hawaii,  Iowa,
Massachusetts,  Michigan, Minnesota,  North Dakota,  New  Jersey,  New York,  Oregon,  Washington,
and the District of Columbia).
34.  On the general  weakness of the existing data on  the actual  practices of corporate  firms,  see
infra notes  164-167 and accompanying text.
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more attributes,  for example intelligence, necessary  for success  in  a cor-
porate  firm.3  The  second  approach  rejects  the claim  that  blacks  are
fundamentally  inferior  to  whites  (genetically  or  otherwise),  but  asserts
that  they  nevertheless  have  acquired  less  of the  human  capital  assets
(that is, education, work  skills, etc.)  that it takes  to succeed  in  this envi-
ronment than their white peers.31
Like  most  others  of  good  will,  we reject  the  first  of  these  argu-
ments.  Although  a complete  statement  of the fallacy  of this position  is
beyond  the scope  of this Article,  as others  have demonstrated  in pains-
taking  detail, the argument  for innate  or even deeply  embedded  racial
differences  in  intelligence  or any  other  relevant  quality. is based  on  ei-
ther  pseudo-science  or  quasi-racist  premises.37  As  we  indicate  below,
however, the persistent myth of black intellectual  inferiority  continues  to
play  an  important  role  in  shaping  both  the opportunities  available  to
and the choices made by black lawyers.
The  second  variation  on  this  theme,  however,  cannot  be  so  easily
dismissed.  As  we indicate  in  Part III, there is little reliable  information
on  the relative  attributes  and  performance  of black  and  white  law  stu-
dents and lawyers.  Nevertheless, there is reason to suspect that black law
school graduates  may  on average  have fewer of the traditional  markers
of academic  success than  their white counterparts."  Once  again,  it  re-
mains  an  open  question  whether  these  differences  in credentials  reflect
actual  differences  in human capital that are likely to  affect performance.
But even assuming that there is a significant  correlation,  we still need  to
know why blacks invest less in their own development.  We posit that the
answer to this question is likely to  depend  upon  the opportunities  black
lawyers face and the likelihood that investing in certain  kinds  of human
35.  See,  e.g.,  DINESH  D'SouZA,  THE  END  OF  RACISM:  PRINCIPLES  FOR  A  MULTIRACIAL
SOCIETY  431-76  (1995)  (arguing  that  IQ  differences,  whether  caused  by  genetics  or  long-term
environmental  factors,  are  an important  part  of the reason  that  blacks  do  not  succeed  in  certain
settings);  RICHARD  HERRNSTEIN  &  CHARLES  MURRAY,  THE  BELL  CURVE:  INTELLIGENCE  AND
CLASS STRUCTURE  IN AMERICAN  LIFE (1994)  (arguing that differences in IQ largely account  for  the
economic and  educational  differentials  between  blacks  and  whites); Linda S.  Gottfredson,  Societal
Consequences of the g Factor in Employment,  29  J.  VOCATIONAL  BEHAV.  379,  398-406  (1986)
(arguing  that in light of IQ  differences  between  blacks  and whites,  blacks  are  overrepresented  in
most well-paying and prestigious positions).
36.  See, e.g.,  GLENN  C. LOURY,  ONE  BY  ONE  FROM  THE  INSIDE  OUT:  ESSAYS  AND  REVIEWS
ON  RACE  AND  RESPONSIBILITY  IN  AMERICA  97  (1995)  (arguing  that income gaps  between  blacks
and whites  are now largely a matter of "supply  side" factors such  as  "poorer  quality  and  quantity of
education and work experience"  for black workers).  Loury goes  on to attribute  these  "supply  side"
differences  to  factors  that  are  similar to  those  we  discuss  below.  See  infra  notes  87-89  and
accompanying  text.
37.  For a small sampling of the critique of the scientific  and  normative assumptions  underlying
the work  of Hermstein  and  Murray,  among  others,  see  Stephen  J.  Gould,  Curveball, THE  NEw
YORKER,  Nov. 28,  1994, at 139; Leon J. Kamin, Behind the Curve, Sci. AM., Feb. 1995,  at 99; see also
RICHARD  LEWONTIN,  BIOLOGY  AS  IDEOLOGY  17-37  (1993).
38.  See RICHARD  L  ABEL, AMERICAN  LAWYERS  102-04 (1989).
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capital will significantly  improve  those  opportunities.  In  the world that
we study,  this  opportunity  calculus  will be  filtered  through  the  institu-
tional  practices  of large  law firms.  Understanding  these  practices  is
therefore  a  necessary  component  of  any  theory  that  seeks  to  explain
racial  differences  in  employment  on  the basis of a non-biological  the-
ory  of differential  ability.
2.  Lack of Interest
This explanation offers  an alternative account of why  blacks do  not
invest in  succeeding  at  corporate  law  firms,  one  based  in  preferences
rather than incentives.  According  to  this  line  of argument,  many  black
students  are uninterested in the work done by corporate law  firms.  Con-
sequently,  they  are  less likely  to  apply  to these  institutions  and, if they
do, leave after a relatively short time. 9  Once  again,  there  are reasons  to
suspect that this factor plays a contributing  role.  Black lawyers  are dis-
proportionately  concentrated  in  the government  and  the  not-for-profit
sector.'  In  addition,  given  the historical connection  between  the black
bar and the struggle  for racial justice, many  blacks  come  to  law school
intending to  use their  new skills to  advance  the interests  of the African
American  community. 4"  Corporate  law firms  are  not the obvious  arena
in which to pursue that goal.
Nevertheless,  the claim that blacks  are uninterested  in  corporate  law
firms is  not supported  by  the available  data.  In  their  study  of the  first
job choices of New York University  and  University  of Michigan  gradu-
ates, Kornhauser  and Revesz discovered  that after  adjusting  for  grades,
loans,  law  school  activities,  and  even  stated  preferences,  blacks  were
more likely to take jobs at corporate  law firms than  their  white counter-
parts.42  If anything, blacks appear to be more interested  in starting work
at a corporate firm than whites.
Moreover,  as Vicki Schultz  has  observed,  one  should  be  skeptical
of claims  that a particular  group  is  underrepresented  because  of  their
39.  See, e.g.,  N.Y.  REPORT,  supra note  12,  at  83  (suggesting  that  interviewers  assume  that
blacks are not interested in  private or business  practice  and  prefer  to work  in government  or other
public service);  S.F. REPORT, supra note 33,  at  17 ("There  was  some sentment  expressed  by  a few
managing  partners,  although  not stated  by  any  minority  interviewee,  that  minorities  don't  like
litigation or prefer  to work  in pro  bono  offices  or other  employement  where  their work  is more  in
sync with what managers perceive  to be their personal  politics.")
40.  See Nelson, supra note  17. at 379 (reporting that one study found black  lawyers  were  more
than twice as likely as white lawyers to work for the government);  J.  Clay  Smith,  Career  Patterns of
Black Lawyers in the 1980's, 7  BLACK  LJ. 75, 76  (1981)  (estimating that  in  1980,  32%  of  black
attorneys  were in government practice).
41.  See Wilkins, Social Engineers, supra note  8  (describing  how Thurgood  Marshell's  legacy
influences the current generation of black  law students and lawyers).
42.  See Kornhauser  & Revesz, supra note 23,  at 931-34  (finding that  African  American  and
Latino graduates are underrepresented  in 'non-elite for-profit  jobs and  overrepresented  both  in elite
for-profit jobs and in not-for-profit jobs).
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lack of interest---especially  where  the  group  has  previously  faced  ex-
press discriminatory  barriers  to  entry  and  the job  in  question  is  both
prestigious  and high paying.43  As Schultz  demonstrates,  firms  can  con-
struct  their  use  of labor  in  ways  that  will discourage  applicants  from
certain groups  from seeking these positions.  An understanding  of these
institutional practices is therefore  a necessary  precondition  to  explaining
why blacks  "choose"  careers  other than corporate law practice.
3.  Racism
To  say that firms  "construct"  their use of labor  in  a manner  that
disadvantages  blacks  sounds  as  if this  conduct  is  merely  racism  in  a
more  sophisticated  form.  Critics  of the  slow progress  towards  integra-
tion  in  various  sectors of the  economy  frequently  make  precisely  this
charge."  Although  many  of these  critics  do  not  equate  "institutional
racism" with  the intentional racism of individuals,  the two are  neverthe-
less often  closely  intertwined.  Thus,  scholars  who  discuss  institutional
racism generally  assert that those  who  design  and run  institutions  either
fail to police discriminatory  conduct by their  subordinates  and/or  adopt
facially  neutral practices with  at least the implicit knowledge  (if not the
express  intent) that these practices will disadvantage blacks. 45
Undoubtedly,  there  is  merit  in  the  institutional  racism  story.  As
study  after  study  demonstrates,  there  are  still  a substantial  number  of
whites who  hold  (consciously  or  unconsciously)  discriminatory  and/or
stereotypical views about blacks."  Scholars have put forward  a plethora
of theories to explain this continuing phenomenon,  including, inter alia,
that certain  whites have an  exogenous  "taste"  for  discrimination,  that
whites  employ  biased  stereotypes  when  evaluating  blacks  and  whites,
43.  See Schultz, supra  note 7.
44.  See,  e.g.,  GERTRUDE  EZORSKY,  RACISM  AND  JUSTICE:  THE  CASE  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION  9-10  (1991)  (arguing  that when  blacks  are  excluded  from  employment  because  they
disproportionately do not have the specific  training or experience  necessary  to perform  the job, the
resulting impact "is appropriately called racist impact").
45.  See, e.g, JAMES M. JONES,  PREJUDICE  AND  RACISM  131  (1972)  (discussing how  individual
intent contributes to institutional racism).
46.  See, e.g., PAUL  SNIDERMAN  & THOMAS  PIAZZA,  THE SCAR  OF RACE 64 (1993)  (reporting
that  "substantial  numbers  of  Americans  are  perfectly  willing  to  express  frankly  negative
characterizations  of blacks"  and  that "racial  stereotyping...  [is]  widely  diffused,  and ...  far from
uncommon');  JOE R.  FEAGIN  &  MELVIN  P.  SIKES,  LIVING  WITH RACISM:  THE  BLACK  MIDDLE-
CLASS  EXPERIENCE  177-80 (1994)  (describing customer and client  prejudice  against blacks);  Ronald
B.  Mincy,  The Urban Institute Audit Studies:  Their Research and Policy Context,  in  CLEAR  AND
CONVINCING  EVIDENCE:  MEASUREMENT  OF  DISCRIMINATION  IN  AMERICA  165  (Michael  Fix  &
Raymond J. Struyk eds.,  1993)  (documenting  instances  in which  employers treated  black applicants
substantially worse than  equally  qualified  whites); HACKER,  supra note  12,  at 107-33  (documenting
gaps  between  black  and  white employment levels  in numerous  fields  of  employment).  Cf. Clark
Nardinelli & Curtis Simon, Customer  Racial  Discrimination  in the Market for Memorabilia: The Case
of Baseball, 105 QJ. EcON.  575  (1990)  (documenting  race-based  premium  for  baseball  cards  of
white players).
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that whites judge individual blacks on  the  basis of the  average  statistical
achievements  of  blacks  as  a group,  that  the  preferences  of  customers
and/or workplace culture  impose additional  costs on  firms  that hire  and
promote  black  workers,  and  that  individual  whites  reward  actions  that
reinforce  the dominant  status of whites  as a group.47  Regardless  of the
cause, however, unless we have reason to believe that corporate law  firms
are immune to attitudes  and  beliefs  prevalent  in  the  rest of society,  it is
likely  that a non-trivial  number  of whites working  in  these  institutions
hold some of these views.48  As a result, one does not have to believe  that
overt  racism  is  widespread  in  elite  firms  to  conclude  that  these  often
subtle predispositions  are sufficient  to provide the grist for  the  dynamic
described  by  institutional  racism  theories.  Moreover,  to  the  extent  that
some  of the hiring  and  promotion  policies  followed  by  certain  corpo-
rate firms  bear little or  no  relation  to  the  substantive  qualifications  of
performing  the job  of  a  corporate  lawyer,  one  can  legitimately  ask
whether  these practices actually  serve a more invidious purpose.
Nevertheless,  the institutional  racism story,  at least in the relatively
straightforward  terms  in  which  it is usually  presented,  is at best  incom-
plete.  As a preliminary matter, this account is in tension with the  widely
accepted  fact that overt  racist  attitudes  are  on  the  decline,  particularly
among highly  educated  and economically  successful  whites.49  Nor  does
47.  See,  e.g.,  GARY  S.  BECKER,  THE  ECONOMICS  OF  DISCRIMINATION,  43  (2nd  ed.  1971)
(claiming  that discrimination  is a  result of a  "taste"  for  avoiding  association  with  people  of  other
races);  RICHARD  A.  POSNER,  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF  LAW  § 27.1  (3d ed.  1986)  (suggesting  that
some whites  wish not to associate with blacks);  Richard  MeAdams,  Cooperation and Conflict:  The
Economics of Group Status Production  and Race  Discrimination, 108  HARV.  L  REV.  1003,  1044
(1995)  (arguing  that discrimination  is a  means  for  social  groups to produce  status for  themselves);
Charles  R.  Lawrence  III,  The Id, the  Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning  with  Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317  (1987)  (connecting  unconscious racism  with the  cultural  meaning  of
an  allegedly  racially  discriminatory  act);  Edmund  S.  Phelps,  The Statistical Theory  of Racism  and
Sexism, 62 AM.  ECON. REV. 659 (1972)  (describing  statistical  discrimination);  Cass  R.  Sunstein,  Why
Markets Don't Stop Discrimination, 8  Soc.  PHIL.  &  POL'Y  22  (1991)  (detailing  how  markets
perpetuate discrimination).
48.  See SNIDERMAN  & PIAZZA, supra note 46, at 51  (reporting  that "notwithstanding  the role
of societal institutions like formal education in reducing the prevalence of negative racial stereotypes,
negative  stereotypes  of  blacks  character  are  widely  diffused  through  contemporary  American
society").  We  provide support  for  Sniderman  and  Piazza's  conclusions  in the  context  of elite  law
firms in Part III.
49.  See  HOWARD  SCHUMAN  ET  AL.,  RACIAL  ATTITUDES  IN  AMERICA  (1985)  (reporting  that
virtually  100%  of whites  say  that blacks  and  whites should have  an  equal  chance  to compete  for
jobs); cf Michael Selmi, Testing  for Equality: Merit,  Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42
UCLA L  REV.  1251,  1283-84  (1995)  ("When  the  discrimination  is subtle  or  unconscious,  even  a
non-discriminating  employer may not be able to identify and  correct  the  resulting  inefficiencies ....
[S]tereotypes  stem  from the  inability  of individuals  to  internalize  the  social  norms  to  which  they
openly ascribe so that while individuals proclaim they are  not prejudiced  their  actions often  indicate
otherwise.").
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it explain  why  many  firms  have  adopted  voluntary  affirmative  action
programs  or taken  other  steps to increase the number of black lawyers.5"
More fundamentally,  the institutional  racism story  does not  explain
why firms  neither change  institutional  practices  in the face  of evidence
that they  disproportionately  burden  blacks.  Nor, in a world without  de
jure barriers  to  hiring  blacks,  can these  theories  explain  why  firms  do
not suffer a significant competitive  disadvantage as a result of their fail-
ure  to  utilize  black  workers  who,  although  not  meeting  the
"discriminatory"  traditional  criteria,  are  nevertheless  fully  competent  to
perform the job.  In order to answer these questions,  one must  construct
a richer account  of the actual  structure  and  operation  of corporate  law
firms  than  the  ones  generally  offered  by  institutional  racism  theorists.
As we explain below, continuing racism-as  well as a host of other  atti-
tudes,  dispositions,  and  beliefs  that tend  to  make  it  more  difficult  for
whites and  blacks  to  live and  work together  as equals-is  an important
component  of this account.'  These individual  attitudes,  however, are  at
least  in part the product  of the manner  in  which  firms  hire, train,  and
monitor their employees.  It is in the interplay  between  these  structual
factors  and  background  assumptions  about  race  and  merit, we  assert,
that one must look for the answer to the question posed  in this Article.
4.  Preaching to the Unconverted2
Notwithstanding  the evidence cited  in  the preceding  Section, many
academics  and policymakers  are skeptical about claims that race  contin-
ues to play a significant  role  in impeding  the progress  of black  Ameri-
cans.  Building  on  the  indisputable  evidence  that  outright  racial
prejudice is on the wane,  these  skeptics  are inclined  to  attribute  dispari-
50.  See  D'SOUZA,  supra  note  35,  at  291  (claiming  that  "racial  preferences  are  now
widespread  in private sector job hiring");  Edward  A.  Adams,  Survey  Shows  Diversity  at Firms Still
Lagging, N.Y. L.J.,  Mar. 29, 1995, at 1, 4.
51.  It is possible, of course, to classify all of these complex  attitudes, dispositions, and beliefs  as
"racist."  We reject this  characterization on the ground that it conflates  cause and effect in  a manner
that devalues  the  moral approbation  that ought to accompany  this charge.  Racism  is,  and ought to
remain, a serious charge applicable to those who consciously or unconsciously seek to devalue blacks
because of the color of their skin.  It should not be confused with the fact that in light of this  country's
racist  past,  virtually  all  Americans  view  each  other  through  the  prism  of  stereotypes  and
predispositions that are deeply  connected to race.  As  we argue, these stereotypes  and  predispositions
disadvantage  certain  blacks  in  particular  circumstances.  We  therefore  focus  attention  on  this
historical legacy by identifying how these racialized  attitudes intersect with institutional structures and
practices  in ways  that reinforce  existing  inequalities.  It  is precisely  because  we  believe  that  the
majority  of those  who  are  participating  in  these  structures  are  not  racists  that  we  believe  that
identifying this institutional dynamic might induce firms to change their behavior.
52.  We are indebted to our friend and mentor Steve Shavell  for emphasizing the need  to frame
our arguments  in the language of those likely to be skeptical  about both our description  of the problem
and the range of potential solutions.  We hasten to add that by thanking Steve we do not mean to imply
that he has been converted to our point of view.
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ties between blacks and whites to a lack of effort on the  part of blacks.53
As a result, those who hold these  views tend  to oppose public and private
efforts  to redress  racial  imbalance  on  the grounds  that  these  initiatives
are  both unnecessary,  since blacks  could  solve their  own  problems  by
working  harder  to conform  to  traditional  American  values,  and  costly,
because they  will inevitably  lower standards  in  a manner  that  decreases
productivity and  increases costs.-'
The  institutional  analysis  we propose  speaks  directly  to these  con-
cerns.  As  we  explain  in  Part II,  we  begin  by  accepting  two  central
premises  generally  associated  with conservative  thought:  that  the  prac-
tices and policies  of elite corporate  firms  are  a rational  response  to  the
market  conditions  within  which these  firms  compete  for  labor  and  cli-
ents,  and  that  individuals  within  firms  (and  those  considering  joining
them) respond  rationally  to the incentives  created  by  these  institutional
structures.55  We hope  to  demonstrate,  however,  that  these  institutional
structures  are  less directly  connected  to productivity  than  conservatives
seem to believe,  and  that they  create incentives  for  blacks  that  are  con-
trary  to  the  values  and  objectives  that  conservatives  wish  to  further.
Such a showing, we  believe,  should  help  to  move  the debate over black
participation  in elite sectors of the economy  away from  the current  im-
pass created  by  conclusory  charges  about  whether  racism  is  or  is  not
widespread  in  contemporary  American  society.  In  order to  do  so, how-
ever, we must temporarily  bracket the most  contentious  issue in  this  de-
bate-affirmative  action.
C.  Affirmative Action
Any  examination  of black underrepresentation  in  corporate  firms
must inevitably confront the issue of affirmative action.  This  is true for
two  reasons.  First, the level of affirmative  action  in  law  school  admis-
sions, law review memberships,  firm hiring,  and  other  relevant  decisions
affects the definition of the pool of qualified  applicants.  Second, judg-
ments  about  this first issue are  likely  to be  affected  by  normative  and
53.  See, e.g.,  SNIDERMAN  & PIAZZA,  supra note 46, at 41 (reporting that nearly  50% of whites
surveyed agreed with the proposition that "if blacks would  only try harder, they would be just as well
off as whites").
54.  See,  e.g.,  D'SouZA,  supra  note  35.  See  generally,  RICHARD  EPSTEIN,  FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS:  THE  CASE  AGAINST  EMPLOYMENT  DISCRIMINATION  LAWS  (1992)  (arguing  that anti-
discrimination laws are both unfair and inefficient).
55.  Indeed, by characterizing  institutions and individuals  as "rational"  we  risk alienating  many
of those who  might otherwise  be sympathetic  to our basic  conclusions  but  who  are  suspicious  of
"rational  actor"  models.  Thus, a subsidiary  aim  of  our  analysis  is  to  convince  progressives  that
discussions of rationality  and  the market in the context  of the microanalysis  of institutions  need  not
deny  the importance  of culture,  ideology, discourse,  or emotion.  See  Rubin,  supra  note  10.  We
sketch out this synthesis  below.  See  infra notes  64-69  and accompanying  text.  We  are  grateful  to
Reva Siegel for pressing us on this point.
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factual  claims  about  the fairness  and/or efficacy  of  various  affirmative
action policies.
Judgements  about both  of  these  issues  have  become  increasingly
controversial.  As  to the first, perceptions  vary  widely about  the degree
to which schools, organizations,  firms,  and  other relevant  decision  mak-
ers actually  give some form of preference to black applicants,  with some
claiming that such  preferences  are pervasive  while others  assert that af-
firmative efforts  to help blacks are much more  apparent than  real. 6  In-
deed,  there  is  very  little  consensus  on  what  constitutes  "affirmative
action"  or whether  policies  that might  fall  under  this rubric  are  prop-
erly  considered  as  a "preference"  for  black  applicants  as opposed  to  a
mechanism for giving blacks  the  same  "preferences"  as whites.  This
last debate merely underscores  the deep divisions  in the American pub-
lic over whether affirmative action  policies are a proper response  to past
and/or present racism or an illegitimate racial  spoils system  that inevita-
bly ends  up harming everyone including its  intended beneficiaries.
58
Given  this  construction  the  debate  is  irresolvable.  There  is  very
little reliable  data  on  the  actual  extent  of  affirmative  action  (however
defined)  in corporate  firms.  Moreover,  so  long  as this  empirical  ques-
tion is tied to background  assumptions about the  extent  to  which blacks
are  disproportionately  disadvantaged  (or  whites  are  unfairly  advan-
taged) by other aspects of the  system, the information  that does  exist is
unlikely  to  sway those who  hold different normative presuppositions.
In order to  avoid this quagmire,  we have chosen  to  break  the issue
down into its component parts.  Thus, in Part II  we examine  the choices
that firms  and  blacks  make in  a world  in which firms  have  no  specific
policies  designed to increase  the number of black lawyers. 9  We hold  to
56.  Compare D'SouZA,  supra  note  35,  with  Daniel  G.  Lugo,  Don't Believe  the  Hype:
Affirmative Action in Large Law Firms, 11  LAW & INEQ. J. 615, 626  (1993).
57.  See, e.g.,  IAN  HANEY  LOPEZ, WHITE  BY  LAW:  THE LEGAL  CONSTRUCTION  OF  RACE  157-
59 (1995)  (describing the benefits that whites receive simply  by not having  to think of themselves in
racialized  terms);  LEE  SIGELMAN  &  SUSAN  WELCH,  BLACK  AMERICANS'  VIEWS  OF  RACIAL
INEQUALITY:  THE DREAM  DEFERRED  134 (1991)  (arguing  that  many  "blacks  and  whites  actually
define affirmative action differently").
58.  For examples of arguments in favor of affirmative action laws, see PATRICIA  J.  WILLIAMS,
THE ALCHEMY  OF RACE  AND  RIGHTS  103  (1991)  ("'Quotas,'  'preference,'  'reverse  discrimination,'
.experienced,'  and  'qualified'  are  con  words ....  As  a  society,  we  have  yet  to  look  carefully
beneath  them to see where the seeds of prejudice  are  truly hidden.");  Alan Farnham,  Holding Firm
on  Affirmative  Action,  FORTUNE,  Mar.  13,  1989,  at  87.  For  examples  of  arguments  against
affirmative action laws, see Stuart Taylor, Jr., Clinton and the Quota Game: Round One, LEG.  TIMES,
Dec.  28,  1992,  at 23  (discussing  firms  labeled  as  discriminators,  whose  "only  sin is hiring the best
employees  they  can  find");  D'SOUZA,  supra note 35,  at 545 (arguing  that affirmative  action  laws
perpetuate a system  of race-consciousness).
59.  Notwithstanding this assumption,  we  do not rule out  the  possibility  that  individual  whites
within corporate  firms might make  special  efforts  to recruit  or retain  black  lawyers.  As with  our
treatment of discrimination  in general,  we simply assume that the attitudes of white corporate  lawyers
mirror the attitudes  about race in American  society as a whole.
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this  assumption  in  Part  III  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  many  of  the
firms  we discuss  have taken  at least  some  affirmative  steps  to  increase
the number  of black  associates and  partners.  Given  that  these  efforts
should reduce the adverse  effects  on  black lawyers  that  our  model  pre-
dicts, however, we feel justified  in  making  this  counterfactual  assump-
tion,  particularly  in  the  absence  of  reliable  data  on  the  extent  and
effectiveness  of law firm affirmative  action  policies.  In Part IV, we ex-
amine how affirmative action  (along with a range  of other  legal, institu-
tional,  and public  policies)  might  affect  the  strategic  choices  that  our
model  predicts.
II
THE  MODEL:  MONITORING  AMONG  THE  HUMAN  CAPITALISTS
Scholars  have offered  a number  of  theories  to  explain  the  devel-
opment  and  functioning  of  large  law firms.  The  earliest  emphasized
that law firms  are professional  organizations,  and  sought  to  explain  in-
stitutional practices  in  terms  of norms  such  as competence,  collegiality,
and client service."  Subsequent theorists  criticized  these early  explana-
tions  by  arguing  that  "professionalism"  was  merely  the  label  under
which law firms pursued their economic  self-interest.6'  The  hard-edged
economic  determinism  of these theories  has  in  turn  been  criticized  by
those who point to aspects of firm  structure  or practice  that cannot  eas-
ily  be  explained  by  short-term  (or  even  long-term)  financial  gain.62
Nevertheless,  there  is now an  influential  body  of  scholarship  applying
the tools  of economic  analysis  to  explain  why  lawyers as  rational  eco-
nomic agents might  choose  to  organize  themselves  into  large  law firms
with the characteristics that we presently  observe. 63
60.  The most famous such defense was offered by Erwin Smigel.  See  SMIGEL,  supra note  13;
Erwin Smigel, The Impact of Recruitment on the Organization  of the Large Law Firm, 25  AM.  Soc.
REV.  56 (1960).  Smigel's work  was  in  the  tradition  of structural/functionalists,  such  as  Talcott
Parsons, who believed  that institutional structures  are  driven  by  the functions  they  were  designed to
implement.  See Robert L. Nelson & David  M.  Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The Professional
Ideologies  of Lawyers in Context, in LAWYERS'  IDEALs/LAWYERS'  PRACTICES:  TRANSFORMATIONS  IN
THE  AMERICAN  LEGAL  PROFESSION  177  (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds.,  1992).
61.  Richard Abel has been the leading exponent of this point of view.  See ABEL, supra note 38;
Richard L. Abel,  Why Does the ABA  Promulgate  Ethical Rules?, 59 TEx.  L  REV.  639 (1981).  Abel's
work  builds  on  the  work  of  Magali  Sarfatti  Larson.  See  MAGALI  S.  LARSON,  THE  RISE  OF
PROFESSIONALISM:  A SOCIOLOGICAL  ANALYSIS  (1977).
62.  See,  e.g.,  Robert W.  Gordon,  The  Independence of Lawyers, 68  B.U.  L  REV.  1 (1988)
(discussing professional  independence and the social factors that affect it); William  H.  Simon, Babbit
v.  Brandeis:  The  Decline  of  the  Professional Ideal,  37  STAN.  L  REV.  565  (1985)  (positing
professional idealism as an explanation  for firm behavior).
63.  See,  e.g.,  GALANTER  &  PALAY,  supra note  24;  Ronald  J. Gilson  & Robert  H. Mnookin,
Sharing  Among the Human Capitalists:  An Economic Inquiry Into the Corporate  Law Firm and How
Partners Split Profits, 37  STAN.  L  REV.  313  (1985)  [hereinafter  Gilson  & Mnookin,  Human
Capitalists];  Ronald  J. Gilson  & Robert  H.  Mnookin,  Coming of Age  in a Corporate  Law Firm: The
Economics of Associate Career Patterns,  41  STAN.  L  REV.  567  (1989)  [hereinafter  Gilson  &
[Vol.  84:493WHY ARE THERE SO FEW BLACK LA WYERS
Our  model  builds  on  these  efforts, but in  a  way  that  incorporates
the importance  of professional  ideology,  social  capital,  and  inequality
captured by the critics  of economic  determinism.'  Like those who  have
applied  economic  theory  to  understand  professional  practices,  we  as-
sume that lawyers,  law firms,  and  clients  are  rational  actors  who seek  to
maximize their own interests.  It is important,  however, to  stress the lim-
its of this standard economic  assumption.  First, building on the work of
Herbert  Simon, we assume  that rationality  is bounded by  the  informa-
tion an actor receives and by that actor's ability  to  understand  and  con-
vey  this information  to  others. 5  Second,  the  "interests"  these  market
participants  pursue are primarily-but  not exclusively-monetary.  For
example,  individual  lawyers  and  firms  compete  for  relative  status  or
prestige  in  ways that may  or may not  be reducible  to monetary  gain.66
Third, as  Robert Nelson's  study  of corporate  law firms  in  Chicago  un-
derscores, even when these entities wish to maximize  their economic  in-
terests, professional  ideology  and  culture  may  restrict  their  ability  to
perceive  and  or implement  institutional  policies  likely  to  achieve  these
goals  efficiently. 7  Similarly,  "the  social  capital  that  lawyers  bring  to
Mnookin,  Coming of Age];  S.S.  Samuelson  &  L. Fahey,  Strategic Planning for Law Firms: The
Application  of  Management Theory,  52  U.  PirrT.  L  REv.  435  (1991);  S.S.  Samuelson,  The
Organizational Structure of Law Firms: Lessons From Management Theory, 51  OHIO  ST.  L.J.  645
(1990);  S.S. Samuelson & LJ.  Jaffe, A Statistical Analysis of  Lmv  Firm Profitability, 70 B.U.  L. REV.
185  (1990).  This literature is part of a wider trend toward applying  economic  principles  to the study
of the legal  profession  in particular  and  law  and  legal  institutions more  generally.  See,  e.g.,  Louis
Kaplow  & Stephen Shavell, Legal Advice  About Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and
Social Desirability, 102  HARV.  L  REv.  565  (1989);  Stephen McG.  Bundy  & Einer R. Elhauge,  Do
Lawyers Improve the Adversary System? A  General  Theory of Litigation  Advice and Its Regulation, 79
CALIF.  L  REV. 313  (1991).
64.  See Rubin, supra note  10, at 1424 (arguing  for  a  new  methodology that would "merge  the
'hard'  social  science of economics  with the 'soft'  social sciences of organization theory  and  political
analysis").
65.  See  HERBERT  A.  SIMON,  ADMINISTRATIVE  BEHAVIOR  xxiv-xxxvii  (2d ed.  1961).  For a
discussion of the importance of this concept, see Rubin, supra note  10,  at 1414,  1426-27.
66.  For example, in their study of the Chicago bar, Heinz and Laumann  report both that lawyers
value  collective projects  to improve  the status of the profession  and  that the  perceived  status of a
given  legal field affects a lawyer's decision to practice in that area.  See JOHN  P.  HEINZ &  EDWARD
0. LAUMANN,  CHICAGO  LAWYERS:  THE SOCIAL  STRUCTURE  OF THE BAR 247 (1982)  (reporting that
87.2% of the Chicago lawyers responding to a survey rated enhancing the status  of the profession  as
very  important);  id. at  135-36  (noting that the prestige  attached  to a  given  field  is  likely to  affect
lawyer  career  choices).  Moreover,  "the  income that a lawyer  receives  from  his  practice  is  not
significantly  associated  with the prestige  of his field."  Id. at  134; see also JEROLD  S.  AUERBACH,
UNEQUAL  JUSTICE:  LAWYERS  AND  SOCIAL  CHANGE  IN  MODERN  AMERICA  93-96  (1976)  (arguing
that nineteenth-century  lawyers sought to exclude recent immigrants from the bar primarily  for  status
reasons  rather  than  because  allowing  these  new  entrants  into  the  profession  would  harm  the
economic interests of the elite bar).  See also McAdams, supra note 47,  (arguing that discrimination  is
a means for the discriminating group to produce status for its members).  But see Richard  A. Epstein,
The Status Production Sideshow:  Why the Antidiscrimination Laws Are Still a Mistake,  108  HARV.  L
REV.  1085  (1995) (responding to McAdams).
67.  See NELSON,  supra note 24, at 4,  10 (arguing that professional  norms  of independence  and
collegiality  inhibit  the  development  of  rational  bureaucratic  decision  making).  Lincoln  Caplan
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efforts  to gain prominence  in a particular field,  for example their family
background  or cosmopolitan  connections,  affects  significantly  the  suc-
cess  or failure  of the efforts."68
Finally,  to  say  that  lawyers  and  firms  are  rational  does  not  mean
that passion,  prejudice,  and  taste have  no  bearing  on  decisionmaking.
As  we  develop  below,  stereotypes,  predispositions,  and  other  related
background  assumptions  and tastes  play  an important role in lawyer and
firm  decisionmaking.  We also  assume,  however,  that  those  who  have
these beliefs  respond  rationally  (as we have  now  defined  this  term)  to
evidence  that either confirms or denies these predispositions.69
In this Part, we explain  why policies  and  practices  common  among
elite corporate  law firms are a rational response to the market  conditions
these firms  confront.  Section  A presents  a  general  theory  to  explain
how firms  that pay  high  wages and  employ  complex  hierarchical  insti-
tutional  practices  insulate  themselves  from  the economic  consequences
of practices that unfairly disadvantage  black workers.  Section  B applies
this general theory to law firms.
chronicles an example that demonstrates both the power and the limits of professional  ideology  when
it conflicts with economic gain.  According to, Caplan,  many  established  New York  law  firms  were
slow to get into  the takeover  business  in part  because  the partners  who  ran these  firms  considered
hostile bids unethical  and  the lawyers  who  pursued  them  unprofessional.  See  LINCOLN  CAPLAN,
SKADDEN:  POWER,  MONEY,  AND  THE RISE  OF A LEGAL  EMPIRE 52 (1993).  As the established firms
watched  Skadden  grow  rich  and powerful  from  this work,  however,  scruples  faded,  and  the large
firms  rushed  in  to  take  advantage  of  this  lucrative  new  area  of  practice.  See  id.  at  207-27.
Significantly, as cognitive dissonance  theory predicts, these firms reinterpreted their understanding  of
professionalism to accommodate  this new form of practice.  See id. at 216.  For a  discussion  of how
lawyers  reshape ideas about professionalism to accommodate  changes  in the  economics  of practice,
see AUSTIN  SARAT,  IDEOLOGIES  OF  PROFESSIONALISM,  CONFLICT  AND  CHANGE  (1992).
68.  Yves Dezaly & Bryant Garth, Constructing an International Legal Order  and  Transforming
the State:  Human  Rights,  Constitutionalism,  and  the  Legalization  of Trade  15  (1995)  (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
69.  In  this respect,  our analysis differs  from  those  who  assert  that  because  racism  is  often
"unconscious"  (meaning  that actors  are  unaware  of  the  fact  that  they  are  influenced  by  racial
stereotypes)  it  cannot  be  corrected  by  market  forces.  See  Selmi,  supra note  49,  at  1288-89
(suggesting  that  market  forces  will  work  less  efficiently  when  unconscious  racism  leads  an
"employer  [to]  foregool  profits  unconsciously").  Professor  Selmi's  article  builds  on  the  work  of
Professor Charles Lawrence.  See Lawrence, supra note 47, (proposing a test for judicial  recognition
of race-based  behavior  that  considers  unconscious  racism).  While  we  agree  with  Selmi  that
unconscious stereotyping often plays  a  central  role  in  the  differential  treatment  of black  and  white
applicants,  and  that  these  beliefs  are  often  resistant  to  falsification  precisely  because  they  are
unconscious, actors  who  do not hold consciously racist  beliefs still  have  an  incentive  to respond  to
evidence tending to show that their preconceptions  are false  when it is in their self-interest to do so.
The problem,  is that in many  circumstances  "market  experience  [will]  not teach  sellers  that  their
preconceptions  are  false"  because  the  actors  have  structured  their  activity  in  such  a  way  as  to
insulate themselves  from  the economic  consequences  of their discriminatory  conduct.  Ian  Ayres,
Fair  Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination  in Retail Car  Negotiations, 104  HARV.  L  REv.  817,
850  (1991).WHY ARE THERE SO FEW BLACK LAWYERS
A.  Discrimination  in High-Level Jobs 7"
For more than four decades, neo-classical  economists  have posed  a
trenchant  query  to those  who  advocate  governmental  or  private  inter-
vention  to prevent  employment  discrimination:  If  there  are  no  mean-
ingful  differences  between  blacks  and  whites,  as  anti-discrimination
advocates  unanimously  assert,  why  won't  discriminating  employers  be
driven  out  of  business  by  competitors  who  cut  labor  costs  by  hiring
qualified blacks at lower  wages?7  This challenge  is based  on  two stan-
dard  assumptions about labor markets  and firms.  First,  those  who claim
that competition  will eventually  drive  out  discriminating  firms  assume
that employers set wages to  equal  an  employee's  marginal  productivity
and that wages fall until there are no longer any  qualified workers  to  fill
the demand  (the  "market-clearing  wage"  hypothesis).72  Second,  they
assume that all firms have perfect  information  about the quality  of po-
tential  workers  and  that  decisions  about  hiring  and  firing  are  costless
(the  "perfect  information"  hypothesis). 
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Even if one accepts these  two assumptions,  the conclusion  that dis-
criminating  firms  will inevitably  be driven  from the market  is far from
certain.7 4  In recent years, however, a growing  chorus  of economists  and
sociologists  have  persuasively  argued  that  both  the  market-clearing
wage  and  the perfect-information  hypotheses  fail adequately  to explain
the ways in which  many  sectors of the labor  market  actually  operate.75
These  theorists argue that in certain  instances, firms  will find  it efficient
to pay workers  a higher than market-clearing  wage and to employ  com-
plex  hierarchical  employment  structures  in  order  to reduce  the cost  of
acquiring  information  about  worker performance.  By  artificially  cre-
ating a  large  pool  of "unemployed"76 workers who are both  willing and
70.  By "discrimination"  we  simply mean  a regime  in which  employers, for whatever  reason,
prefer average whites  to average blacks.  In keeping with  the assumption  outlined above,  we  do  not
assume that this phenomenon  is the result of employers holding racist views about blacks (as we  have
defined that term).  See supra note 51.
71.  This theory was first developed by Gary Becker in the 1950s.  See  BECKER,  supra note 41,
at 40-43.
72.  See Charny & Gulati, supra  note 9, at 4.
73.  Id.
74.  For thoughtful criticism of these claims, see John J. Donohue  II,  Is Title  VII  Efficient?, 134
U.  PA.  L  REv.  1411 (1986);  Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle,  92 MICH. L. REv. 2410 (1994).
75.  For a general critique of the market clearing wage hypothesis, see, e.g., Charny  and  Gulati,
supra note 9, at 11-14; EFFICIENCY  WAGE  MODELS  OF  THE  LABOR MARKET  (George  A. Akerlof &
Janet L. Yellen  eds.,  1986);  ROBERT  M. SoLow,  THE LABOR  MARKET  AS  A SOCIAL  INSTITUTION
28-33  (1990);  ANDREW  WEISS,  EFFICIENCY  WAGES:  MODELS  OF  UNEMPLOYMENT,  LAYOFFS,  AND
WAGE  DISPERSION  (1990).  For a powerful  critique  of  the perfect  information  hypothesis  in  the
context of labor markets, see John J. Donohue  III,  Employment Discrimination  Law in Perspective:
Three Concepts of Equality, 92  MICH. L  REv.  2583  (1994)  (contrasting  labor markets  with capital
markets).
76.  By "unemployed"  we simply mean that there are workers  who are  willing to work  for  the
high salaries being offered even if they currently have other, lower-paying jobs.
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competent  to  perform  the job,  firms  that  utilize  one  or  both  of  these
strategies can partially  shield  themselves  from  the  kind  of market  pres-
sures that neo-classical theorists assert will drive out discrimination.
In  an  Article  written with  Professor  David  Charny,  one  of us  has
argued  that firms  will  find  high  wages  and  other  hierarchical  institu-
tional  structures  particularly  attractive  in  circumstances  in  which  the
subjective  nature  of  performance  renders  monitoring  and  evaluating
worker quality  expensive. 77  The following four Sections briefly  summa-
rize and expand this  argument  and  its implications  for  the  employment
prospects of black workers.
1.  Subjectivity and Monitoring
Firms  pay  wages  in  order  to  induce  employees  to  perform  their
jobs competently  and efficiently.  Once a worker is hired, however,  there
is always the danger that he or she will shirk by working  either  less hard
or  competently.  The  standard  response  to  this  danger  is  for  firms  to
monitor employee performance  directly  and to  discharge  those  workers
who are not performing  effectively.
Direct monitoring,  however,  is expensive.  Employers  must  divert
resources  from  revenue-generating  activities  into  detection  and  en-
forcement.  This is particularly  true when  pertormance  cannot  be  evalu-
ated by reference  to easily  observable  objective criteria  such  as outputs.
In  circumstances  in  which  quality  judgments  depend  on  a  complex
evaluation  of an  employee's  technical  competence,  thoroughness,  and
judgment  (in  addition  to results), a firm  would  have to  retrace  a  good
deal  of the employee's  actual decision  making  process  before  it could
reach  an accurate  assessment about performance.
Firms seek to reduce this burden  by  offering  employees  additional
incentives  to work hard that do not depend  exclusively  on  direct  moni-
toring.78  These alternatives  fall  into two general  categories:  high  wages
and tournaments.
2.  When It's Cheaper  to Overpay
One way to induce effort without monitoring  is to pay  employees  a
higher wage than they could receive elsewhere  in the market.  This  wage
premium has  two effects that collectively  tend  to lower monitoring costs.
First, by  offering  a higher  than  market-clearing  wage, firms  generate  a
large pool  of qualified  applicants  from  which  to  hire.79  This  reduces
77.  See Chany & Gulati, supra note 9.
78.  No firm will be able to avoid direct monitoring altogether, since without it employees  would
face no risk that their shirking will be  detected.  At  best, therefore,  these  alternative  strategies  only
supplement direct enforcement.  See id. at, 16 n.52.
79.  Id. at  15-16.  Higher  wages  also  attract  a  certain  number  of  unqualified  applicants.
However, since even qualified applicants face long odds of actually  securing  these coveted  positions
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search  costs  and  places the burden  on  applicants  to  differentiate  them-
selves from the rest of the pool.  Second,  once a worker is  hired,  she has
an incentive to work hard  since  she  knows  that if she is fired  for shirk-
ing, she cannot obtain a similar salary  elsewhere and  that there are  many
"unemployed"  workers who  would  gladly  take  her  place."  The  net
result is that firms  that employ  a high-wage  strategy  will have an  easier
time finding qualified workers  and will have to spend fewer resources  to
ensure that those hired  are performing their jobs efficiently.
Moreover, once one firm  adopts  a high-wage  strategy, competitors
will feel  strong  pressure  to follow  suit.  Firms that seek to cut costs by
refusing to pay the wage premium  run the risk of losing  "good"  work-
ers  to firms  that do while simultaneously  attracting  "bad"  workers  who
cannot  currently  get jobs  at the  higher  wage.8'  High  wages  therefore
tend  to be inelastic to downward  market pressures.
3.  Tournament Theory
Firms also seek to  induce  effort  by  promising  employees  a reward
(commonly  either  a cash bonus  or  a  lucrative  promotion)  if they  can
credibly  signal  that they  have successfully  performed  their jobs  over a
specified period  of time.  In  such firms, workers  compete  against  each
other in a "tournament"  that rewards those  who  have made  the greatest
contributions  to  the  firm.2  Shirking,  therefore,  is  costly  to  the  em-
ployee  because  it reduces  her chance  of receiving  the reward.  Indeed,
when properly  designed  (that  is, when  the  reward  is  sufficiently  large
and the chances  of obtaining  it are reasonable-although  by  no  means
(a product of the high wage exerting downward pressure on demand),  unqualified applicants will find
it relatively inefficient to spend much time seeking high wage jobs.
80.  This should also reduce costs associated  with turnover since workers are less likely to  leave
these high paying,  and therefore scarce, jobs voluntarily.
81.  See Chamy  and Gulati, at 12-13.  Firms  can attempt to avoid or reduce this effect by  paying
some workers  more than others  or by signaling that they  offer  workers  additional  benefits  (such  as
working  conditions,  promotions, status)  that more than  offset  the  decrease  in  salary.  There  are,
however, barriers to implementing both of these strategies.  In order to pay  differential  wages,  firms
must be  able  reliably  to distinguish good workers  from  bad  ones.  When  quality  assessments  are
subjective,  such  distinctions  will  always  be  expensive  (for  the  same  reasons  that  monitoring  is
expensive)  and  may,  for  reasons  we  develop  in our account of the large  law  firm,  be  impossible.
Moreover,  the  more  arbitrary  these  judgments  seem,  the  more  pay  differences  run  the  risk  of
decreasing  employee  morale.  Finally, just  as  employees  will  have  a  difficult  time  assessing  the
fairness  of  case-by-case  wage  differentials,  they  will  also  be  suspicious  of  promises  of  better
working conditions, promotion  rates, or other non-monetary  benefits.  In  each  of these  areas,  firms
have an incentive (albeit tempered by reputational  concerns) to promise more than  they  deliver  or to
act opportunistically after the employee has committed to the firm.
82.  See  id. at  13-14.  For  a  general  overview  of  tournament  theory,  see,  e.g.,  James  M.
Malcolmson, Work Incentives,  Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets, 92 J.  POL.  EcoN.  486 (1984);
Lome  Carmichael,  Firm-Specific  Human  Capital  and Promotion Ladders,  14  BELL  J. EcON.  251
(1983); Edward  P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order  Tournaments as  Optimum  Labor  Contracts,
89 J. PoL.  ECON.  841  (1981).
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guaranteed),  employees can  be motivated  to  expend  efforts  that  go  be-
yond what could  be  expected  in  a world  in  which monitoring  was both
perfect and costless.
Firms can  further  lower their  monitoring  costs  by  structuring  the
tournament  in  ways that give employees  incentives  to  contribute  moni-
toring  resources  to  the firm.  For  example,  consider  a  tournament  in
which  a senior  employee's  possibility  of obtaining  the reward  (for ex-
ample, promotion  to partnership)  depends  in part upon the work  of that
employee's juniors.  Under these circumstances,  experienced  employees
have an incentive  to monitor their subordinates more  carefully than they
would  otherwise.  Firms  thus  have  an  incentive  to  create  a  pyramid
structure  in which  a relatively  small number  of experienced  employees
are  responsible  for  monitoring  the performance  of a larger number  of
junior workers,  who are themselves motivated to work  hard  by the pros-
pect  of becoming  senior  employees  who  are  then  eligible  for  the  re-
ward.'
4.  "Efficient" Discrimination
Firms that employ  high  wages,  tournaments,  or  some  combination
thereof, to induce  worker effort face reduced  market pressures  to detect
and  sanction employment  decisions  that either  penalize  blacks  or favor
whites.  This is true for two reasons.
First, assuming that firms face  a normal  bell-shaped  distribution  of
worker  talent  (that  is,  a  small  number  of  "superstars"  and
"unacceptable"  workers  at either  end  with  the  majority  of  candidates
clustered  together  in  the  "average"  range),  they  should  be  relatively
indifferent  as to which  average  candidates  are  hired. 5  Since  quality  is
subjective  and therefore  difficult  to  evaluate, the signals  applicants  use
to  demonstrate  their merit  (for  example,  educational  credentials,  rec-
ommendations, work experience)  will be "noisier"  (that  is, less reliable
predictors  of actual quality) the closer  one  gets  to the mean.  Although
a  thorough  investigation  of  potential  employees  (for  example,  an  in-
depth interview, reading sample  work product,  or  an  apprenticeship  pe-
riod) might reveal whether an  applicant's  signals  are reliable,  firms  that
employ  high  wages  and  tournaments  to  save on monitoring  costs  have
little incentive to invest in this kind of cross-checking.  As a result, can-
83.  For example, in a world where firms only use direct monitoring to induce effort,  employees
have little incentive to perform above whatever minimum level the firm establishes  for  "good"  work.
In  a  firm  that  employs  a  tournament  to  save  on  monitoring  costs,  even  "good"  work  may  go
unnoticed.  Consequently,  if getting  noticed is a  necessary  condition  for  winning  the  tournament,
employees have an incentive to do better than good work.
84.  As we explain below, this is not the only incentive for firms to create a pyramidal  structure.
See infra Part II.B.2.b.
85.  See Charney and Gulati, supra note 9, at 14-17.
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didates  in  the average  range  appear  indistinguishable  from  the  firm's
perspective.  Because  the firm  pays  high  wages,  there  will be  a large
number of average  candidates  available.
As a result, the firm  has  little reason  to  investigate  whether  those
responsible  for  hiring  systematically  prefer  average  whites  to  average
blacks.  By definition,  the firm  does  not lose productivity  as  a result  of
such discrimination.  Average workers  are  merely  being  substituted for
average  workers.  Furthermore, because of the inflexibility  of wages,  the
firm  will  not  be  placed  at  a  competitive  disadvantage  vis-h-vis  those
firms  who do  not discriminate  since these  latter  employers  will  find  it
difficult to hire blacks  at reduced  wages, thereby  cutting  their costs be-
low those of firms where average whites are favored.86  This effect  is ex-
acerbated  in  firms  that  also  utilize  a tournament  in  order  to  separate
those who are truly outstanding from the many  who are  merely  compe-
tent.  Because  these firms  know  that they  will be able  to collect  a large
amount of relatively  reliable  information  about  employee  performance
before they promote the small number  of tournament  winners  to senior
positions,  these organizations  have even less incentive  to make  accurate
distinctions among  average workers  at the hiring  stage.
Second, because black  applicants  know that they  face  reduced  op-
portunities-that is, that they  will lose out  to  average whites  unless  they
can clearly signal themselves  to be superstars-they have an incentive  to
invest  in  human  capital  strategies  that, paradoxically,  will  on  average
decrease  their  chances  for  success.'  As  an  initial  matter,  since  black
applicants  face higher entry barriers, they have an increased  incentive  to
invest in acquiring the kind  of signals  that employers  look to  when  de-
ciding  which candidates  are  outstanding.  To  the extent that  these  sig-
86.  See id. at 18.  As the text implies, firms will suffer  both productivity  and competitive  losses
if they hire average whites over superstar blacks.  This simple economic reality helps account for the
widely held belief that blacks with outstanding  credentials receive  many  offers  from elite employers
in business and the professions.  For reasons  that we  set out below,  however,  the fact  that a black
superstar  gets  hired  does  not  mean, that  he  or  she  will  be  accorded  the  same  opportunities  and
perquisites  that white  superstars  receive.  This, in turn,  helps  to explain  why  black  superstars  win
tournaments in smaller numbers than their white counterparts.  See  infra Part III.B.
87.  See id. at 19-24.  Once again,  we  stress  that blacks  are  not the only  ones  likely  to choose
one of these strategies.  Because average whites  also have a difficult time  securing jobs in firms  that
employ  high  wages  and  tournaments  to  reduce  monitoring  costs,  they  too  have  an  incentive  to
overinvest in the signals necessary to obtain the job (as opposed to actual job skills)  and  to pursue  the
kind of low  investment  or  high investment  strategies  described  in  the  text.  Nevertheless,  since
average blacks face the additional  barriers described above, we should expect that they will  be even
more  likely  to follow  one  of these paths-and  to do  so  in a manner  that  exaggerates  the  dangers
involved-than  their white  peers.  Of  course,  in  those  situations  where  certain  whites  also  face
additional barriers, (for example, women,  openly  gay  whites,  or whites  from  lower  socio-economic
backgrounds),  we  might  see  similar  skewing  effects.  Given  our skepticism  about  whether  the
experiences  of the members  of one  disadvantaged  group  are  automatically  transferable  to  other
disadvantaged  groups, we venture no  opinion about whether the skewing  effect  would  in fact  be  the
same.
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nals directly  measure  skills  that  are  actually  necessary  to  perform  the
job  effectively,  this extra  incentive performs  a positive function  by  in-
creasing  black  investment in human  capital.  In  many  cases,  however,
firms  value a  particular  signal  (for  example,  obtaining  a  high  school
diploma)  because they  view it as  a surrogate  for  some  difficult  to  ob-
serve personal  quality  (for  example,  hard work  or perseverance)  rather
than  because  the  signal  actually  represents  a  valuable  job  skill."
Moreover, where firms rely on  high  wages  and  tournaments  because  of
the difficulty  of evaluating  and  monitoring  highly  subjective  job  per-
formance,  the  link  between  the  signals  these  employers  are  likely  to
look for  and  either  actual job  skills  or  the  personal  qualities  of  good
workers  is unlikely  to be tight enough  to produce  only beneficial  effects
on the  investment  decisions  of black  workers.  Instead,  firms  are  likely
to  prefer  less  accurate  but easily  observable  signals  over  ones  that  are
more difficult to observe or measure, but are ultimately better correlated
with future job performance,  on  the  ground  that  the  gap  between  ex-
pected  quality  (as  measured  by  these  less  costly  signals)  and  actual
quality  can be sorted  out  in the course  of the tournament.  As a result,
investing  heavily  in  obtaining  these  signals  can  end  up  damaging  a
black employee's  long-term  prospects.  Although  black  candidates  who
invest disproportionately  in signals may  increase  their chances  of being
hired,  if we make  the plausible  assumptions  that there  is  at  least  some
tradeoff  between  investing in  signals  and  investing  in  skills  (if for  no
other  reason  than  the  finite  nature  of  time),  and  that  beginning  work
with skills is positively correlated  with  success  on  the job, these  workers
may also have a decreased chance  of actually winning the tournament.
The incentives that push the investment decisions  of black  employ-
ees in directions  that decrease  their chances  for  success are  even  more
prevalent  once  the  employment  relationship  begins.  Given  that  the
same social forces that tend  to  lead whites  to  prefer  average  whites over
average  blacks  are  likely  to  continue  inside  firms,  those  blacks  who
manage  to  secure  one  of  these  coveted  positions  must  decide  how  to
react to these diminished  opportunities.  Some  black  workers  may  seek
to minimize  the  adverse  consequences  of  their  employers'  diminished
expectations  by  avoiding  situations  where they  believe  that  their  com-
petence  might  be  drawn  into  question.  Others  will  take  the  opposite
tack  and invest heavily in their careers at the  firm  by  taking  on difficult
88.  Andrew Weiss describes this "sorting process" as follows:  "In  sorting  models, schooling  is
correlated  with differences  among  workers  that were  present  before  the  schooling  choices  were
made;  firms  make  inferences  about  these  productivity  differences  from  schooling  choices,  and
students respond to this inference process by going to school longer."  Andrew  Weiss, Human Capital
vs. Signaling Explanations of  Wages, 9 J. ECON.  PERSP.  133,  134 (1995).
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or risky projects  that, if successful,  might  induce  firm  leaders  to  view
them as superstars  instead of merely as average.
Both  strategies  decrease  an  average  black  worker's  chances  for
success  at the firm.  The  futility  of the  first  choice  is  clear:  although
those  pursuing  a low-risk strategy  may  manage  to  avoid  making  the
kinds  of mistakes  that  will lead their employers  to  view  them  as unac-
ceptable  (and  therefore  candidates  for  being  fired  immediately),  they
are  also  unlikely  to  win  a  tournament  in  which  others  are  investing
heavily in firm-specific skills.  At the  same time, average  black  workers
who pursue  high-risk strategies  by  taking  on  more  than  their  share  of
difficult or risky work assignments-assignments  that would  be difficult
even for  those with superstar  abilities-run  a  substantial  risk  of being
downgraded  in  the estimation  of their  employers  if they  fail to  pull  all
of these projects off successfully.
Given  this  dynamic,  discrimination  will  be  self-perpetuating  in
firms  that  employ  high  wages,  tournaments,  or  some  combination
thereof  to  reduce  monitoring  costs. 9  The  next  section  argues  that this
dynamic helps to explain the current  structure of large law firms.
B.  Making Elite Law Firms
Elite firms  depend  for  their  economic  survival  upon  delivering
high-quality  legal  services  at  acceptable  prices.  As  a  result,  a  firm's
most important  asset is the accumulated  human  capital  of its  lawyers."
Firms therefore  have strong incentives to seek out  lawyers  who  will pre-
serve  and enhance the firm's reputation  and  to  ensure  that partners  and
associates  in  fact fulfill  this  promise  throughout  their  tenure  with  the
firm.
This basic economic truth lies at the core of the standard  claim, re-
cited  like a mantra by  every  law firm  during  recruiting  season,  that  its
hiring  and  promotion  practices  are  solely  designed  to  produce  the
"best"  lawyers.  In  this Section  we argue  that these  familiar  claims  are
ultimately misleading.  Firms do have an  incentive to hire  and  promote
the  "best"  workers,  but  only  insofar  as  the  cost  of  evaluating  and
monitoring  worker  quality  does  not  exceed  the returns  from  selecting
marginally  better  workers.  Hence,  the resources  firms  are likely  to de-
vote to  making  distinctions  among  workers  vary  with both  the  cost  of
reaching  reliable quality  determinations  and  the  expected  benefit  to  the
firm  of more  accurate  matches  between  employees  and jobs.  As  we
shall  see, elite law firms  have developed  institutional  practices  with  re-
89.  See Charney and Gulati, supra note 9, at 23.
90.  See Gilson & Mnookin, Human Capitalists,  supra  note 63, at 324-27  (discussing the "critical
role of human capital"); see also Peter  D.  Sherer, Leveraging Human Assets in Law Firms: Human
Capital  Structures  and Organizational  Capabilities,  48 INDUS. & LAB.  REL.  REV.  671 (1995).
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spect to  both  of these  issues that reduce  their  need  to  invest substantial
resources  in  distinguishing  among  average  workers  at crucial  stages  in
the employment  process.
1.  Good Lawyers are Made, Not Born
In  the previous  Section, we explained  why  firms  gravitate  towards
high  wages  and/or  tournaments  in  circumstances  where the  subjectivity
of quality assessments renders  monitoring  both  difficult and  expensive.
Large law  firms find themselves in this position due to  two related  char-
acteristics of lawyering.  First, legal work contains  a core element of dis-
cretionary  judgment, which is the  product  of  both  contingent  external
factors and the lawyer's own  character, insight, and  experience.  Second,
partly as a result of this core discretionary  element, good  lawyering  is a
practice  that ultimately cannot be reduced  to principles  or rules  that can
be  taught  in  the  classroom.  These  two  related  characteristics  render
judgments  about  a  lawyer's  quality  inherently  subjective  and  provi-
sional.
Lawyers have long asserted  that  one  of the most  important  distinc-
tions  between  their "calling"  and  other  "occupations"  is the  link  be-
tween  lawyering  and  judgment.9'  Although  lawyers  frequently
exaggerate both  the uniqueness  of legal judgments  and  the implications
of  recognizing  that lawyers  inevitably  exercise  discretion,9"  the  claim
that  good judgment  lies  at  the  core  of  good  lawyering  rests  on  solid
ground.
Good  judgment  in  this  context  derives  from,  but  ultimately  tran-
scends, specialized knowledge  and technical  expertise.  In  order  to  ren-
der  sound  advice  to  clients  or  make  persuasive  arguments  in  court,  a
lawyer must have  a firm  command  of the  relevant  substantive  and pro-
cedural doctrines.  But an effective lawyer must also be a good judge  of
character,  a quick and  accurate  calculator  of costs  and  benefits,  an  em-
pathetic  listener,  and  a  thorough,  balanced,  and  calm  deliberator  who
nevertheless  does not lose sight  of the important  role  that passion  plays
91.  See  ANTHONY  T.  KRONMAN,  THE  LOST  LAWYER:  FAILING  IDEALS  OF  THE  LEGAL
PROFESSION  3  (1993)  (describing  "judgment"  as  the  core  of  the  lawyer-statesman  ideal  of
professional  practice).  Indeed,  for  many, this ineluctable  element  of  discretionary  judgment  is  a
defining  feature  of professionalism  generally.  See,  e.g.,  AMERICAN  BAR  ASSOCIATION,  "IN  THE
SPIIT  OF  A  PUBLIC  SERVICE..  ."  (1986)  (endorsing  sociologist  Eliot  Friedson's  definition  of
professionalism  as, inter  alia, involving a practice  that "requires  substantial intellectual  training  and
the use of complex judgments").
92.  One  of us  has  written  about  this subject  extensively.  See David B.  Wilkins,  Who Should
Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV.  L. REV.  799, 853-73  (1992) (discussing the misuse of arguments  about
"independent judgment" in the debate over self-regulation);  David B.  Wilkins, Practical  Wisdom for
Practicing  Lawyers: Separating  Ideals  from Ideology in Legal Ethics, 108 HARV. L. REV  458, 468-472
(1994)  (discussing how claims that lawyers are especially gifted at making certain kinds of judgments
have been used to justify lawyer paternalism).
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in human  affairs. 3  In the world of elite law practice,  she  must also  be a
team  player,  a  salesperson,  and  a  manager  of  complex  personalities,
events, and  institutions. 4  Indeed,  given  the  indeterminacy  of many  ar-
eas of the law, even  technical  legal  competence  involves  an  important
element  of discretionary  judgment. 95
Moreover,  lawyers develop  virtually all  of  these  relevant  qualities,
including  technical  expertise, on the job.  Lawyers  have  always referred
to  what they  do as the "practice"  of law.  As with claims  about  the im-
portance  of professional  judgment,  the profession  has  frequently  used
this standard  assertion  to advance  its own ends.96  In  addition,  however,
the word  also  captures  how  lawyers  generally  believe  good  legal  skills
are cultivated-in  practice.  Although law schools  now make more of an
effort  to  be  comprehensive,  including  offering  students  a  variety  of
clinical courses  in  which they  actually  perform  legal  work, the gap  be-
tween what law schools teach and  what practicing  lawyers  need  to  know
is arguably as wide as it has ever been. 97
Together, these two features of good lawyering make it difficult for
law  firms to reach  accurate judgments  about the qualifications  of poten-
tial recruits, to train these new lawyers once they are hired, and to ensure
that they are  performing  competently.  At the recruiting  stage, because
most of the qualities of a  good  lawyer  (including  the  ability  to  reach
93.  See KRONMAN, supra note 91, at 2 (arguing that an outstanding lawyer is "a person  of good
judgment, and not just an expert  in the law");  CAPLAN,  supra note 67,  at 3  (reporting  that Skadden
founder and  mega-dealmaker Joe Flom's partners  are most impressed by "the power of his  brain  and
by his large quota of the vague  but bankable  resource  that lawyers  call  good judgment");  Angela  P.
Harris  & Marjorie  M. Shultz,  "A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason": Toward Civic Virtue  in Legal
Education, 45 STAN.  L. REV.  1773 (1993)  (discussing the importance of emotion in legal argument).
94.  See Gilson  & Mnookin,  Coming of Age, supra note  63,  at  572  (arguing  that  "subjective
personal  characteristics-for  example,  cooperativeness,  maturity,  the  ability  to  gain  respect  of
existing clients  and  to recruit  new  ones-.. . traditionally  have  been  important  to  the  partnership
decision");  Mary Ann Galante, Firms Finding  More Value  in Marketing, NAT'L LJ., Nov.  18,  1985,
at 28-29  (arguing  that successful  lawyers  must learn  to deal  effectively  with  the media  and  public
relations  personnel).
95.  See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers,  104  HARV.  L. REV.  468,  478-99  (1990).
For  an  argument  that  connects  indeterminacy  to  discretionary  judgment,  see  William  H.  Simon,
Ethical Discretion  in Lawyering, 101  HARv. L. REV.  1083  (1988).
96.  See  generally CHARLES  W. WOLFRAM,  MODERN  LEGAL  ETHICS  76  (1986)  (noting  that
lawyers  seek  to distinguish  the  practice of  law from  other  forms  of moral  political  and  economic
argument as  a way  of enhancing  their own power);  Deborah  L. Rhode,  Policing the  Professional
Monopoly: A  Constitutional  and Empirical  Analysis of Unauthorized  Practice Prohibitions,  34  STAN.
L REV.  1 (1981)  (arguing that claims  about the inherent  distinctiveness  of the practice of law  are
used to support restrictive unauthorized practice rules).
97.  See  TASK  FORCE  ON  LAW  SCHOOLS  AND  THE  PROFESSION:  NARROWING  THE  GAP,
SECTION  OF  LEGAL  EDUCATION  AND  ADMISSIONS  TO  THE  BAR,  AMERICAN  BAR  ASSOCIATION,
LEGAL  EDUCATION  AND  PROFESSIONAL  DEVELOPMENT-AN  EDUCATIONAL  CONTINUUM  (Robert
MacCrate  ed.,  1992)  [hereinafter  MACCRATE  REPORT].  See  also  David  Luban  &  Michael
Millemann,  Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9  GEo.  J. LEGAL  ETHICS  31  (1995)
(arguing that the kind of judgment that lawyers need to cultivate is best taught through trial  and error
and by imitation).
19961CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
sound  discretionary  judgments)  are  learned  on  the job,  the  firm  must
rely  on  predictors  of future  success  as opposed  to  a record  of demon-
strated  ability.  The most  visible signals  about  the  potential  quality  of
particular  applicants  (i.e., law school  grades  and  other  traditional  aca-
demic honors),  however, are not strongly  correlated  with either  substan-
tive lawyering skills or the personal qualities that it takes to be successful
in the practice of law.
Two aspects  of the grading process  diminish  its predictive capacity
with respect to substantive  lawyering  skills.  First, many  of the  substan-
tive  areas in which  elite firm  lawyers  work are  either  not  taught  in  law
school  at all  or  are  covered  only  in  introductory  survey  courses  that
spend relatively  little time  on  the  kind of cutting  edge  legal  issues that
increasingly  occupy  corporate  lawyers.9 8  Second,  even  with respect  to
those fundamental  skills taught in the standard  law  school  curriculum,
such  as  "thinking  like a lawyer"  and  the basic  architecture  of the legal
system, the predictive  value  of grades  is distorted  by  the peculiar  char-
acteristics  of  the  law  school  examination  process."  Although  grades
may  work  better  as  a proxy  for  personal  qualities  that  are  plausibly
connected  to  success  in  law, such  as  intelligence,  hard  work,  persever-
ance,  or perhaps aggressiveness, even this signal is noisy.  A certain  per-
centage of students  who  lack some  or  all of these  qualities  nevertheless
get good  grades.  Other  equally  valuable  talents  (such  as the  ability  to
work well with others)  may  be  inversely  correlated  with  success  in  law
school."ro  As a result of all of  these  factors,  "[e]ven  law  teachers  ac-
knowledge  that a student's  performance  in law  school  is  a  very  noisy
signal of her long-term  performance  as a lawyer."''  This assessment  is
confirmed by empirical  research  finding little or no  correlation  between
98.  See Graham C. Lilly, Law School Without Lawyers?  Winds of Change in Legal Education,
81  VA.  L  REv.  1421,  1450  (1995)  (describing  "alienation  between  academics  and  practicing
professionals");  Roger  Parloff, For  the Record: Dean Anthony Kronman, Aht. LAW.,  Jan.-Feb.  1996,
at 85, 89 (noting the low correlation  between  much  of legal  education  and  the tasks one  faces  at  a
law  firm).
99.  As Michael  Selmi  demonstrates,  even  tests  that are  aimed  precisely  at  predicting  future
performance  (which law  school grades  are  not) are often  unreliable  due  to underinclusiveness  (the
test's  failure to capture  all of the relevant  criteria  responsible  for  success  at  the subsequent  task),
overinclusiveness  (testing for qualities such as risk taking that are  unrelated  to future  performance),
and measurement  errors  (individuals  will  score differently  on  the  same  test  if taken  at  different
times).  See Selmi, supra note  49, at  1261-76.  As  a  result,  most employment  tests  explain  less  than
15% of the variance in future performance.  The Law School Admissions Test (LSAT),  for  example,
explains only about  10%  of the variance  in first-year  grades  among  test-takers  (its  intended  target).
See id. at 1263-64.  There is little reason to expect that law school grades,  which are  not specifically
designed to  measure future performance  as a lawyer, would do any better.
100.  See Richard C. Reuben,  The Lawyer Turning Peacemaker,  A.B.A.  JOURNAL,  54-62  (August
1996) (criticizing law schools  for discouraging cooperation and concilliation).
101.  Gilson & Mnookin,  Coming ofAge, supra  note 63, at 572 n.16.
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legal  education  or  success  in  law  school  and  partner  income. 2  Al-
though firms  could improve the quality  of their predictive judgments  by
looking  behind  a  candidate's  grades  and  other  paper  credentials,  for
example  by  reviewing  a candidate's  work product  or  talking  to  refer-
ences,  each  additional  step  will inevitably  increase  the  cost  of recruit-
ing.1
0 3
The fact that law  is a practice that must be learned  on  the job  also
increases  a firm's training costs.  Traditionally,  firms  taught young  law-
yers  by gradually allowing  them  to  take  increasing  amounts  of respon-
sibility  on  a  broad  array  of  projects  under  the  direction  of  senior
lawyers.  This  apprenticeship  model,  however,  is  expensive  because  it
takes  senior lawyers  away  from revenue-generating  activities."
Finally,  given  the importance  of discretionary  judgment  to  assess-
ing  the quality  of a lawyer's  work, results  are not  an accurate  measure
of shirking.  In many instances,  the end result of the representation-for
example, the fact that a motion  was lost or a deal  completed-is  a very
imperfect  measure  of the quality  of the work that went into  producing
this result."5  Even  easily measurable inputs  such as the time that it takes
a lawyer to accomplish  a given task can be misleading  in the absence  of
further investigation."°6  Therefore, in order to make  accurate  judgments
102.  See James B.  Rebitzer & Lowell  J. Taylor,  Efficiency  Wages and Employment Rents: The
Employer-Size  Wage  Effect in the  Job Market for Lawyers,  13  J.  LAB.  ECON.  678,  690  (1995)
(reporting that in their analysis of partner  income, variables  corresponding to law school prestige, law
review membership,  and top law school grades "are not statistically significant at the 5%  level");  see
also Lugo, supra note  56, at 624  (claiming that many  law  firm partners  were  neither  former  law
review  members nor top percentage  graduates).
103.  This  is  particularly  true  with  respect  to  those personal  qualities  that  are  not  strongly
correlated with success in law school.  See Brendan O'Flaherty & Aloysius Siow,  Up-or-Out Rules in
the Market  for Lawyers, 13 J. LAB.  ECON. 709,712 & n.10 (1995)  (noting that firms  do not consider  a
potential associate's  ability to generate business, get along with colleagues,  and  supervise  employees
because "it is probably difficult to distinguish between new law school graduates on  the basis of these
skills").
104.  See  RICHARD  N.  FEFERIAN,  BUILDING  YOUR  FIRM  WITH  AssocIATEs:  A  GUIDE  FOR
HIRING  AND  MANAGING  NEW  ATTORNEYS  55-56  (1988)  (acknowledging  that  time  spent  training
associates is generally not billable to clients).
105.  This is not to suggest, of course,  that results have  no  probative  value  or that a  pattern  of
results (e.g., a lawyer who loses every case) might not be even more probative.
106.  Thus, a recent commentator's  claim that "[tihe view  that attorneys  are  difficult  to monitor
breaks down under closer analysis" is only half right.  See Kevin  A.  Kordana,  Note,  Law Firms and
Associate Careers: Tournament Theory  Versus the Production-Imperative Model,  104  YALE  L.
1907,  1914 (1995).  Kordana  correctly  observes  that firms  keep  track  of the time that an  attorney
spends on a particular matter by monitoring the lawyer's billable hours. Id. at 1914-15.  Moreover,  as
we explain below, firms can also structure their work  practices  to ensure  that senior  lawyers  gain  a
certain amount of the information they need to measure lawyer quality in the normal  course  of doing
their work (i.e.,  by requiring senior lawyers to review the work of junior lawyers).  Where  Kordana
errs is in assuming that these sources of information  provide an  accurate  measure  of lawyer  quality.
See id. at  1915-16.  While  billable  hours  may  be  a  reasonable  measure  of lawyer  effort  (although
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about lawyer quality, a firm would have to look  behind  both results  and
work  product  to  determine  whether  the  lawyer  considered  all  of  the
relevant legal and factual considerations that might bear  on  the decision
at hand.  To accomplish  this task, the evaluator must have both  the tech-
nical expertise to identify  considerations  that may  have been overlooked
(or  misinterpreted)  and  sufficiently  developed  powers  of professional
judgment to assess the discretionary judgments underlying  the first  law-
yer's decisions.  Like  training,  this process  is expensive  because  it nec-
essarily  involves  senior  lawyers  whose  time  could  be  used  more
productively  elsewhere."'
Recent  changes in  size, structure,  and  operation  of corporate  firms
present  firms  with a host of  new  monitoring  and  training  problems. 8
As firms  grew  in  size  and  geographic  scope,"°  their  hiring  needs  ex-
panded  as  well.  Correspondingly,  the  opportunities  for  partners  to
this limited  claim),  they  are  a very  crude  measure  of the  quality  of  that  effort.  As  Gilson  and
Mnookin argue:
Shirking involves more than simply putting in too few hours.  In this respect, the shortcoming
of a time-keeping system is the same  as ...  with any  productivity  formula:  It  is merely an
imperfect  proxy for what is really sought to be measured-effectiveness  of legal  work ....
There  is an  enormous  difference  between  the  performance  of  a  lawyer  who  is  simply
putting in his time and that of a lawyer who is truly motivated to produce.
Gilson & Mnookin, Human Capitalists,  supra  note 63, at 374.
107.  Kordana errs once  again  when  he  asserts that "monitoring  the quality of [an  associate's]
output is not usually a cost to the firm" because  clients pay  partners  to review  associates.  Kordana,
supra note 106, at 1915.  Time spent reviewing associate bills and  evaluating  whether  the associate's
time was  well  spent is  costly  to  the  firm  even  if partners  can  bill  all  of  this  time  to clients-a
questionable  assumption  in today's  competitive  legal  marketplace.  As  the  new  productivity  based
compensation  systems employed by most firms attest, the most productive  use of a partner's  time is  in
finding new clients rather than in servicing old ones-let alone billing clients for  past services.  Time
spent monitoring is time that cannot be spent developing new business.  Not surprisingly,  firms seek  to
avoid these  opportunity  costs as  much  as  possible,  As we  argue  below,  regardless  of whether  the
"promotion to partnership  tournament"  accounts  for  the  rapid  growth  in  firms  over  the  last  two
decades, it is a rational  response to the difficulty of accurately judging the quality-as  opposed to  the
quantity-of a lawyer's work.  See infra Part II.B.2.
108.  For a general  description  of  recent  changes  in  corporate  law  firms,  see  GALANTER  &
PALAY, supra note 24, at 37-76; KRONMAN, supra note 91,  at 273-307.
109.  For our purposes,  it is not important  to identify  any  single cause  for  this growth.  For  a
discussion of law firm growth, compare GALANTER &  PALAY, supra note 24, at 77-120  (arguing  that
tournament  theory  explains  large  law  firm  growth),  with  Kordana,  supra note  106,  at  1923-33
(arguing that law firm growth is better explained  by the "production-imperatives"  of the work  these
firms do  for their clients).  In contrast  to  both  of these  views,  we  believe  that  there  is credible
evidence  that  a  variety  of  factors,  including,  inter alia, the  inherent  dynamics  of  partnership
tournaments,  the needs  of clients,  the potential  for extracting  higher  profits  through  leverage,  and
status competition  among firms for the coveted  designation of being  a "national"-or increasingly  a
"global"--leader in the corporate law firm world contributed to the rapid escalation  in firm size.  (On
this last point, see Lincoln Caplan's description of how Skadden  lawyers  measured  their  status  vis-a-
vis their more established New York competitors by scrupulously keeping track of their relative  size.
See CAPLAN, supra note 67, at 56).  Our interest is simply in understanding how law  firm size  affects
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monitor  associates  directly  decreased."'  This  trend  has  been  exacer-
bated by both  the growth in the size of today's  corporate  and  litigation
projects  and  increased  specialization  among  attorneys  at  all  levels.
Larger  projects  in  the  litigation  and  corporate  areas  have  produced
larger and more highly  leveraged  teams  of lawyers. "'  As a result, part-
ners have less contact with each  associate on the team and  are  less likely
to work jointly with associates  on specific projects.'  The fact that most
firms are also  more highly  leveraged  than they  were in the past (that  is,
they have increased the ratio  of associates  to partners)  further  increases
monitoring  costs."3   Similarly,  specialization  and  the  departmentaliza-
tion that has  followed in  its wake reduce  contact among  lawyers  across
specialty areas and increase  the difficulty  of making  accurate  subjective
evaluations of quality  across departmental  lines.
Size and  leverage  also affect  the credibility  of  the  firms'  training
and out-placement promises.  Law school  graduates  still must be trained
if they  are  to become  effective  lawyers.  The  same  factors  that  have
made  direct  monitoring  more  difficult  (for  example,  larger  teams,
greater  task  differentiation  between  partners  and  associates,  etc.)  also
reduce opportunities  for partners  to train associates.  Moreover,  as cor-
porate  clients  have become  more  savvy  and  articulate  about  protecting
their interests, they  are  less willing to pay  for associate  training.  As  a
result, firms  are under  pressure  to  find  ways  to  reduce  the  amount  of
money  that they  have  to  spend  on recruiting,  training,  and  monitoring
without endangering  either quality  or competitiveness" 4  As our general
model predicts,  many  firms  have  gravitated  towards  a  combination  of
110.  It is now  quite common  for  partners  at large firms  to  bemoan  the  fact  that  they  barely
recognize their  fellow partners,  let alone  have  any  significant contact  with the vast majority  of the
firm's  associates-even  those  associates  who  are  eventually  considered  for  partnership.  See
CAPLAN, supra note 67, at 263-74 (describing the partnership selection process).
Ill..  See  ROBERT  J.  ARNDT,  MANAGING  FOR  PROFIT:  IMPROVING  OR  MAINTAINING  YOUR
BOTTOM  LINE 72 (1991)  (arguing  that today's  litigation  work permits  firms  to maintain  a relatively
high associatelpartner  ratio).  Not  all  law  firm  departments  are  organized  in  this  fashion.  See
Kordana,  supra note  106, at  1925-28  (documenting  that tax  departments  are  less  highly  leveraged
than either litigation or corporate  departments).  We return to this distinction below.
112.  See  NELSON,  supra note  24,  at  180  (noting that  in  modem  law  firms,  "partners  and
associates perform  very different tasks"); Samuelson, supra  note 63, at 648 (noting that today's senior
partners  "do not write research  memoranda  or draft  interrogatories;  they reserve  their energies  for
complex issues of law and strategy").
113.  See  James  W.  McCrae,  Strategies for Dealing with Slow  Growth or No  Growth,  LAW
PRACTICE MGNT., Dec.  1992, at 29 (describing high leverage  rates  of the  1980s).  As  Galanter  and
Palay note, for many firms both inside and outside New  York, partnership  rates  actually  rose  during
the boom years  of the  1970s,  while the  number  of years  to partnership  fell.  See  GALANTER  &
PALAY,  supra note 24, at 62-63.  Since  1980,  however,  both trends  have  reversed.  Id. at  63-64.
These latter trends have intensified during the belt-tightening years of the 1990s.
114.  See Rita K.  Stropus,  Mend it, Bend it, and Extend it:  The Fate of Traditional Law School
Methodology in the 21st Century, 27 Loy. U.  Cm.  LJ. 449,  470-71  (1996)  (noting  that  with  the
breakdown  of long-term  relationships  between  clients  and  firms,  clients are  less  willing to pay  for
associate training).
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high wages and  a series of complex hierarchical  institutional  practices  as
a means of reducing these expenditures.
2.  An Efficient Model in an Age of Opportunism
Three  interlocking  structural  components  typify  contemporary
elite firms:  high  wages,  a steep pyramidal  structure  in  which  all lawyers
compete in a series of tournaments  and there is pressure  to  reduce  work
to its smallest  and  least  demanding  unit  of  measure,  and  an  informal
tracking system that separates  associates  who will be  trained  from  those
who will not." 5  Each of these  institutional  characteristics  and  the  previ-
ously mentioned  monitoring problems  are discussed  below.
a.  High Salaries
High  associate  salaries are  now  a standard  fixture  of  the  elite  law
firm world.  This was not always the case.  Prior to  the late  1960s,  these
firms  paid  their  associates no  more-and  in  some  instances  less-than
most  of these  young  lawyers  could  earn  in  other  sectors  of  the  legal
economy." 6  Beginning  with the so-called  "Cravath  shock"  in  1968,"1
starting salaries for associates have skyrocketed  to more  than  $85,000  a
year in New York and other comparable  cities."'  On  average,  associates
now  earn  as  much  as  72%  more  than  their  counterparts  in  govern-
ment." 9  A considerable  gap also  exists  between  associate compensation
and  salaries  paid  by  corporate  legal  departments,  small firms, and  aca-
115.  Needless  to say,  not every  large  law  firm  follows  all  aspects  of  the  strategy  we  outline
below.  Law firms, like other similar organizations, vary in their structure,  culture, and practice.  See,
e.g.,  NELSON,  supra note  24, at 51-52  (describing  the difference  between  "general  service  firms"
and  "specialty  firms,"  that provide spot services  to a  larger  number of clients).  Nevertheless,  the
policies  and  practices  are  common among  firms  of this type.  Moreover,  to  the  extent  that  these
practices  we  describe  are efficient,  competitive  pressures  will  push  firms  to  adopt  them.  These
pressures  help  to explain  the growing similarity  among  corporate  firms  in  various  regions  of  the
country.  As we  argue  below,  however,  there  is  nothing  inevitable about  this  result.  See  infra
Conclusion.
116.  For example,  in  1954, the  mean income  for  law  firm  associates  in the  United  States was
$7,786  as  compared  with $7,915  for government  lawyers.  ABEL,  supra note  38,  at 302.  The  late
Professor and former Dean of the Harvard Law School Albert Sacks once told Professor Wilkins  that
when he joined Covington  & Burling  in  1950 after  clerking  for Justice  Felix Frankfurter,  he  took a
significant  pay  cut, and  that when  he joined the Harvard  Law  School Faculty  two  years  later,  he
received a substantial pay  raise.
117.  In  1968,  the  Cravath  firm,  breaking  with  the  unofficial  cartel  that  had  set  New  York
salaries  for  the preceding  decades,  increased  starting  associate salaries  from  $10,500  to  $15,000.
See GALANTER  & PALAY,  supra note 24, at 56.  These raises  were  then  matched  by the major New
York firms  and also exerted upward pressure on  salaries in comparable  firms around  the country.  Id.
118.  See Edward  A. Adams,  Firms Give  "Going Rate" Gentle Boost, N.Y.  LJ., Apr.  17,  1995,
at 1.
119.  See Marcia Coyle & Marianne Lavelle,  1 of))  Federal  Attorneys  Quits Each  Year, NAT'I.
L.J., Sept. 11,  1989, at 5 (citing a 72% pay  gap  between  senior corporate  attorneys  and  government
lawyers  with similar experience);  Closing the Gap, NAT'L  LJ., Mar.  27,  1989,  at  12  (arguing  that
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demia 2°  Furthermore,  after  the second  "Cravath  shock"  in  1986,  as-
sociates'  salaries are  now comparable  to  those  of  their  counterparts  in
consulting firms and investment banks.'
Nor  can  these  differences  in  salary  be  explained  solely  on  the
ground  that associates  at elite firms  are  either  better  prepared  or  more
productive than those who work in other areas.  For example,  in a  com-
prehensive  study  of  associate  salaries  in  private  firms,  Rebitzer  and
Taylor  conclude  that differences  in  ability,  human  capital  investments,
and working  conditions  (including  hours  worked)  at most  account  for
between  42%  and  57%  of  the  wage  differential  between  associates
working  in elite firms  and  those in  small  firms.'  Adjusting  for  these
factors, the authors find that  "an associate  lawyer in the largest firm-size
category  makes roughly  $11,000  more per year  than her counterpart  in
the  smallest firm-size  category."' 3
Moreover, these  high  salaries have proven  to be resistant to down-
ward  economic  pressure. 2 4  During  the  recent  recession,  not  a single
firm cut its starting salary for fear that the move  would  signal  to poten-
tial recruits  (as  well as  to  clients)  that  the  firm  was  in  economic  trou-
ble.'  Nor have most firms created  salary differentials among  associates
or established  a separate  category  of "contract"  lawyers  who  are  paid
lower salaries  and  are  excluded  from  partnership  consideration.'26  De-
spite the obvious cost savings of both  of these strategies,  most firms have
been  dissuaded  by  the costs of increased  monitoring  and  lowered  mo-
120.  See  ABEL,  supra  note  38,  at  166-75,  206-07  (reporting  salary  differentials  between
corporate lawyers and other sectors of the profession).
121.  In 1986,  Cravath raised starting salaries  from $53,000 to $65,000, in part due  to competition
from investment banks.  See  GALANTER  &  PALAY,  supra note 24, at 56-57  (describing the second
Cravath  shock);  Tamar  Lewin,  The  Faster Track:  Why  Law  Firms Are  Losing  New Talent  to
Investment Banks, L.A. DAILY  J., Aug. 14, 1986,  at 4.  As  a  result,  the "going  rate"  for  associates  is
equivalent to (and in many cases exceeds) the starting salaries  paid  in comparable  occupations.  See
John E. Morris, Cut the Going Rate, Ami.  LAw.,  Sept. 1993, at 5,77 (reporting  that from 1982  to  1993
the consumer price index rose 41%, salaries  for Harvard MBAs 31%, base  pay  for  consultants 45%,
and starting salaries for associates 78%).
122.  See Rebitzer and Taylor, supra  note  102,  at 696-97.
123.  Id., at 697.
124.  For example,  the starting salary for associates  in New  York  City  has  remained  constant  at
approximately $83,000 even though the number  of job openings  dropped  by 50%  during  the period
from  1989-92.  See Morris, supra note  121,  at 77.
125.  See id. (noting that firms refrain  from cutting salaries in tough economic times because  they
do not want to be perceived  by clients  and  potential  associates  as  being  in financial  distress).  As
Morris notes, however, less visible items of compensation,  such  as  bar  exam  stipends,  generosity  in
expense reimbursements,  leave policies, etc., vary considerably across firms  in the same  geographic
locale.  See John E. Morris, How Do You Measure Up?, AM.  LAW.,  Sept. 1993, at 67-75.
126.  On differential compensation systems  for associates, see Attorneys and Dollars, NAT'L  LJ.,
Aug.  1994, at 27.  On the growth  in "contract"  lawyers,  see  Michael  Orey,  Staff Attorneys: Basic
Work at  Bargain Prices,  AM. LAW.,  Sept. 1987, at 20 (discussing Jones Day's program).
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rale  that appear  to flow from  making  these  distinctions  among  associ-
ates.12 7
Despite the frequent protestations by law firm hiring partners  to  the
contrary,  there is ample evidence that the high  salaries paid  by corporate
firms  are efficient  from  the  perspective  of recruiting  and  monitoring.
Many  students state that the high  salaries paid by corporate  firms are the
primary  reason  they  choose  jobs  in this sector  over  what they  consider
to be more rewarding  work  in  government  or  public  interest practice.,
More  importantly,  once  an  associate joins  a  corporate  firm,  the  high
salaries  and other benefits  create a substantial  inducement to stay.  After
years  of  deferred  gratification,  many  associates  find  irresistible  the
prospect  of  acquiring  a  lifestyle  that  is  commensurate  with  (if  not
greater  than)  their  income.  Once  they  have  bought  (often  with  the
firm's  help)  the  "right"  house,  the  "right"  car,  and joined  the  "right"
clubs,  however, they  are  dependent  on  continuing  to  earn  the  "right"
income  which they can  only do by staying at the firm.'29
Moreover,  the fact that elite firms  also  hold  out  the  possibility  of
partnership  as a means  of inducing  associates  to  work hard  and  stay  in
their jobs  does  not  render  high  associate  wages  superfluous  for  these
127.  See Alison Frankel, Debevoise Doesn't Budge, AM.  LAw., June  1993, at 76, 78  (noting that
Debevoise  &  Plimpton  has  concluded  that  lockstep  compensation  improves  morale  and  firm
collegiality).  In  addition,  it is possible that creating  a  separate  tier of  "contract"  lawyers  is  less
advantageous  than  making better  use of paralegals.  During the last  two  decades,  the  number  of
piralegals employed by large law firms has skyrocketed. See GALANTER  & PALAY,  supra note  24, at
65  (reporting  that the  number of paralegals  in large  firms  went from  14,000  in  1972  to  83,000  in
1989).  As we  note  below,  paralegals  now  perform  a  substantial  number  of  routine  legal  tasks
(including drafting, basic research, keeping track of documents)  that once were  the sole province  of
associates.  See infra note  192  and  accompanying  text.  By increasing  the  amount of work  given to
paralegals, firms can simultaneously cut client costs while increasing  profits since paralegal hours are
directly billed to clients at rates that substantially  exceed their costs.  See ABEL, supra note  38,  at  198
(arguing that "paralegals  generate  between  two  and three  times  as  much  income  for  their  firms  as
they  cost in salary  (and require  less overhead  than  associates)").  Moreover,  paralegals  must  be
supervised by associates, who in turn bill this time to clients.  Finally, a firm that uses  this strategy  can
avoid  the obvious problem  of having  to  tell  its clients that  less  than  "the  best"  lawyers  have  been
assigned to their cases.
128.  See ROBERT  GRANFIELD,  MAKING  ELITE  LAWYERS:  VISIONS  OF  LAW  AT  HARVARD  AND
BEYOND  151-53  (1992)  (reporting that the high salaries  paid  by  corporate  firms  are  a  substantial
inducement for Harvard law students who decide to work for  corporate  firms,  particularly  for those
with large loan burdens).  Luring potential recruits  from the newly emerging public  interest  and  legal
services  sectors  was  one  of Cravath's  primary  motivations for  administering  its  first  shock  to  the
going rate in 1968.  See GALANTER  &  PALAY,  supra note  24, at  56.  Even  if they  are  not primarily
interested in money (which many may  be),  applicants may  mistake  high  salaries  for a  guarantee  of
firm quality  (including the  firm's  financial  health and  stability),  distrust their  ability  to  judge  non-
monetary  compensation  (such  as  training,  interesting work,  or quality  of life),  or believe  that  it is
impossible to hold firms to their promise to deliver these other goods.
129.  It is for  this reason  that associates  often refer  to their  high  salaries  and  other benefits  as
"golden handcuffs."  See Edward A. Adams, Cravath Raises Current  Associates' Pay, N.Y. L.J.,  Dec.
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purposes. t '  Although  the promotion-to-partnership  tournament  might
be a sufficient solution  to the monitoring  problems  we describe  if every
associate  actually  participated  in  this  process, both  empirical  and  anec-
dotal  evidence  about  associate  career  paths  suggests  that  this  is  no
longer the case.  For reasons  that we discuss  more  fully in the next  two
sections, a substantial number  of the associates joining  large  law  firms
have at best a weak commitment to staying with the firm long enough  to
be considered  for partnership. 3'  For  these  associates,  the  high  wages
paid  by  corporate  firms  are a  substantial  inducement  to  work  hard  in
order to retain  these  coveted  positions  until  they decide  that  they  are
ready to leave-a decision,  as we indicated  above,  that the  salary differ-
ential between  elite firms  and  other legal  employers  may  help  to  delay
or even to change.3 2   Cravath's  latest "shock"  to  the prevailing  salary
structure-a  30%  increase  in  the  salaries  of  senior  associates-
demonstrates how much firms use high salaries  as a means of motivating
and retaining associates who have, given Cravath's notoriously  low part-
nership  rates,  little  chance  of  winning  the  promotion-to-partnership
tournament.
3 3
The  downturn  in  corporate  legal  services  in  the  early  1990s  has
only  served to  reinforce  these  incentives.  Associates  are  now  acutely
aware that they face the possibility  of being  laid off in tough  economic
times and  that firms have the incentive  to portray  this decision  as based
on the associate's  quality rather than on the firm's  poor  economic  per-
formance."
M  Given that  other  potential'employers  will  have  relatively
little information  about the quality of an associate who loses her job, the
130.  See Rebitzer and Taylor, supra note 102, at 697-98  (speculating  that firms  do not pay  high
wages to induce effort or save on monitoring costs because these problems  are adequately  taken care
of by the incentives created by  the promotion to partnership tournament).
131.  See Kordana,  supra note  106 (noting that many associates  who  now join  large  law  firms
have no intention of trying to make partner).
132.  In  this respect,  high  wages complement  tournaments  by inducing  some  associates  to  stay
with firms long enough to invest (both psychologically and  financially)  in the possibility  of becoming
partners.  This reinforcing  effect  is particularly  powerful  with  respect  to  those  associates  whose
declared  intention  to  stay  at  a  firm  for  only  two  years  is  more  a  device  for  reconciling  their
ideological  commitments  with  their  material  interests  than  a  real  statement  of  interest.  See
GRANFIELD, supra  note  127,  at 151-52 (arguing  that when  Harvard  law  students state  that they  only
intend  to stay  at their firms  for  two years  to pay  off  their  loans  they  are  engaged  in  a  form  of
ideological  work).
133.  See Adams, supra note 129 (observing that the increase was a result of Cravath's inablity  to
retain senior associates).  It remains to be seen whether these raises will actually induce associates  to
stay in circumstances  where  their prospects for  winning the tournament would not justify reducing
their chances  of securing  a  good job in  the  lateral  market.  Cf. John E.  Morris,  Weil,  Gotshal's
Generation  Gap, AM.  LAw.,  Dee.  1995, at 5 (discussing the problems of retaining senior associates  at
New York's  veil Gotshal).
134.  See David Machlowitz, How to Counterattack  If You're Losing Your Job, BARRISTER,  Spring
1991,  at 16 ("To add insult to injury, many of the firms claimed the wholesale firings did not mean the
firms'  revenues were down, but rather that the firings were  'strictly on the basis of merit."').
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negative signal that she has been  "laid  off'  is likely  to have draconian
consequences  for  her  future  employment  prospects.  Moreover,  since
associates  are  aware  that firms  have  relatively  little  information  about
actual  associate  quality  (particularly  in  the  early  years)  they  know  that
decisions about  whom to lay off can  be based  on a wide array  of small
and  potentially  random  distinctions.  They  therefore  have  a  strong  in-
centive  to  ensure  that  all aspects  of  their  performance  (from  hours  to
dress code) are beyond  reproach.
In sum, the high  wages  paid  by  elite firms help  to  create  a culture
of fear that motivates associates  to work hard even in  the absence  of ex-
tensive monitoring.  Not only  do  associates know  that there  are  a large
number of capable lawyers who would love the chance to work at one  of
these  high paying  jobs, but  they  are  also  aware that  any  hint  that  they
are leaving their firm on anything less than the best of terms  will have a
devastating  effect  on their  future  employment  prospects.'35  Even  those
who do  not see  themselves  as  having  long  term  careers  with  the  firm
have an incentive to work productively  as a means  of keeping  their  op-
tions  open.  The  pyramidal  structure  employeed  by  many  large  firms
reinforces  these effects.
b.  Pyramiding
Even before they began paying high  salaries, law  firms employed  a
promotion-to-partnership  tournament  to  induce  both  hard  work  and
loyalty.  The basic  parameters  of this competition  have remained  fairly
constant:  firms  pay  recent  law  school  graduates  along  a  fixed  salary
scale for six to ten years,  at the end  of which  time they  promise  to  pro-
mote those associates who have demonstrated  that they  have the greatest
potential for making  long  term contributions  to  the firm. 36  This prac-
tice tends to produce  a pyramid  structure,  since  in order  to  be an  effec-
tive  substitute  for  direct  monitoring,  there  must  be  fewer  tournament
winners than  entering  associates.  Recent  changes  in  the  size,  competi-
tiveness, and profit  structure  of large  law firms,  however, have  accentu-
ated this trend.
As elite firms have grown in  size, they have  also  tended  to become
more highly leveraged.  The reasons  for this change are straightforward.
Partners  make  money  on the surplus  of revenues  generated  by  associ-
ates over the amount they  are  paid.  Although  the high  salaries  paid  to
associates increases  the cost of leverage, these costs  are  more  than  offset
135.  As  the head of the bankruptcy practice at an  elite New  York  law  firm  is  reported  to  have
told his associates (during a morale boosting talk!) a few months  after  a  wave  of firings at  the  firm:
"Well,  there is one thing I want to say to you.  There are no jobs out there.  But there are thousands  of
people who could do your jobs just as well as you.  Think about  it."  Jonathan Foreman,  Poor People
Skills Can Collapse Firms,  NAT'L L.J. 1,  Jan. 29, 1996.
136.  See GALANTER &  PALAY,  supra  note 24, at 100.
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by  the profits  these  lawyers generate  from  the  time  that they  join  the
firm.'37  As a result, the size of a firm is positively correlated with partner
income. 3
1  Moreover,  the  smaller  the  number  of  partners  entitled  to
share in  this profit, the bigger each individual partner's  share is likely  to
be.  Not  surprisingly,  as  the  larger  classes  of  associates  hired  in  the
boom  years  of the  1970s  and  1980s  moved  through  the system, many
firms  decided that "there  [was] just not room  at the top"  to  accommo-
date even the same percentage  of partners  that the firm  was prepared  to
make from the smaller associate  classes of the  1960s. 3 9
In  addition,  the  growing  competitiveness  of  the  legal  market  has
also led law firms to institute a new tournament  to solve a problem  that,
for  many,  has  proved  to  be even  more  important  and  intractable  than
the  problems  of  monitoring  and  motivating  associates:  preventing
shirking  by  partners.  Traditional  structures  such  as  lifetime  tenure,
lock-step  compensation,  and  autonomous  working  conditions  afford
partners  ample opportunity  to shirk on both the quantity  and  quality  of
their work for the firm.40  At the opposite  extreme,  non-shirking  part-
ners  (particularly  those  with  their  own  clients)  now  have  access  to  an
active lateral market where they can sell their services  to the highest  bid-
der.
4'
Firms have generally  responded  to these  problems  by  raising  the
income  of productive  partners  and  by  cutting  the  compensation  of-
and  in  some  cases  dismissing-unproductive  partners. 42  At  the  same
time,  many  firms  have  effectively  recreated  the  promotion-to-
137.  As  Richard  Abel  cogently argued  in  1989, "If we  make  the ...  realistic  assumption  that
starting associates are billing 2000 hours annually at $75 an hour, they easily earn the  firm  more than
three times their salaries, even though these  now start at more  than  $50,000  at some  firms."  ABEL,
supra note 38, at  192.  To be sure,  the firm  must pay  the associates'  overhead  out of these profits
(e.g., secretarial support, office space, supplies).  Moreover, it is possible that firms will not be able to
bill every  hour a beginning  associate  works  to  a  client.  Despite  these  caveats,  however,  many
observers believe that associates  become profitable almost immediately.  See,  e.g.,  Steven  Brill, The
New Leverage, AM.  LAw.,  July/Aug.  1993,  at 5,  65  (arguing  that under  traditional  billing practices,
law firms make profits on  associates "after  1,200-1,400 hours"  depending  upon  overhead);  James  F.
Fitzpatrick, Legal Future  Shock: The Role of Large Law Firms  by the End of the Century, 64 IND.  L.
461,464 (1989)  (arguing that associates  are  immediately  profitable);  NELSON,  supra note 24, at 77
(same).  As we argue below, the less resources  firms spend on training a given  associate,  the higher
will be their return on these hours.  See infra text accompanying note 149.
138.  See ABEL,  supra  note 38, at 194 (citing data).
139.  See Peter Griggs & Daviryne McNeill,  Upper  Ranks Add Heft at Most Big D.C. Firms, LEG.
TIMEs,  Dec. 28,  1987-Jan.  4, 1988, at 4.
140.  See  Gilson  & Mnookin,  Human  Capitalists, supra  note  63,  at  341-46  (describing  how
traditional partnerships  are vulnerable to partner shirking).
141.  See  GALANTER  &  PALAY,  supra note  24,  at  54-55  (describing  the  lateral  market  for
partners).
142.  See ABEL,  supra  note 38, at  185.  Significantly, the few  firms  that have resisted  this trend
(e.g.,  Cravath  and  Cleary,  Gottlieb)  are  among  the  most  highly  leveraged  (and  therefore  most
profitable) firms in the country.
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partnership  tournament  for  partners  by  establishing  multi-tiered  part-
nership systems.'
4
1
These  changes  in the structure  of  large  law firms  threaten  to  un-
dermine  the effectiveness  of the  promotion-to-partnership  tournament
as a device for motivating associates to work  diligently  and  competently
with  relatively  little  supervision.  The  combination  of  diminished
chances  of becoming  a partner  and  reduced  rewards  (e.g.,  diminished
job security, greater delay  in obtaining  substantial financial  rewards)  for
those who win  the tournament are likely to lead some number of associ-
ates to conclude  that becoming  a partner is neither  sufficiently  plausi-
ble-nor perhaps  even sufficiently  desirable-to justify  the tremendous
sacrifices that it takes to reach  this goal.
This dynamic  presents  two challenges  for  elite firms.  First,  many
associates  do  not  see  themselves  as  participating  in  the  tournament.
Second,  because  outside  employment  prospects  are  likely  to  decrease
the closer they get to the partnership  decision,  firms  will have difficulty
retaining senior associates.1"
The pyramid structure  ameliorates both of these potential  pitfalls to
firm profitability.  As Heinz  and Loumann  observe:  "In  the practice  of
law-as on  the assembly  line and  in  many  other  sorts  of work-an  al-
most inevitable consequence of the division  of labor  has  been  a routini-
zation  of tasks for  most of the workers.' 14 5   Both  client  pressures  and
the firm's economic  interests dictate that wherever possible, work  should
be divided  into  those  aspects  that  require  discretionary  judgment  and
those that do not, with the latter "flow[ing]  to the lowest  level within  the
firm that can  perform  it satisfactorily."'46  As a result, firms  generate  a
143.  See  ALTMAN  &  WEIL,  INC.,  COMPENSATION  PLANS  FOR  LAWYERS  AND  THEIR  STAFFS:
SALARIES,  BONUSES  AND  PROFIT-SHARING  11  (1986) (reporting that one-half of all firms  with 75 or
more  lawyers  had  at least two classes  of partners);  D.  Weston  Darby  Jr.,  Are  You  Keeping  Up
Financially?,  A.B.A.  1,  Dec.  1985,  at 66,  68  (reporting  that 25%  of  a  sample  of  150  large-  and
medium-size law firms had more than one class of partners).  Kordana  is therefore  right  to note  that
monitoring problems among partners  should lead  to partners  engaging  "in  a  series  of  tournaments
throughout  their careers."  See Kordana,  supra note  106,  at  1917 & n.54 (using  this  prediction  to
dismiss  tournament theory).  Given  these  multi-level  partner  compensation  systems  and  the  ever-
present danger that unproductive  partners will be fired,  many partners  effectively  do  face  an  almost
endless series of promotion contests.
144.  See Morris,  supra note  133,  at  5,  7 (discussing the  problem  of retaining  senior  associates
(years seven to ten) because of the difficulty  they face in getting jobs elsewhere  if they  do  not  make
partner); Gilson & Mnookin, Coming ofAge, supra note 63, at 591 (discussing  the  negative  effects  of
being turned down for partnership  on an associate's out placement prospects).  We return to this issue
below.  See infra note 288 and accompanying text.
145.  HEINZ & LAUMANN,  supra  note 66 at 133-34.
146.  JOHN G. lEzzi,  RESULTS-ORIENTED  FINANCIAL  MANAGEMENT:  A  GUIDE  TO  SUCCESSFUL
LAW  FIRM  FINANCIAL  PERFORMANCE  7 (1993).  Dividing  projects  in this fashion  arguably  serves
both the firm's interest (in maximizing the number of timekeepers  billing  on  a given  matter) and  the
client's  desire to pay the higher rates charged by partners  and senior associates only when successful
completion  of the task actually  requires  the  kind  of  discretionary  judgment  these  senior  lawyers
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good  deal  of "repetitive  and  ministerial  tasks"  that  can be proftably  be
assigned  to junior  associates. 1 47  This,  in  turn,  helps  to  insulate  firms
from  the economic  consequences  of the  high  associate  turn-over  rates
produced  by  the  diminished  attractiveness  of  the  promotion-to-
partnership  tournament.
Nevertheless,  firms  must  still  produce  senior  lawyers  who  both
monitor the ministerial  work  of junior  lawyers  and perform  those  tasks
that do  call for expertise  or judgment.  This brings  us  to  the  issue  of
training.
c.  Tracking and Training
The continued  viability of any  elite law firm  rests  on  its ability  to
reproduce  its partners  and  to  maintain  a  cadre  of  able  and  motivated
senior  associates.  Although  firms  can  look  to  the  burgeoning  lateral
market to satisfy some of their needs, most senior lawyers must come up
through  the ranks.4  As a result, firms  must  invest  some  resources  in
training.
Given their pyramid  structure,  however, it is grossly  inefficient  for
firms  to train  all of their  associates.  This  structure  ensures  that  most
associates  will leave the firm  before  becoming  partners.  Hence,  while
the firm  needs  a few trained  senior  associates,  it has  little  incentive  to
should have acquired during their tenure with the firm.  We  return to this tension  below.  See infra
text accompanying  notes  155-156.
147.  KRONMAN,  supra note 91,  at 285-86.  Kronman's  assessment is  confirmed  by  a  host  of
testimonials by young lawyers  reported  in a  recent  "insider's  guide"  to life  in large  law  firms.  See
THE  INSIDER'S  GUIDE  TO  LAW  FIRMs  331  (Sheila  V.  Malkani  &  Michael  F. Walsh  eds.,  1994)
[hereinafter  "INSIDER'S  GUIDE"]  (quoting associates  at Chadbourne and  Park  as  complaining  that
most corporate  and  litigation  associates  handle  "mundane"  drafting and  research  assignments  and
deal with "a lot of paper");  id. at 351 (reporting  that associates  at Dewey  Ballantine  complain  that
their assignments involve "grunt work that has nothing to do with legal work").  Of course,  not every
area  of practice  lends  itself to this kind of division.  For example,  litigation  and  general  corporate
departments are more highly leveraged than tax departments.  See Kordana, supra note  106,  at  1925-
28 (linking the lower leverage rates in tax departments  to the fact that there is less "paperwork" to  be
done in this area).  Moreover, just because work is "repetitive and ministerial" does not mean that it is
not important  or that large  negative consequences-such  as  losing clients  or suffering  malpractice
judgments-might  not result from an  associate's  failure  to perform  one of these  simple  tasks  in  a
competent and timely fashion.
148.  Theoretically, a firm could rely entirely on the lateral market to satisfy its need for qualified
senior associates.  Although  many firms  actively  recruit  senior associates,  several  factors  limit the
usefulness of this strategy.  First, if a firm relied entirely on lateral entrants, the firm's own associates
would  have  no  incentive  to  participate  in  the  promotion-to-partnership  tournament  since  this
tournament would have no  winners.  Moreover,  a senior  associate  is  only valuable  if she has  been
well trained.  As we have said throughout, firms will have a difficult time making  this kind of quality
judgment in all cases.  Given that the firm is likely  to have  better information about its own  lawyers
than  those  working  at other  firms, however,  it has  good  reason  to  believe  that  subjective  quality
judgments  about the former group  will be  more  reliable  than  evaluations  of outsiders  and  therefore
has an incentive to promote  its own  associates.  Finally, there is  some reason  to believe  that home-
grown  senior associates  and  partners  will  be  more  loyal  to the firm than  those  who  have  already
shown  their willingness to switch  firms when a better offer comes along.
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invest scarce training resources  on  lawyers who are  not going  to  stay  at
the firm long enough for the firm to recoup  that investment. 49  Moreo-
ver, so long  as  there is  work that can  be  done  profitably  by  inexperi-
enced  lawyers,  firms  have  an  incentive  to  keep  some  number  of
untrained  associates  on their staffs.
In addition, even  if the firm  as a whole  has  an interest  in ensuring
that every associate gets some minimal level  of training, individual  part-
ners do not.  Associate training is both  a public good for the firm  and  a
private  good  for  individual  partners.  The  firm  as  a  whole  arguably
benefits  when  all  associates  receive  some  credible  level  of  training.'
Individual  partners,  however, have sub-optimal  incentives  to  contribute
to  the production  of this firm-wide  benefit.  Training  is costly  to indi-
vidual partners;  time spent training is time that the partner  cannot  spend
either producing  revenue  or consuming  leisure.  The benefits  of train-
ing, on  the other  hand,  are  diffuse.  To  be sure, every partner  needs  a
certain  number  of well-trained  associates  to  do  his or her work.  Time
spent training  these associates produces  private gains  for  the partner-if
that associate continues to work for the training  partner.  Given that  as-
sociates typically  work for more  than  one  partner,  however, no  individ-
ual  partner  will  be  able  to  capture  the  full  value  of  time  invested  in
training.'5'  As  a  result,  partners  have strong  incentives  to  ration  time
spent on training and to invest only in those associates  who are likely  to
benefit them  and their practices  directly.
Given these incentives, we expect partners  to  make  decisions  about
how to staff projects according to the following criteria:5 2
First, partners  will have  a preference  for  associates  who need  little
or no  training.  Monitoring  the work  of other lawyers  is both  difficult
and expensive.  Partners  want to  staff their  projects  with associates  who
149.  The incentive to invest in those who will leave is not zero,  since  firms  want  to maintain  the
good will of lawyers who  may end up working for potential clients.
150.  We assume  that well-trained lawyers  are generally  more productive (even  on menial  tasks)
and that associates value training and are therefore  more likely (all else being  equal)  to apply  to and
select firms that provide this good.  These benefits would still have to be  weighed  against  the cost  of
training  all  associates  and  the  danger  that  even  firms  that  do  so  will  lose  associates  to  their
competitors who will then reap  the benefits of the training without incurring  the  costs.  As  we  argue
below, this trade-off helps to explain why firms  have moved to formal  training programs, which allow
them to hold  themselves  out as offering  real  training  without having  to  incur  the  substantial  costs
associated with supervisorial training.  See infra  text accompanying notes  361-370  (discussing  formal
training programs).
151.  In firms in which a relatively  small  number  of partners  freely  share  trained  associates,  as
well  as  the  revenues  generated  by all  partners,  this  externality  is  not  very  important  since  each
partner has an important incentive not to shirk his or her fair share of  the training  duties.  Moreover.
in  small  firms,  it  is  easier  for  partners  to  monitor  each  other for  compliance  with  this  mutual
obligation.  For the reasons discussed  above, this mutual monitoring is now less  likely.  See supra text
accompanying notes  108-113 (discussing size and specialization).
152.  This description assumes that there is no formal training  or assignment  system.  In  Part  IV,
we examine how various formal assignment and training systems might alter these incentives.
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will be able  to  do  the  work  with relatively  little  supervision.  Finding
lawyers  who can perform tasks  competently  and quickly is  therefore  the
preeminent  selection  criterion.
Second, if the partner can  secure  the  services  of such an  associate,
the  partner  will  invest  in further  training  that  lawyer.  Although  this
seems  paradoxical  (since the lawyer was  selected because he or  she only
needed  minimal  training  to do  the job), training  superstar  associates  is
nevertheless  an important part of the implicit bargain that partners strike
with  these new entrants  and their colleagues.'53
Third, to the extent possible, partners  will leave training  and  super-
visory  functions to senior associates.  These  lawyers,  however, have little
incentive  to invest in  training,  as opposed  to supervising,  their charges.
As an initial matter, there is  a limit to what any  particular  senior  associ-
ate knows.  More importantly,  since senior associates  are also  competing
for  scarce training  opportunities  and  attempting  to signal  partners  that
they  are well trained,  these  associates  have  an  incentive  to keep  good
work assignments  (e.g.,  those  involving  client  contact,  court  appear-
ances,  or plum  writing  assignments)  for  themselves  instead  of  passing
them down  the line.  The  fact that  only  a few of these  lawyers  will be-
come partners  further  increases  their  incentive to  take  credit  for  good
work done by  their juniors  and  to  blame  their  charges  for  their  own
mistakes.'-
As a result, associates will gradually be divided into two broad  cate-
gories:  those  who have received  training  (or are  considered  worthy  of
receiving training)  and those who have not (and who  are  not considered
good  training  prospects).  Although  the boundaries  between  these  two
groups  are  fluid, they  nevertheless  will  tend  to  be  self-perpetuating.
Trained  associates can  lose their  privileged  status  by  making  mistakes
that  cause  partners  to  doubt  that  their  training  investment  will  be  re-
couped (or to  suspect that the reputational  costs  of being  seen  as push-
ing  a  relatively  weak  associate  outweigh  the  benefits  of  providing
training).  Similarly,  previously  untrained  associates  can  come  to  the
attention  of partners  by doing  exemplary  work on routine  assignments.
More often, however, once  an  associate  has been  trained,  other  partners
have an incentive  to use  her  and  to  provide  additional  training.  Those
153.  As  an  initial  matter,  a  partner  may  hope  that  if she  trains  a  superstar  associate,  that
associate  will be more  likely to want  to work  with the  partner  in  the  future.  To  the  extent  that
partners must inevitably share associates, providing  good training to someone  else's protege  makes  it
more likely that your protege will also receive good training when working for others.
154.  See D.  Jean  Veta,  Grabbing the Brass Ring: Making  Partner  at a Large Firm,  in THE
WOMAN  ADVOCATE:  EXCELLING IN THE  90'S  (Jean  M. Snyder  & Andra  B.  Greene  eds.,  1995),  at
265, 274.  Although  partners  can  increase  a  senior  associate's  incentive to  invest in training junior
lawyers by weighting this  factor more heavily in their calculus  for making new partners, the difficulty
of differentiating senior lawyers on this basis is likely to deter partners  from adopting this strategy.
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who do not get trained,  on the other  hand,  are less likely  to  receive  the
kind of work that will give them  the opportunity  to  become  trained  (or
otherwise to demonstrate their talent).
Those  who  have not  been  trained  face  diminishing  opportunities
for  success.  Although  we  have  seen  that  firms  generate  a  substantial
amount  of relatively  routine  work,  clients  will not  pay  for  this  work  to
be  done  by  senior  associates when  it can  be handled  just as  effectively
by  lower-cost junior associates.'55  As a result, an  associate  who has  not
been trained  will gradually find that she has  less  and  less work  assigned
to  her  as  the firm  becomes  unable  to  bill  her  increasingly  expensive
time to clients.- 6
Figure  1 portrays  this divergence.  The curved  line  denoting  asso-
ciates receiving  training  represents  the  standard  story  told  to  law  stu-
dents  by every  hiring partner during recruiting  season:  "Our firm loses
money  on  associates  during  the  first  several  years  because  we  invest
heavily  in training  these  young  women  and  men  to  become  excellent
lawyers.  Even if you only stay at our firm a few years,  you  will develop
the skills and  dispositions  that  will  help  you  succeed  at  any  legal  job
you choose  to take  on."'57  The flat line denoting associates  who are  not
receiving  training, however, portrays  the  reality  that  many  enthusiastic
recruits find when  they join elite law firms:  an initial period  of grinding
but undemanding  work, followed by a gradual  slow  down  until  they  are
gently but firmly  told that their services  are no longer needed.'58
155.  See Abram  Chayes  & Antonia  H.  Chayes,  Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37
STAN. L. REV.  277, 291-92  (1985)  (reporting  that corporate  counsel  monitor firms  for  overstaffing
and overbilling).
156.  Firms, of course,  have an incentive to prolong this process as long as possible since  a  senior
associate's  higher  billing rate potentially  increases  profits.  Given that most  firms  have  few  senior
associates,  the  opportunity  costs  of  using  one  of  these  valuable  assets  in  such  a  relatively
unproductive  manner  is  high  enough  to  discourage  firms  from  indulging  in  this  mild  form  of
overcharging.
157.  For an  example  of this kind of rhetoric,  see,  e.g.,  JOEL  F.  HENNING,  MAXIMIZING  LAW
FIRM  PROFITABILITY:  HIRING,  TRAINING  AND  DEVELOPING  PRODUCTIVt  LAWYERS  3-1  (1991)
(warning  that many  associates  are not interested  in long-term  careers  with  firms;  "[ilnstead,  they
seek  postgraduate  skills  training to  become  competent  lawyers,  and  they  know  that  the  private
corporate law firm is the best place to acquire that training").
158.  As  with  any  model,  Figure  1 oversimplifies  the phenominon  it attempts  to represent.  For
example,  because  firms  take time to determine  which  associates  will  receive  training,  there  is  a
period where the marginal productivity of all associates (by which we simply mean the net income  an
associate  generates  for  the firm)  is  roughly  the  same.  In  addition,  the  marginal  productivity  of
associates who do not receive  training  never flattens  out completely,  since  over  time these  lawyers
become  more  proficient  at the routine  tasks  to  which  they  are  assigned.  Notwithstanding,  these
simplifications, Figure I captures the essential difference  between  associates  who  are  being  trained
and those who are not.  It also explains why  the barrier  to moving  from the  "flatlining  track"  to the
"training track" becomes more solid as time passes.  Higher billing rates both increase the opportunity
costs associated  with training senior associates  and reduce the potential  benefits  since  their expected
future at the firm is shorter.  This combination  makes it extremely unlikely that partners will decide  to
invest in their training.  Cf Note,  Why  Law Firms Cannot  Afford  to Maintain the Mommy  Track,  109
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The  separation  of  associates  into  a  "training  track"  and  a
"flatlining  track"  highlights  two  important  differences  between  elite
law firms  and  the organizations  portrayed  in standard  touranment  the-
ory  models.  First, contrary  to standard tournament theory,  firms  do  not
run a competition  in which every  associate  is given an  equal  chance  to
succeed. 59  Instead,  from  a  very  early  date,  firms  begin  giving  some
employees the capital that it takes to succeed in the firm while failing  to
provide this  essential good  to  others.  An  analogy  can  be drawn  to the
social  structure  of bees."W  If a bee  larvae  is fed  a rich  nutrient  (called
"Royal  Jelly")  by  the queen,  that bee  will develop  into  a queen.'6'  If
that  same  bee  receives  no  Royal  Jelly,  it will  develop  into  a  worker
bee.'62  Training is the Royal Jelly of elite law firms.  Those  who  receive
it have a realistic chance of becoming  "queens"  capable  of supporting
their own  cadre  of worker  bees.  Those  who  do  not are  destined  to re-
main worker bees whose usefulness  to the hive will eventually draw to an
end.
HARV.  L. REV.  1375,  1379  (1996)  (with  constant pressure  on  partners  to improve their  productivity,
they have only a finite amount of time to invest in training associates).
159.  See  generally, Rebitzer  and Taylor, supra note  102,  at  681-84  (describing  the  standard
assumptions underlying tournament theory).
160.  We are grateful  to Ian Ayres for suggesting this wonderful analogy.
161.  See BERNHARD  GRZIMEK,  GRZIMEK'S  ANIMAL  LIEr  ENCYCLOPEDIA,  461 (2d ed. 1975).
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Second, the process  of picking  partners  is therefore  more  straight-
forward than tournament theory suggests.  By the time tournament  win-
ners  are  selected,  the  firm  will have  had  eight  to  ten  years  to  collect
information  about  which  associates  are  receiving  the  Royal  Jelly  of
training  and  to  determine  whether  those  who  have  received  this  good
have developed  as  expected.  Moreover, because  firms  know  both  that
their future  productivity  depends  upon  accurately  assessing  this infor-
mation and that associates  (particularly  senior  associates)  are  in  a good
position  to  evaluate  the  fairness  of the firm's  partnership  choices, firm
leaders  have  strong  incentives  to  weigh  the  information  they  collect
carefully.  As a result, partnership  decisions are  likely  to  be  much  more
highly  correlated  with future  productivity  than  hiring  decisions  at  the
associate level.
63
Success  at a large law firm  depends,  therefore,  on  not becoming  a
flatliner,  which  in  turn  is  dependent  on  obtaining  the  Royal  Jelly  of
training.  This  is true  for  all  associates,  white and  black.  We predict,
however, that black  associates are,  on  average,  less likely  to  receive  this
essential good than their white peers-just  as the  structure  of elite firms
makes it less likely that they will be hired in the first instance.  The  next
Part tests this hypothesis  in the context  of recruitment  and training.
I
THE APPLICATION:  MAPPING  THE RACIAL  LAW  OF AVERAGES
We posit that  there  are  two reasons  why  discrimination  is likely  to
be  a stable equilibrium  in firms  that  employ  high  wages  and  complex
institutional  mechanisms  such  as touranments  and  tracking  to  save  on
monitoring costs.  First, these devices  reduce a firm's  incentive  to  detect
and  correct practices  that systematically  disadvantage  "average"  blacks.
Second,  since blacks therefore  face higher barriers  to  success, they  have
a  corresponding  incentive  to  invest  in  human  capital  strategies  that,
paradoxically,  reduce  their  chances  for  success  even  further.  In  this
Section,  we explore both of these  hypothesies  in  light  of publicly  avail-
able  statistical  and anecdotal  evidence and  our own preliminary  data.
Before proceeding, however, it is  important  to underscore  the limi-
tations of this inquiry.  Elite  law firms have recently  become  an  impor-
tant subject of academic  investigation."  In addition,  both  the  legal  and
163.  See O'Flaherty & Siow, supra note  103, at 727 (arguing that firms make correct  partnership
decisions  82.3%  of the  time).  The  authors  nevertheless  assert  that  firms  are  likely  promote  a
substantial  number of "unqualified"  associates to partnership.  This  conclusion,  however,  is based  in
part on their assumption that the "qualifications"  of potential partners are fixed before  they  are  hired
by the firm.  See id. at 711.  For the reasons  stated above,  we believe this assumption  is incorrect.
164.  See generally GALANTER  &  PALAY,  supra note 24; Gilson  & Mnookin,  Coming of Age,
supra note 63; Peter D. Scherer, Leveraging Human Assets  in Law Firms: Human Capital  Structures
and Organizational  Capabilities,  48  INDUS. & LAB.  REL. REV.  671  (1995).
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the popular  press  have taken  a  substantial  interest  in  these  institutions
and the lives of the lawyers who  work there.'65  As a result, there is now  a
substantial volume  of information  about corporate  firms  in  the  public
domain.  There  are, however, limitations  on the usefulness and reliability
of these accounts.  For the most part, the  academic  literature  is theoreti-
cal,  rather than empirical,  often  relying  on anecdotal  evidence  from  the
legal  press. 66  These  latter accounts  are  subject to  a variety  of  familiar
defects  in  terms  of selectivity and  reliability.'67  Our  own  analysis  nev-
ertheless follows in this tradition.  As a result, our  tone  is speculative  in
recognition  of the large gaps in our knowledge  about  the experiences  of
both black and white lawyers at elite firms.
We  have,  however, supplemented  the publicly  available  data  with
our own preliminary  research  on black  Harvard  Law School  graduates.
Our  data  comes  from  three  sources.  First, we  examined  the  data  re-
ported in  the Harvard Law School Alumni Directory for black graduates
of the  classes of  1981,  1982,  1987,  and  1988.  Second,  we  sent  out  a
brief survey  to  200  Harvard  black  alumni  associated  with  the  Harvard
Black Law Students Association.  The  overall  results  of  both  of  these
efforts  are presented  in the  Appendix  in  Tables  1 and  2  respectively.
Third, we sent a brief request  to 250  corporate  firms  around  the coun-
try,  asking  them  to  provide  information  about  their  entering  class  of
associates for 1995-96.  Finally, we have included,  where  relevant, sum-
maries of comments during interviews conducted by Professor Wilkins.
Our emphasis  on  Harvard graduates  is not simply parochial.  Har-
vard  graduates  are  an  important  part  of  the  total  population  of black
lawyers.  This is true for two reasons.  First, Harvard  has more black  stu-
dents  than  any  of the other law  schools  from  which  elite firms  recruit.
Second,  because  we hypothesize  that  the  institutional  practices  we  de-
scribe  are most likely to disadvantage  "average"  blacks,  the experience
of black  students  from  Harvard  (given  the  school's  overall  reputation
for  quality  and  record  of successfully  placing  its graduates)  should  on
average  be  better (and  certainly  no  worse)  than  the  experiences  of
165.  See GALANTER & PALAY,  supra  note 24, at 68-75 (discussing the "new  information  order"
in which  publications, such  as the American Lawyer, report  on  the once-secret  world  of corporate
firms).
166.  For three  notable  exceptions  to this trend,  see JOHN  HAGAN  &  FIONA  KAY,  GENDER  IN
PRACrICE:  A STUDY  OF LAWYERS'  LivEs  (1995)  (discussing  differences  among  Toronto lawyers);
NELSON,  supra note 24  (studying four  large  Chicago  law  firms); Chambliss, supra note 7 (studying
gender and racial  integration in selected firms).
167.  On  the dangers  of relying  on  anecdotal  evidence,  see  Craig  A.  Nard,  Empirical Legal
Scholarship:  Reestablishing  a Dialogue Between the Academy  and Profession, 30 WAKE  FOREST  L
REV. 347,  349 (1995)  (criticizing the lack of legal scholarship based  on  statistical  data,  since  without
such data it is difficult to draw conclusions or formulate policy).
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blacks  from  other  schools.6  If anything,  therefore,  our  emphasis  on
Harvard  graduates should understate the effects we predict.
Once again, it is important to emphasize the limited use to which we
intend  to  put  these  data.  We make  no  claims  that  the  results  of  our
analysis  are  statistically  significant  or  that they  meet  the  relevant  stan-
dards for empirical research.  As Tables  1 and 2 indicate,  the total  num-
ber of black  graduates  included  in  our  two  samples  is  relatively  small
and we have no way of measuring  whether those who answered  our  sur-
vey or sent their information  to the Harvard Alumni Office  are  different
in relevant ways from  those  whom  we have failed  to  locate.'69  In  addi-
tion,  we  do  not  have comparable  data  on  white Harvard  Law  School
graduates.  Nor is there much comparable data on white  lawyers  in  gen-
eral.  We therefore  do not  claim  to  have proven anything.  Instead,  we
offer our data, as we offer our model,  as  an  invitation  to  discussion  and
further work.
We divide our review  of the data into  two parts:  recruiting  and  re-
tention.  As those  concerned  with law firm  integration  consistently  re-
port,  simply hiring  more  black  lawyers  is unlikely  to  change  the racial
composition of these  institutions in  light of the fact  that virtually  all  of
these new  entrants  leave  before  making  partner. 70  Retention,  not  re-
cruitment,  is therefore  the  key  to  increasing  the number  of  black  law-
yers.  Retention,  however, is affected  by  the dynamics  of the  recruiting
process.  Obviously, before a black lawyer can successfully  move herself
on  to the "training  track,"  she  must  first be  hired.  Moreover,  many
knowledgeable  observers  believe  that  the  fewer blacks  that  a  firm  al-
ready  has among  its associates  and partners,  the more  difficult  it will be
to recruit black students.'  Conversely, by focusing  on  a few easily  ob-
168.  See  MONA  HARRINGTON,  WOMEN  LAWYERS:  REWRITING  THE  RULES  10-11  (1994)
(justifying the author's decision  to focus on Harvard Law School  graduates).
169.  Our sample from the Harvard  Alumni  Directory  contains  sixty members  of the classes  of
1981  and  1982, and fifty-seven  members of the classes  of 1987  and  1988.  Appendix,  Table  1.  In
addition, sixty-six black alumni (out of approximately 200 who were sent  the questionnaire)  returned
our survey, including twenty-one pre-1986 graduates  and forty-five post-1986  graduates.  Appendix,
Table 2.  There may  be some overlap between the Alumni Directory sample  and  those  who returned
our survey.
170.  "In  fact, as in every other major city which  has studied  the  matter,  minority  retention  was
stated  by the  interviewees  in every  large  San  Francisco  employer  to  be  the  firm's  most  serious
problem."  S.F. REPORT, supra note 33, at 17 (footnote omitted).  See  also Davis, supra  note  15,  at  1
(reporting "significant attrition in their latter years has  left partnership  ranks  almost  as  white  as  five
years  ago.").
171.  "'Recruitment is one thing, but if you can't keep people in,  it doesn't  do  any  good.  And  if
you can't keep people in,  that hurts you the next  time you  go  to recruit."'  Eric  Herman,  Committee
Targets Retention of  Minorities at Big Law Firms, CH.  LAW.,  May  1995,  at  13  (quoting  W.  Muzette
Hill,  a  founder  of the Chicago  Committee on  Minorities  in Large  Law  Firms).  See  also, Robert
Schmidt, Minority Lawyers and the D.C.  Firm: Race, Culture, and Sexism  Make  Integration  Drfficult
at Law Offices, LEG.  TIMEs, Sept. 26, 1994, at S42,  S46 ("Observers  agree,  however,  that no matter
how aggressively  a  firm recruits  minority attorneys,  if it doesn't  have a  'critical  mass'  of minority
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servable signals that are  only  loosely  correlated  with valuable job  skills,
the recruiting process  creates incentives that will  adversely  affect  the re-
tention  prospects  of those blacks  who  are  hired.  It is  therefore  neces-
sary  to look at both  recruiting and retention if one is  to understand  why
blacks  continue to  be underrepresented  at corporate firms.
A.  Recruitment
Law firms  have changed  their  hiring practices  dramatically  during
the last thirty  years.  In  the "golden  age,"  the process  was  both  brief
and  informal,  consisting  primarily  of  walk-in  interviews  during  the
Christmas holidays.'  In that insular  world,  social connections  counted
at least as much as academic standing.'  Blacks  were systematically  ex-
cluded even  in those instances  where  they  clearly met the firm's  stated
qualifications.
Compared  to these  not-so-golden  practices,  the  current  recruiting
system is both  open  and  meritocratic.' 7   Firms now  expend  enormous
resources  (in  dollars  and  time)  on  interviewing  second,  third,  and  even
some first year  students for summer  and full  time positions. 1 7 6  Moreo-
partners,  minority  law  students or lateral  associates  will likely look elsewhere.");  Chambliss  supra
note 7,  at  190.  There  are  a  number  of  reasons  why  this  might  be  true,  including  the  greater
willingness of black lawyers to invest in discovering the actual quality of black  applicants,  the ability
of black insiders to point out and correct for  overt  and  covert discriminatory  practices,  and  the fact
that black applicants are more likely to gravitate toward a firm where there are  other  black  lawyers.
See Ed  Cray, Blacks and Browns in Blue-Chip Firms, CAL.  LAW.,  Oct.  1984,  at  35,  36  (quoting
Stanford's placement director as  stating,  "Students  look to see  the NALP  [National  Association  for
Law  Placement]  breakdown  of  statistics.  If  no  minorities  are  represented  in  a  firm,  they  ask
themselves  'why,'  and then  'why  not."').  We  return to the  role  that  black  lawyers  can  play  as
possible "change agents"  in Part  IV.  See  infra notes  398-401  and  accompanying  text.  The phrase
"change agents"  comes from Menkel-Meadow, supra note  12.
172.  See GALANTER  & PALAY,  supra note 24, at 24.
173.  See SMIGEL,  supra note  13, at 37 (noting that firms wanted "lawyers  who  are  Nordic,  have
pleasing  personalities  and  'clean-cut'  appearances,  are graduates  of the  'right'  schools,  have  the
'right'  social  background  and  experience  in  the  affairs  of  the  world,  and  are  endowed  with
tremendous  stamina").  The  group most obviously  disadvantaged  by these  additional  criteria  were
Jews, who,  despite their superstar academic credentials,  were virtually excluded from most corporate
firms until the late 1960s.  See GALANTER  &  PALAY,  supra note 24, at 25.  Indeed,  as  Paul  Cravath
noted in a famous speech to Harvard law  students,  law  finns did not particularly  value  brilliance  at
all:
Brilliant intellectual  powers are  not essential.  Too  much imagination,  too  much  wit,  too
great  cleverness,  too facile  fluency,  if not leavened  by a sound sense  of  proportion  are
quite as likely to impede success as to promote  it.  The best clients are  apt to be afraid  of
those qualities.  They want as their counsel a man who is primarily honest,  safe,  sound and
steady.
2 ROBERT  T. SWAINE,  THE  CRAVATH  FIRM  AND  ITS PREDECESSORS  1819-1948, at 266 (1948).
174.  See Knapp & Grover, supra note 6, at 302.
175.  See GALANTER  &  PALAY, supra note 24, at 57 (noting  that "recruitment  has  become  more
competitive and more meritocratic, leading to changes in the social composition of the new recruits").
176.  See  RICHARD  D.  KAHLENBERG,  BROKEN  CONTRACT:  A  MEMOIR  OF  HARVARD  LAW
SCHOOL  94 (1992)  (reporting that a Harvard Law  School  placement  official  "told Calvin Trillin thatCALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
ver, every firm now  claims  that it screens  for  the "most  qualified"  ap-
plicants  regardless  of race, gender,  or religion-applicants  who have  the
potential  to become partners  in the firm.
Yet when  we look  closely  at the hiring  process,  we are confronted
with  an  apparent  paradox:  notwithstanding  the  vast  sums  that  firms
spend annually  on recruiting,  they collect  little information  about  a law
student's actual  substantive  legal knowledge  or  skills,  and  the  informa-
tion  that they  do  acquire  on  these  issues  is generally  ignored.  In  this
Section, we argue that these seemingly  paradoxical  practices  in fact  con-
stitute a consistent  and  rational  response  to  the institutional  realities  of
elite firm practice  and the benefits  firms  expect to receive  from  recruit-
ing.  These  practices,  however,  also  systematically  disadvantage  black
applicants.
1.  The Process
Law firm  hiring  typically  consists  of  three  stages:  the  on-campus
interview,  the  call-back  interview,  and  (for  first  and  second  year  stu-
dents)  a summer internship.' 7  What  is striking about the first two phases
is how little they  have  to  do with the  applicant's  substantive knowledge
or skills.
Initial interviews  are primarily  a function  of student  interest.'  The
interview consists of a brief twenty-minute  discussion  with  a single  law-
yer (often an associate).  Although the interviewer has  access to  the can-
didate's  resume  (including  his  transcript)  prior  to the  interview,'79  it  is
rare for an  interviewer  to  ask  questions  designed  to  test what the appli-
cant has  learned  in  law school.'  Instead,  this  brief encounter  is taken
the large  firms spend as much money in recruitment-travel,  hotels,  receptions,  summer-clerk  perks,
and  forgone billable hours-as the law school's annual budget").
177.  See id. at 94-95 (describing the interview  process  for  Harvard  law  students); David  Eaves
et al.,  Gender, Ethnicity and Grades: Empirical Evidence of Discrimination in Law-Firm Interviews,  7
LAW & INEQ. J.  189,  192 (1989)  (describing the interview  process  for  UCLA  Law  School  students);
IN SDER's  GUIDE,  supra note  147,  at  13-16  (describing  the  interview  process).  Third-year  students
with judicial  clerkships also  frequently work as summer associates.
178.  At most elite schools, employers  are required to interview every student who  applies  for an
interview and receives a slot through a lottery  system in which  students  rank  firms  according  to the
strength  of their interest.  See GRANEIELD,  supra note  128, at 134; Eaves et al., supra note 177,  at  192
(describing a similar system at UCLA).  At many  non-elite schools,  firms  decide  whom to interview
on the basis of the resumes they receive, or in many  cases,  skip the  on-campus  interviewing  process
altogether.
179.  Whether the interviewer actually  looks  at  the resume before  the  interview  is less certain.
Anecdotal testimony over the  years  by both  interviewers  and  interviewees  suggests  that at least on
some  occasions they  do  not.  See  Stewart  Yerton,  Scenes  from the  Recruiting  Front:  The  Laws  of
Supply  and Demand  Are  Making  Law  Students at UVA  Nervous,  AM.  LAw.,  Nov.  1993,  at  60,  63
(quoting a University of Virginia law student's belief that an  interviewer  from  New  York's  Hughes,
Hubbard  & Reed did not read his resume before the  interview).
180.  See  GRANEIELD,  supra  note  128,  at  136  (reporting  that  "[r]ecruiters...  rarely  pose
questions to students that test their legal knowledge"  and quoting a second year Harvard  Law  student
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up  almost  entirely  by  a discussion  of  the  applicant's  general  interests,
background  and  experience,  and  whatever  questions  the  applicant  has
about  the  firm.'  Interviewers  frequently  conduct  as many  as  ten  to
fifteen  of these  sessions in  a day.  Finally,  firms  rarely  supplement  the
information  they receive  from  resumes  and  interviews  with other  infor-
mation  (e.g.,  writing  samples, faculty  recommendations)  that might  of-
fer insight into an applicant's  quality.'82
Firms therefore  make call-back decisions based  on  the information
that appears  on  an  applicant's  resume  and  transcript and  a  single  law-
yer's  assessment  of  the candidate's  general  promise  and  personality.
Not surprisingly,  grades  and  other  traditional  indicia  of  academic  ac-
complishment  (such  as law review  membership)  figure  prominently  in
this calculation."3  Even these  traditional  indicia  of merit, however,  are
not treated  as seriously  as they  might  be.  Rather  than  ranking  candi-
dates  by  academic  standing,  firms  tend  to  use  loose  grade  cutoffs
pegged  to  the  academic  standing  of  the  applicant's  school. 4  Within
these rough  and  malleable  ranges,  the primary  criterion  is  whether  the
candidate will  "fit in"  to  the firm's  culture.
More often than not, call-back interviews  merely repeat this pattern.
Although  applicants  see more  lawyers,  the content  of these  discussions
mirrors  what transpires  on campus:  candidates  are  asked almost no  sub-
as  saying "I  prepared  myself for a  technical  discussion.  I  thought they  would  ask  me  about  strict
liability  or something.  They  didn't ask me any  legal  type of questions").  By way  of  comparison,
consulting  firms  routinely  ask  applicants  to  analyze  a  typical  business  school  case  during  the
interview.  Interview with Roger Ferguson,  Principal at McKenzie and Co.
181.  The following comments are typical of statements in the Insider's  Guide:
[When interviewing at New York's Simpson  Thatcher,] "be  as personable and  engaging  as
possible"....  The best way to fit into the firm's culture  is to be "relaxed  and charming,"
counseled one  [firm  lawyer].  "Emphasize  other  interests  besides  the law,"  recommended
another.  "Don't emphasize money"  commented  one contact and don't be "anal or pushy."
INSIDER'S  GUIDE,  supra note  147,  at 422.  "While  [New  York's  Fried  Frank]  emphasizes  high
academic  achievement, one person stated that 'you  have to  have  something  unusual on  your resume
to get a call-back.  Bungee jumping or skydiving helps, but so  does being an  opera singer  or enjoying
math problems."'  Id. at 362; see also Paul F. Buller & Caryn L. Beck-Dudley,  Performance, Policies
and Personnel:  How Does Your Firm Do It?, A.B.A. 1,  Oct.  1990, at 94, 94  (reporting that personal
characteristics are among the most important traits recruiters look for when interviewing candidates).
182.  For example, only six of the approximately  600 firms  interviewing  at Harvard  Law  School
in  1994 asked  candidates  to bring a  writing sample to their  initial  interview.  See  HARVARD  LAW
SCHOOL  OFFICE OF CAREER  SERVICES,  INTERVIEWING  CALENDER  (1994).
183.  See Eaves et al., supra  note  177, at 197-98 (demonstrating that high  grades  and  law review
membership  are  both strong  predictors  of  whether  a  UCLA  student  is  likely  to get  a  call-back
interview).
184.  See INSIDER'S  GUIDE, supra  note  147, at 230 (reporting that Houston's Baker & Botts "looks
at people in the top quarter of their class at the University of Texas, the top five percent of their class
at the  University  of Houston,  and  the  top  half  of their  classes  at  national  law  schools  such  as
Columbia, Harvard,  Stanford, the University  of  Chicago,  the  University  of  Virginia,  and  Yale").
Firms  pay  more  attention  to  the  perceived  quality  of the  institution  from  which  a  candidate  is
graduating than to the content of the courses on an applicant's  resume, rarely  taking note of whether
the courses  a student has taken are likely to prepare him or her for corporate law practice.
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stantive  questions and the primary  issue is whether the applicant will "fit
in."'85  As a result, at some  firms, call-back  interviews  are  almost  a pro
forma  process  in  which  most  candidates  receive  summer  offers  unless
they  affirmatively  demonstrate  that they  are  not  likely  to  fit  in  to  the
firm's  culture.'86  Even those firms that use call-back interviews  as a sig-
nificant screening device, however, do  so primarily  on  the basis  of per-
sonality  and fit.
This lack  of attention  to quality  in the first  two phases  of the  re-
cruiting  process  might  be understandable  if firms relied  on  their  sum-
mer  programs  to  monitor  and  evaluate  summer  associates  before
extending  offers  of  permanent  employment.  But  they  do  not.  Al-
though  firms  collect  information  about  their  summer  associates,'87  this
information rarely  influences  hiring decisions.  Figure 2 shows  the  aver-
age  summer associate  offer  rates for large  firms  in  Baltimore,  Atlanta,
San Francisco,  New York, and  Chicago.' 8  With the  exception  of Balti-
185.  The  following comments  about  three  Boston  firms  are  typical:  "[At  Bingham,  Dann  &
Gould,]  []all-back  interviews,  which  usually  involve  meeting  four  attorneys,  were  described  as
'pleasant chats.'  One source reported that 'they  are just trying to see if you would  fit  in and whether
you have a personality."'  Id. at 79.
[At Goulston & Storrs,]  [c]allback interviews involve meeting with about four attorneys and
going to lunch with a few  more.  Candidates who are invited  to the firm  for  a callback  are
presumed to be academically  qualified  to work at Goulston,  and  the major  purpose  of the
interview  is to assess whether  the  applicant  "fits in"  with  the  firm  culture.  Attorneys ask
very few "substantive legal questions" in the interviews,  our contacts  told us.
Id. at 98.
[At  Nutter, McClennon & Fish,]  [a]t  the  call-back,  candidates  usually  interview  with a
senior partner, the hiring partner, and two  associates.  They  then  go  out to lunch with two
associates.  Most call-back  interviews  are  conversational.  No  one  we  interviewed  was
asked substantive legal  questions.  According  to one  insider, the partners  make the hiring
decisions, and they are mainly "looking to see if you fit"  into the firm culture.
Id. at  I11.
186.  As associates at Boston's Goodwin, Procter & Hoar report:
The interview  is "more  an  opportunity  for  you to find  out more  about the  firm,"  said one
successful applicant.  If you make it to the  callback  stage,  "there  is a presumption  in your
favor" that you will be hired, commented another.  "They just want  to make sure  they can
work with you."
Id. at 95.
187.  This was not always the case.  In the go-go days of the 1970s and  1980s,  summer programs
were characterized by tickets  to ball games  and  outings to partners'  houses  rather  than by work  on
serious  projects.  During  the  recession,  programs  were  tightened  up.  See  Caroline  V.  Clarke,
Summer of Fear,  AM.  LAw.,  Oct.  1991,  supp.  6,  8;  Amy  Stevens,  Vacation  Is  Over for Summer
Associates as Law Firms Reduce  Perks, Add Work, WALL  ST.  J.,  June  10,  1994, at  BI  (describing
how,  as a result of the recession,  firms have reduced  expenses on  summer  programs).  Nevertheless,
according to many reports, social functions still play an important part in the summer experience,  See
INSIDER'S  Gums, supra note  147,  at 27  (describing  Alston  &  Bird's  summer  program  as  "really
social"  and  "summer camp-like");  see also Rick Hampson,  Summer law Associates Still  Want  the
Perks; Survey Finds Food a Concern of Many Students, LEGAL  INTELLIGENCER,  Nov. 3,  1993,  at 3
(calling summer programs  "prenuptial  honeymoons");  Saundra  Torry, In  Frugal '90s, Firms Still
Pamper Summer Associates, WASH.  PosT,  July 4,  1994, at  7  (describing  relatively  lavish  current
programs).
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more, 89 all of these  rates  exceed  70%,  with firms  in the most  desirable
cities hovering  around  90%.  Many  of  the  country's  most  prestigious
firms  grant  offers  to  all of  their  summer  associates."9 t  Moreover,  like
assoicate  salaries,  these  percentages  have  remained  remarkably  consis-
tent over  time,  even  during  the  recession  when  firms  were laying  off
"permanent"  associates.
Elite  firm  hiring,  therefore,  is  "meritocratic"  only  to  the  extent
that the few highly  visible signals  a firm  can  observe  at the  initial  on-
campus  interview-the  most important  factor  in  determining  whether  a
candidate  receives  a  permanent  job  offer-are  accurate  predictors  of
which law students will make the best lawyers.  As noted  previously,  al-
though  the  signals  are  loosely  correlated  with  both  substantive  legal
knowledge  and  important  personal  characteristics  such  as  intelligence
and  effort, they  are notoriously  noisy when it comes to predicting  future
performance  as a  lawyer  (as  opposed  to  future  performance  as a  law
student). 9'  Why do  law firms  spend  tens of thousands  of dollars  each
year on a process that provides  such an imperfect  measure of the quality
of their future employees?  The  answer lies in the firm's bottom line.
2.  Signals and Signaling: Stocking the Pipeline and
Protecting the Franchise
Elite law firms have two primary  objectives in hiring.  The first is to
stock  the  pipeline  with  associates  capable  of  competently  filling  the
firm's labor needs.  The  second is to signal the firm's  quality  to clients,
competitors,  and potential recruits.
Stocking  the pipeline  requires  hiring  associates  who can  diligently
perform routine tasks with a minimum  of supervision.  Although  this is
also the pool from which the firm will select most of its  senior associates
and partners, for the reasons  stated in  Part II, it is not necessary  that all
(or  even  most)  of its  entering  associates  be  of  "partnership  quality."
Moreover,  since  whether  any  particular  associate  actually  develops  the
higher  order  legal  skills needed  by  senior  associates  and  partners  de-
pends  in  large  part  on  whether  she  receives  the  Royal  Jelly  of  firm
189.  The lower offer rate in Baltimore  may be due to the fact that these firms are less leveraged
and have higher partnership rates  than are  typical  in the other four  cities.  Thus, according  to data
from the Insider's Guide, the ratio  of associates  to partners  in Baltimore was  .83:1,  as  compared  to
1.1:1  in San Francisco/Palo  Alto and 1.9:1  in New York.  See INSIDER'S  GUIDE, supra note 147,  at  53,
509,  305.  Given these structural  differences,  these firms are likely to collect more information on  the
actual  quality of their summer associates  (because of the relative  ease of direct monitoring) and  have
a greater incentive to use this information  (since the smaller  number  of associates  makes each  one
more valuable).
190.  See INSIDER's  GUIDE,  supra  note  147, at 338, 332,398,428 (reporting that Cravath; Cleary,
Gottlieb;  Paul, Weiss;  and  Sullivan  & Cromwell all  gave  offers  to  nearly  100%  of  their  summer
associates  in 1993).
191.  See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
1996]CALIFORNIA LAW  REVIEW
training,  it is  more efficient for the firm to defer looking for those likely
to  fill  these  roles  until  the  first phases  of  the  tournament  rather  than
spending  resources  refining  their predictions  about  future  potential.  It
is the need for foot-soldiers,  not generals,  that drives the  hiring process.
The  high  wages  and  benefits  associated  with  working  at  an  elite
firm ensures  that firms will be deluged  with applicants  who  meet the  ba-
sic  requirements  for being good foot-soldiers.  The  pyramidal  structure
of elite firms ensures  that much of the work done  by  entering  associates
will  be  routine  and  redundant,  calling  for  none  of  the  discretionary
judgment  at the heart  of good  lawyering.  Nor is  it  necessary  that  the
lawyers  who  are  assigned  these  tasks  be  exceptionally  smart  or  well
trained.  Although there may be advantages  to  having  a person  With  su-
perstar  intelligence  keep  track  of  documents,  draft  letters  and  memo-
randa  to  the file,  respond  to  discovery  requests,  and  do  routine  legal
research, these benefits  pale in relation  to the value of having  an  associ-
ate who is careful, well organized,  pays attention to detail, and has a high
boredom  threshold.  These  qualities  are  neither  taught  directly  in  law
school  nor  especially  rewarded  in  the  grading  process.  The  fact  that
many  firms  have  recently  turned  a  substantial  amount  of  this  routine
work over to paralegals with no law  school  training,  is potent  proof  that
the range  of people  who can  perform  this  work  competently  is  larger
than those with  traditional  signals such  as  an  elite law school education
or law review membership.
92
As most  partners  would  be  quick  to  point  out,  however,  this  de-
scription  of the work of an entering  associate  only tells part of the  story.
In  addition  to  performing  routine  and  undemanding  tasks, new associ-
ates are sometimes called upon to answer difficult  legal  or factual  ques-
tions.  Moreover,  these  issues  can  arise  unexpectedly,  embedded  in
problems that otherwise  appear to be routine.  Given this reality,  the  hy-
pothetical  partner  would  argue,  firms  need  to  hire  associates  who  can
recognize  sophisticated  legal  and  factual  issues when  they  arise  even  if
they have not yet developed  the higher order skills  and  dispositions  that
are  ultimately  necessary  to  resolve these  questions.  Consequently,  the
partner would  conclude, the range  of applicants  who  are  actually  quali-
fied  to  be  associates  at  an  elite  corporate  firm  is  much  smaller  than
might at first appear.  In addition,  since  legal  knowledge  and  basic  per-
sonal qualities  such  as intelligence  and hard  work  are  the  key  variables
in this story, it is rational for firms  to rely  on  traditional  credentials  like
law school  status and high  grades  as proxies  for  the  characteristics  they
seek.
This  argument  trades  on  a  confusion  between  "average"  and
"ideal."  Law firms,  like all other employers,  would  prefer  to  have em-
192.  On the growth in the number of paralegals, see GALANTER  & PALAY, supra note 24, at 65.
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ployees  who  could  quickly  and proficiently  handle  every  contingency
that might arise in the performance  of their duties.  To  the extent  firms
can  identify  applicants  who, because  of either  their  legal  skills or  their
other personal characteristics,  are likely to be  able to recognize  complex
legal issues and  take appropriate  action  with relatively  little supervision,
they will prefer these candidates  to those who do not have these abilities.
Assuming  arguendo  that superstar academic  performance  (e.g.,  gradu-
ating at the top of the class at an elite  law school)  is even loosely  corre-
lated  with these abilities-a  reasonable,  although  as  we have  indicated,
largely  unproven  assumption-a  firm  might  choose to  hire  only  those
who have this qualification. 193
In  today's  legal  marketplace,  however, this  strategy  is no  longer  a
realistic option.  Given  the explosion  in the  size  and  number  of  large
firms  competing  for  the  pool  of  superstar  graduates  from  elite  law
schools, not even  the most  prestigious  and  high  paying  firms  can  limit
their recruiting in this fashion.'94  Instead,  firms must  also hire from  the
much  larger pool  of average  candidates.  These  candidates  present  an
array  of  mixed  signals:  for  example,  average  grades  at  high  status
schools or good  grades  at lower status schools.  Unlike  the small num-
ber  of  academic  superstars,  the  claim  that  these  candidates  can  be
ranked in terms  of their actual quality by  referring  to  a few easily  ob-
servable signals lacks credibility.  To  take just one  example,  to  say that
where a student goes  to  law school  is an  accurate  proxy  of  either  that
student's  legal  skill or  native  intelligence  ignores  the  many  variables
that can  affect that choice.  As a result, it is doubtful  that many  would
claim  that a student in the middle  of her class at  Harvard  is  inevitably
better prepared  or "smarter"  in  any  way that plausibly  correlates  with
job performance  as an associate at an elite firm than a student  at the top
of her class at Boston University  who put herself through  law school by
working two jobs.  Yet, this  kind  of judgment  is exactly  what would  be
required  to justify  on merit grounds the enormous  weight that is placed
on the status of a candidate's  law  school in the recruiting process.
This  is not to  say that firms  could  not make  more  nuanced  judg-
ments about the quality  of these applicants  if they were  so  inclined.  In-
deed,  if firms  were prepared  to  dig  deeper, perhaps  by  conducting  in-
depth interviews  designed to  reveal  substantive knowledge  and  problem
solving  skills, or by doing an extensive  investigation into the candidates'
academic  and  work  experience,  they  might  discover  that  applicants
193.  It is important  to note that this supposition  is belied  by the fact that  firms  counted  social
background  at least  as  highly  as academic  standing  during  a period  when  their hiring needs  were
much smaller than they are today.  See supra note  173.
194.  See Bernstein,  supra note 30, at 20 (reporting that the yearly  demand  for  associates  by  the
top 250 firms far exceeds the number of students in the top  507o  of the graduating  classes  of the top
20 law schools).
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whose traditional  signals were on  the margin  actually  have better  skills
than those whose signals were at, or near, the  top.  Certainly,  any  review
of the "best" lawyers in America would reveal  several  who  do  not have
the kind of traditional  credentials  that most corporate firms look for. 9 5
Firms, however, have little incentive to expend  the added  resources
it would take  to reach  such fine-tuned judgments.  The  average  workers
that they  select  on  the basis of the limited  information  they  collect  are
perfectly  capable  of performing  the average jobs  to  which  they  are  as-
signed.  To  be sure, as  the hypothetical  partner  discussed above  would
insist, the  fact  that  firms  make  their  hiring  decisions  in  this  manner
means  that sometimes  an associate  whose  actual abilities  are  in  the  low
end of the average range will fail to see a complex  legal issue embedded
in an otherwise straightforward  discovery problem  that would  have been
spotted  by  the associate  the firm  could  have hired whose skills were  in
the high  part of the average distribution.  So  long  as  the  firm  suffers
relatively  few  negative  consequences  as  a  result  of  such  occurrences
(e.g.,  because  the issue  is  never  discovered  by  either  the  client  or  the
client's adversary, or because the firm  is able  to rectify-or  cover  up-
the mistake),  it is rational for  employers  to  take  this risk rather  than  in-
cur the cost of reviewing the actual abilities  of each  applicant  in  the  av-
erage  range.
Although  this  explains  why  firms  pay  little  attention  to  a  candi-
date's  substantive  legal  skills, the  question  remains  why  firms  invest
such large sums in recruiting  and  why  they  rely  on a mixture  of objec-
tive and  subjective  criteria.  Given our  conviction  that there  are  a large
number of lawyers  who could  competently  perform  the work  of the  av-
erage corporate law firm associate, we might expect firms  to recruit  at a
large  number  of elite and  second-tier  law schools,  but  to  expend  rela-
tively little energy  choosing  among  average  applicants.  Skadden  Arps,
for example, used this  strategy  quite effectively  during  the  1980s  when
it hired  large  numbers  of  associates,  including  many  from  "second-
tier" law schools such as Fordham,  and  then  let these new recruits  fight
it out for  partnership.'96  Indeed,  since  we  theorize  that  associates  are
motivated  in  part  by  the  fear  of  losing  their  high-paying  jobs,  one
would  think that, other things  being equal, a firm  would prefer  to hire  a
law  student from Fordham as  opposed  to  one  from  Yale,  since elite  law
firm jobs are  scarcer for Fordham graduates.
Elite firms, however, gain more  from recruiting than  simply getting
lawyers to do the work of the firm.  They also use  recruiting  as a means
of signaling the firm's  quality  to potential  clients,  competitors,  and  po-
195.  For example,  only  two of the  lawyers  in  O.J.  Simpson's  famous  "Dream  Team,"  Alan
Dershowitz and Barry Scheck,  graduated from elite law schools.
196.  See CAPLAN, supra note 67, at 157,  159.
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tential recruits.  One of the traditional ways that law firms, have signaled
their quality  to clients  is by  the number  of former  Supreme  Court  law
clerks,  law review members,  and  other  elite  law  school  graduates  they
employ. 9 7  Over and above their usefulness as  a business-getting  device,
recruits  from  elite law  schools  also  increase  a firm's  status  among  its
peers. 1 9  Indeed,  even individual  lawyers  within  firms  are  likely  to  be
biased  in favor of graduates  from  their  alma mater,  since  hiring  these
students  both  validates the partner's  own  credentials  and  increases  his
standing with his fellow alumni."9  Given the restrictive hiring  practices
followed  by  most firms  during  the "golden  age,"  this bias further  in-
creases  the  demand  for  elite  law  school  graduates.  As  a  result,  firms
overinvest in competing for elite law school  graduates and for those with
"prestige"  signals."°
In order to win  the competition for  these coveted  recruits,  however,
firms must both credibly signal their quality  to these  applicants  and  ap-
pear to treat those  who  do  apply  fairly.  This helps to explain  the divi-
sion  of  the  recruiting  process  into  a  "visible"  stage,  in  which  firms
review  a  candidate's  objective  credentials,  and  an  "invisible"  stage,
dominated  by  subjective judgments  about  personality  and  fit.  At  the
visible stage, firms signal their quality by appearing  to  rely  on  objective
criteria  (law school  status, law review membership,  and  grades)  that are
easily  accessible and rankable  by law  students.  Those firms  that can  be
the  most  restrictive  on  these  criteria  gain  a  reputation  as  being  the
"best"  firms,  and  therefore  attract  the "best"  potential  recruits.  If a
firm  is  seen as acting unfairly  at this visible stage  (for  example, by  re-
fusing to interview  black  candidates  whose credentials  are clearly  supe-
rior  to  those  of  white  candidates  who  are  interviewed),  the  firm's
reputation among  law students  will suffer. 20'
197.  On  the  connection  between  a  law  firm's  status  and  the  educational  background  of  its
lawyers, see ABEL,  supra note 38, at 206; NELSON, supra note 24, at 66.
198.  See  ABEL,  supra note  38,  at 217-18  (describing  the  tendency  of  prestigious  schools'
graduates to be channeled to larger firms and local schools to produce solo practitioners).
199.  See GRANFIELD, supra note 128,  at 135 (discussing the importance of the fact  that "[mI]any
interviewers  are  former  [Harvard]  graduates  demonstrating  their  loyalty  to  the  institution");
INSIDER'S  GUIDE,  supra note  147,  at 362 (quoting  an associate  at Fried Frank  who  reported,  "it's
harder to get an offer if you are from a local school; though if you are from  Yale,  you  will definitely
get an  offer because Yalies stick together").
200.  The experience of Skadden Arps  is again  instructive.  Lincoln  Caplan  reports  that despite
unparalleled  financial  success  during  the  1980s,  Skadden  partners  still  longed  for  the  status  and
respectability  of its more established  "white  shoe"  Wall  Street competitors.  To achieve  this  goal,
Skadden invested heavily in recruiting elite law school graduates, setting records for the lavishness  of
its  recruiting  events  and  summer  program.  These  efforts  eventually  bore  fruit.  As  a  result,
Skadden's hiring patterns now look like those of its  competitors.  See  generally CAPLAN,  supra note
67.
201.  As we explain below, discriminating in this fashion might also result in legal liability.
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At the invisible stage, however, firms no longer have to worry  about
this problem.  Law students realize that the objective  criteria used  at the
visible stage do not  account  for all of the variables  on  which  a rational
firm might want to make  its employment decisions.  They  therefore  ac-
cept the fact that firms should  inquire more  deeply  into  the qualities  of
candidates,  particularly  where  the objective credentials  of  two  or  more
applicants  are functionally  indistinguishable.  Because  this  process  oc-
curs  out  of sight  (for example,  in call-back  interviews),  firms  have  less
of an incentive  to base their decisions on  objective criteria.  Thus, rather
than reviewing writing samples  or asking  substantive  questions  designed
to  test  legal  knowledge  and  analytic  skill,  firms  focus  on  assessing
whether the applicant will fit in to  the firm's  culture.  Although  this  as-
sessment is undoubtedly  an  important  part  of any  hiring  process,  firms
are  free  to emphasize  issues of personality  and  fit over  arguably  more
relevant  determinations  about  writing  ability and  analytic  skill  because
the invisibility  of the call-back  stage  makes  it unlikely  that  the  firm's
actions in  this  sphere  will undermine  its overall reputation  and  ranking
among law  students.
Taken  together,  these costs  and  benefits unravel  the  paradox  pre-
sented at the beginning  of this  Section.  Although  the  objective  signals
firms  employ  at the visible stage  are  a highly  imperfect  measure  of an
applicant's  potential,  they  do  a  reasonably  good  job  of  winnowing
down the pool and,  more importantly, they  give clients, competitors,  and
law students an  accessible and  rankable  method  of rating  firms.  Given
that this process  will produce a large number  of average  applicants  who
could  perform  the job  effectively,  firms  are  free  to  rely  on  subjective
criteria to  make  the final  selections  at  the  invisible  stage  while  at  the
same  time lavishly  pursuing  the  few superstars  upon  whom  the  firm's
prestige  in  the  recruiting  market  for  elite  law  school  graduates  ulti-
mately  rests.
3.  Race and Recruiting
In  the absence  of countervailing  policies, 02  we predict  that  blacks
will  be  disadvantaged  by  recruiting  practices  such  as  those  described
above  in  two ways.  First, since firms  have little incentive  to investigate
the actual  quality  of their potential  employees,  average  blacks  are  less
likely to be hired than  average whites.  Second, because  black applicants
are  aware of their reduced  employment  prospects,  they  have  an  incen-
tive  to  adopt  human  capital  strategies  that,  on  average,  decrease  their
overall prospects for success.  The following examination  of how  blacks
have fared  in the recruiting process supports both  predictions.
202.  At this stage we are interested in exploring what  happens  when firms  make  no  affirmative
efforts  to hire black lawyers.
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The fact that firms rely on a few  objective signals  to  identify  quali-
fied  applicants  at the  visible  stage  and  reserve  the  right  to  go  behind
these credentials  to make judgments about  personality  and  fit at the in-
visible  stage  doubly  disadvantages  black  applicants.  As  others  have
documented,  by  relying  on  sorting  devices  such  as  law  school  status,
grades,  and  law review  membership,  firms  systematically  exclude  the
majority of black  applicants,  who do  not have these  standard  signals. 3
Thus,  although  blacks  may  be  more  likely  to  attend  higher  status  law
schools than whites,2"  the schools  with the largest  black populations  are
not ones from which  large firms  typically recruit.0 5  Even  black students
with  superstar  credentials  from  lower status  schools  have  little  or  no
chance  of being  hired  by  a large firm.2"  Those  blacks  who  do  attend
elite schools face recognized  barriers  (e.g.,  poor primary  and  secondary
school  education,  diminished  expectations,  hostile  environments,  and
part-time  work)  to  performing  well  in  the  classroom  or  in  extra-
curricular activities such as law review."  Given these added  pressures,  it
is  plausible,  as both  conservative  critics  of  affirmative  action  in  elite
schools  and  supporters  of  historically  black  schools  frequently  assert,
that  some  black  students  who  are  currently  admitted  to  elite  schools
would  be more  successful  (both  academically  and  personally)  if they
203.  See Lugo, supra note  56,  at  624-30  (arguing  that law  firm  hiring  criteria  are  racially
discriminatory).  Needless  to say,  these  criteria  also  exclude the vast majority of white  applicants,
many  of whom are  also  within  the average  range  in terms of their  skills  to be  average  corporate
associates.  The percentage of whites remaining in the pool, as defined by these  criteria,  however,  is
disproportionally  larger than the corresponding percentage of blacks vis-a-vis their,  percentage  in law
schools.  This is simply another example  of how  practices  that  affect  all  workers  disproportionately
disadvantage  blacks.
204.  Cf. Gene Kratz, Less Diversity at B-Schools, Bus.  WK.,  Apr. 26,  1996,  at 26.  Given  that
blacks  generally  score  lower  on  the LSAT  than  whites,  this upward  trend in  part  reflects  greater
affirmative  efforts  on  the  part  of elite schools.  See Russell  L.  Jones,  The  Legal Profession: Can
Minorities  Succeed?, 12 T.  MARSHALL  L  REV.  347,  349  (1987)  (discussing lower  LSAT scores  of
black applicants).  We return to affirmative action by elite law schools  below.
205.  See  Richard  Connelly,  Preconceived  Notions:  Recruiters Pigeonhole  TSU  Graduates,
Leaving Top Students in the Cold, TEx.  LAW.,  May  17,  1993,  at S-1  (noting that "[f]irms  that  talk
grandly about increasing their minority hiring don't look to do it at [Texas  Southern  University]'s  law
school,  where half of the 587 students are African-American");  Jensen, supra note  12, at 29  (arguing
that  firms should include  minority-dominated  law  schools  in addition  to Howard  University in their
recruiting efforts).
206.  See Connelly, supra note 205, at S-1.  Connelly describes  a  TSU  student's inability  to get  a
single offer from a large firm in Texas despite the fact that she graduated "magna cum  laude, second
in her  class,  [was  a]  law  review  editor, and...  clerk[ed]  at the Texas  Supreme  Court."  As  one
hiring partner explained,  "we usually can fill our needs at the top schools."  Id.
207.  See Jensen, supra note  12, at 29  (quoting Lujuana  Treadwell,  President  of the  National
Association  for Law Placement  and director of recruitment  for Berkeley's  Boalt Hall,  as  stating that
"minority students are more likely to need to be employed during law school or choose to be active  in
student  organizations,  thereby  making  it  more  unlikely  that  they  might  meet  the  big  firm  rigid
employment criteria").  See also, FEAGIN  AND  SIKms, supra note 46, at 78-129  (describing  the many
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did not attend these  academic  institutions."8  However,  given  the nearly
dispositive role  that the status of an  applicant's  law school  plays  in  the
recruiting process,  black students  who want  to  have the  option  of work-
ing  at an  elite firm  have  little incentive  to  choose  this  option.  Those
who  have problems  at elite institutions,  however,  risk being  branded  as
unacceptable  by prospective  employers.
Indeed,  to the extent that firms make hiring decisions based  on  sig-
nals such as grade point averages,  as opposed  to  the  substantive content
of the courses  a student  has  taken  or other  indicia  of the skills that the
candidate has acquired  in law school,  black applicants  have  an incentive
to structure their education  so as  to maximize  the  former  at the  expense
of the latter.  For example,  it  is widely  believed  that  certain  advanced
corporate  courses, such  as  corporate  tax, commercial  transactions,  and
securities regulation,  are among the most difficult in  the  law school  cur-
riculum, particularly for students  who  have little or no prior background
(academic  or otherwise)  in  these  areas.  If this  is  true,  and  if black  stu-
dents are less likely to have the kind  of background  knowledge  that  in-
creases their chance of doing well in these subjects,2"  then they will have
an  incentive  to  avoid  these  difficult,  but  potentially  useful,  courses  in
favor  of  classes  where  they  stand  a  better  chance  of  getting  a  good
grade. 0
208.  See FEAGIN  AND  SIKES, supra note 46, at 130-32  (reporting  that many  black students  feel
they would be more successful  at black educational  institutions).
209.  Empirical and anecdotal  evidence suggests that this may  be  the  case.  Given  that less  than
40% of black  households qualify  as  middle  class  (as  opposed to  70%  for  whites)  it  is  likely that
African American law students tend to come from more disadvantaged  socio-economic  backgrounds
than  their  white classmates.  See  MICHAEL  DAWSON,  BEHIND  THE  MULE,  RACE  AND  CLASS  IN
AFRICAN  AMERICAN  POLITICS  29 (1994).  Affirmative action programs  that combine  race  and  class
will reinforce this tendency.  Moreover, as Dawson  goes on to point out, even middle-class  blacks are
less likely to be connected  either through  employment or wealth accumulation  to the upper echelon  of
the private sector that is the focus of the kind of high-level corporate  courses we are  discussing.  See
id. at 29-33  (arguing that middle-class  blacks are less likely to work in the private  sector  than  whites
are  and  have  accumulated  substantially  less  household  wealth  than  middle-class  whites).
Anecdotally,  many  black  students  have  told  Professor  Wilkins  over  the  years  that  their  lack  of
knowledge or experience with the problems  discussed  in advanced  corporate  courses  is  one reason
why they believe that they will  find these  courses  particularly  difficult.  Even  if black  students are
mistaken about the importance of this kind of background knowledge, if they believe  it to be  true  the
adverse effects described in text will persist until this misperception  is corrected.
210.  Two pieces of anecdotal  data  collected  by  Professor  Wilkins point in  this direction.  First,
Harvard Law School faculty  who teach  upper-level courses  in corporations,  securities  and  tax  report
that relatively  few black students take these offerings.  Second, several  black  students  reported  that
the reputed  difficulty  of these  courses  and concerns  that a  low grade would  diminish  their overall
employment prospects has discouraged  them or their African  American  classmates  from  enrolling  in
these courses.  Although we contend that most lawyering skills are learned on the job, associates  who
come in with more knowledge  about the legal issues that are relevant to their chosen area  of practice
will have lower start-up costs in completing the first  few  assignments,  and  therefore,  stand  a better
chance of signaling that they are good prospects  for the training  track.  It is precisely these potentially
valuable job-related skills, however, that the current recruiting process  undervalues.WHY ARE THERE SO FEW  BLACK LAWYERS
At the same time, the emphasis  on  personality  and  fit at the invisi-
ble  stage  can  disadvantage  black  applicants  with  traditional  signals.
Like the general population  from  which they  come,  law firm  interview-
ers hold a variety  of conscious and unconscious  stereotypes  about black
law students.  Although  incidents  such as the  1989  debacle  involving  a
partner from Chicago's  Baker  & McKenzie,  who demanded  to know  a
black female  applicant's  high  school  grade  point  average  and how  she
would react to being called a "black  bitch"  or  "nigger"  are undoubt-
edly  rare,2"'  they  underscore  the  fact  that  outright  prejudice  against
blacks  still exists at elite firms.  Sexual  harassment  and  other forms  of
overt discrimination  against women mean that black women  face  a dou-
ble  burden. 2"2  Such outright prejudice is no longer condoned and, when
detected,  is  sanctioned.23  The  subtler  forms  of  bias  or  preferencing,
however, are more pervasive and difficult to pin down.
For example,  a consistent  line  of  empirical  research  demonstrates
that when  whites evaluate blacks,  they  frequently  attribute  negative  acts
"to  personal  disposition,  while positive  acts are  discounted  as the prod-
uct of luck  or special circumstances."2 4  Empirical  and  anecdotal  ac-
counts  of  the  experiences  of  black  and  white  applicants  in  the
interviewing  process  confirm  that  this  phenomenon  negatively  affects
employment  opportunities  for  black  lawyers.  Pervasive  myths  about
black  intellectual  inferiority  combined  with  lower  average  levels  of
achievement in areas  such as grades  and  test scores tend  to  make  white
interviewers  question  the  credentials  of  blacks  more  than  those  of
211.  See Lugo, supra note 56, at 626 n.48  (describing  the  incident).  Baker  and  McKenzie  was
temporarily banned  from  recruiting  at several  law  schools  because  of the incident.  Jensen,  supra
note 12,  at 29.
212.  The fact that King and Spalding proposed holding a "wet t-shirt contest"  for female summer
associates--to  be  staged  while  the  finm  had  a  sex  discrimination  lawsuit  pending  against  it-
demonstrates just how difficult these  barriers  will be  to overcome.  Upon sober  reflection,  the firm
decided to hold a swimsuit competition instead.  See  HARRINGTON,  supra note  168 at 36, 37.  For a
discussion of the double burden faced  by black women, see  generally  Kimberle  Crenshaw,  Mapping
the Margins:  Intersectionality,  Identity Politics,  and Violence Against Women  of Color, 43  STAN.  L
REV.  1241  (1991).
213.  The classic  example is that of King  and Spalding,  see  supra note  212,  which  today  has
reformed  matters so far that a 1995 study by the Harvard  Women's  Law  Association rated  it as  the
best of fifty-seven elite  law  firms for  women  lawyers.  John E. Morris,  King & Spalding Lands On
Top, AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb.  1996,  at 18.
214.  Selmi, supra  note 49, at 1285  (describing  perception  of outgroup  behavior  generally);  see
also James Jones, Piercing  the Veil: Bi-cultural Strategies  for Coping with Prejudice and Racism, in
OPENING  DOORS:  PERSPECTIVES  ON  RACE  RELATIONS  IN  CONTEMPORARY  AMERICA,  179,  195
(Harry J. Knopke et al.  eds.,  1991)  (noting that "the basic tendency  for  human  beings  [is]  to make
social categorical judgments  leading to an ingroup preference");  George I. Whitehead,  III et  al.,  The
Effect of  Subject's Race and Other's  Race on Judgments of Causality  for Success and Failure,  50 J.
PERSONALITY  193, 200 (1982) (noting a study finding "that the failure of another is attributed more  to
the lack of ability when the other is racially dissimilar than when he is similar").
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whites.'15  In addition, interviewers  generally expect  to feel  less comfort-
able when  interviewing blacks."6  Similarly, as  we note  above, interview-
ers  frequently  tend  to  believe  that  blacks  are  "uninterested"  in
corporate  practiceY. 2 7   Black  women  are  particularly  vulnerable  to  this
"lack of interest"  stereotype  in  light of the persistent belief  that women
place family responsibilities  above professional  commitments." 8
Given  that firms  collect  little information  about  an  applicant's  ac-
tual  skills,  it  is  not  surprising  that  interviewers  are  affected  by  such
stereotypes.  Since race  is costless  to  observe,  it provides  a convenient
mechanism,  much  like  "personality"  and  "fit,"  for  sorting  applicants.
The fact that it does not correlate  to the  ability  to practice  law is irrele-
vant from  the point  of view of firm profits,  so  long  as the only  conse-
quence of error is that average  whites are  hired  in  the place  of average
blacks.
Moreover, blacks on average have less access  to  influential  contacts
and  other informal networks that allow some other  candidates  to bypass
the  formal  screening  requirements.  Consider  the  experiences  of  two
students  at the  University  of  Virginia  law school  reported  in  a recent
story in  the American Lawyer. 219  Both students-Jay,  a white male  and
Jennifer, a black female-had  grades  in  the B-minus/C range.  As a re-
sult, although  both  have  strong  personal  qualities  and  extra-curricular
activities,  neither  was  able  to  secure  an  interview  with  a  large  firm  in
215.  See  Emily  Campbell  &  Alan  J.  Tompkins,  Gender, Race,  Grades  and  Law  Review
Membership as Factors  in Law Review Hiring  Decisions:  An Empirical  Study, 18 J. CONTEMp.  L  211,
241 (1992)  (reporting that with resumes of candidates in hand, law firms were  more  likely to  request
more  information  from  a black  candidate  in the  top 30%  of his  class  than  from  a  white candidate
similarly situated).
216.  See Arnie  Kanter, Hiring of Minorities Takes Thought, NAT'L LJ.,  Apr.  25,  1988,  at  19
(quoting a hiring partner  from a major firm as stating, "When  I go into an interview with a  minority, I
just want to get out of the thing alive").  As  Kanter  notes, such  feelings  are  likely  to make it  more
difficult  for  the minority  interviewee  to  make  a  "good  impression  on  the  interviewer"-a  major
determinant of whether the candidate will receive a job offer.  Id.; see also Steven  Keeva,  Unequal
Partners:  It's Tough at the Top for Minority Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Feb.  1993,  at 50, 52 (arguing  that
whites feel less comfortable with black lawyers).
217.  See supra note 39 and accompanying  text.
218.  See HARRINOTON,  supra note 168  at 19 (reporting that women  must frequently  justify  their
commitment  to  law  practice  to law  firm  recruiters);  Marie  T.  Huxter,  Survey  of Employment
Opportunities  for Articling Students and Graduates of the Bar Admission Course in Ontario, 15  LAW
Soc'Y  GAZE'rE  169,  189-90  (reporting  that  women  lawyers  in  Canada  are  frequently  asked
questions such as "if I intended to make a career out of practising law or planned  to marry  and  have
babies").  The fact that studies of women in the workplace  have repeatedly  demonstrated  that women
generally have higher  levels of commitment to their jobs than men has so far failed to  eradicate  these
stereotypical  beliefs.  See, e.g.,  HAGAN &  KAY, supra note 166,  at 185  (reporting  that  their  study  of
women lawyers in Ontario  did  not confirm that women  were  less committed  to their jobs  than  men
and that "men accumulated  more hourly billings than women through the use of hierarchical  positions
in firms,  not because  women  gave  up  hours  as  a  result  of  competitive  demands  or  comparative
specializations that involved investments in the family").
219.  See Yerton, supra  note  179, at 60, 61.WHY ARE THERE SO FEW  BLACK LAWYERS
their respective cities of choice (Richmond for Jay,  Atlanta for Jennifer)
through  the  normal  UVA  process. 22  Nevertheless,  by  the  end  of  the
story, Jay  is headed for three promising interviews  with Richmond  firms
while Jennifer  has no  such  prospects.  Why?  Because  Jay  was  able  to
call a friend  "with  considerable  influence  in  Richmond."22'  Jennifer
had no similar connections. 2
This story  also  highlights  another  way  in  which  the  interplay  be-
tween formal  and informal  criteria  disadvantages  blacks.  Although  her
grades were uninspiring, Jennifer was a member  of the UVA  law review
and  had  worked for two  small  firms  during  prior  summers,  including
one in Atlanta.  Law review  membership  and  prior  work experience  are
the kind  of easily  observable  signals upon  which  firms  generally  rely,
but Jennifer appears  to be getting  less mileage  out  of these  signals  than
one might expect.2'  Although there may be many explanations  for  this
result, 224 one  possible explanation  is that even  traditional  signals  such  as
good grades  and  law review membership count less for blacks  than  they
do for whites.'
220.  Unlike many of its elite competitors, UVA allows interviewers to pre-screen resumes and to
interview only selected candidates.  Id. at 61.
221.  Id.
222.  As she pointedly observes:  "The  reality is,  there  aren't  that many black  men and  women
[at large firms] who could give jobs to their kids or friends or whatever."  Id. at 62.
223.  Of course  we  would not expect Jennifer  to get the same  benefit  from being  on  the  law
review  as  someone with  an  "A"  average.  However,  to  the  extent  that  firms  view  law  review
membership as an independent  signal,  it should have  value,  even  for  those with low grades.  Thus,
Jennifer, who has this signal, should do better than Jay, who  does  not.  We recognize,  however,  that
firms may have discounted Jennifer's  law  review  signal  because  they  believed  that the  law review
has  an affirmative  action  policy.  Unless they  believed  that  this  policy  carried  over  to  the  work
Jennifer  did on  the magazine,  this signal still should  have  value.  We return  to  affirmative  action
below.
224.  For example, the article does not state whether Jennifer  received an offer  from the Atlanta
firm where she clerked during the previous summer.
225.  There is some empirical support for this proposition.  For example,  in their excellent  study
of gender  differences  anong  lawyers  in large firms  in Toronto,  Professors  Hagan  and  Kay  found
evidence that the "meritocratic criterion  [of good grades]  is applied  more  stringently  in the selection
of women than men."  HAGAN  & KAY, supra note  166,  at 66; Susan  Duncan,  What Women Need to
Make It to the Top, AM.  LAw.  (Supp.)  Jan.-Feb.  1996,  at 9  (arguing  that  it  is  more  important  for
women than for men to be superstars).  Similarly, Hagan and Kay found  that personal  characteristics
such as having a "WASP"  background were statistically beneficial to men but not to women.  HAGAN
& KAY, supra note  166, at 66.  Although not statistically significant because of the small sample  size,
a study of minority and  non-minority  students  at UCLA Law  School  found  that  "even  top  G.P.A.
minority  students  had  lower  success  rates  than  non-minority  students,  and  third-quartile  minority
students had less than half the success rate of non-minority students."  Eaves et al., supra note  177,  at
201.  Interestingly,  this same study found  that women did significantly  better  in obtaining call-back
interviews than men with similar grades  and  that this disparity  was  greatest  when  men  interviewed
women  at the bottom of the class.  Id. at  204-10.  Whether  this  difference  is  due  to  "attraction
between  male lawyers  and women"  or "a reluctance  by female  lawyers  to offer  call-backs  to other
women,"  id. at 207,  the data  demonstrate  how  an  interviewer's  subjective  biases  or tastes  affect  a
candidate's employment  prospects.  See  also Jensen,  supra note  12,  at 29  ("Justice  Archer  of the
Michigan Supreme Court claims that the large law firms-despite  their claims to  the contrary-reach
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Even black superstars  can  fall victim to  this phenomenon.  A firm
does  suffer  an  efficiency  loss if it consistently  fails to hire  blacks  who
fall into  the superstar category. 6  Nevertheless,  the bias against  average
blacks also makes it more difficult for black superstars  to be regarded  as
such.  Because  employers  know  that blacks have  an  incentive  to signal
themselves  as  superstars  when  they  are  in  fact  average,  and  that  this
strategy  (if successful) will be difficult to detect, firms  have  an  incentive
to discount  indicia  of accomplishment  as false positives.  Since  hiring
partners  know  that  criteria  such  as  grades  are  fuzzy,  lawyers  who  are
predisposed  to believe that blacks  are  less  likely  to  be  superstars  than
whites  can  justify  looking  beyond  the usual  signals  to  reach  a  more
subjective  evaluation  of the  candidate's  quality.  Anecdotal  evidence
suggests  that this  occurs  with some  frequency.'27  At  a  minimum,  this
possibility  must  be counted  against  the potential,  documented  by  Ste-
phen  Carter,  for  whites,  because  of  their  diminished  expectations  of
black performance  to accord  superstar  status to  average  blacks  because
they  are  the "best black"  in  the group. 228
Together,  the  fact that  firms  prefer  average  whites  over  average
blacks  and the corresponding tendency  for  these  employers  to  discount
the credentials  of blacks who signal  themselves  to  be  superstars  make  it
harder for blacks to be hired  by  elite law firms.  This state of affairs  is
self-perpetuating,  since firms  that substitute average  whites  for  average
as deep as the top 60 percent of the class for white  candidates  but they  select  minority  recruits  from
only the top 10 percent."); Deborah Holmes,  Structural Causes of Dissatisfaction  Among Large.Firm
Attorneys: A  Feminist  Perspective, 12 WOMEN's  RTs.  L  REP.  9 (1990)  (reporting that unattractive  or
overweight female candidates  have a disproportionately  difficult time finding jobs).
226.  This  helps  to  explain  the  common  perception  that  blacks  with  superstar  traditional
credentials are heavily recruited.  See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 171,  at S46.  Schmidt reports:
Major firms..,  recruit law students  in the top of their class at a select group of law schools,
fostering fierce competition for  the  few  minorities  who meet  the traditional  description of
the well-qualified  associate.
"Like  most  of  the  big  firms,  we're  hiring  outstanding  students  and  there  is  quite  a
competition [for minorities],"  says Wiley, Rein name partner Richard Wiley.
Id.  Although this is often described as a competition for "qualified" blacks, we believe that it is better
understood as a search for black superstars.  We return in Part IV  to the potentially  valuable effects
of fostering a competition for black applicants.
227.  For example,  a former associate at a major Washington,  D.C. law  firm  reports  that a black
Harvard  graduate  with an  A-minus/B-plus  grade  point  average  was  turned  down  for  a  summer
associate position because firm partners  felt that he had taken too many "easy courses."  One partner
even  went so far  as  to suggest calling  one  of the  applicant's  professors  to  determine  whether  he
really deserved the "A" he received  in the course.  The  informant reports  that during  her  tenure on
the hiring committee,  no one inquired  into  the difficulty  of courses  taken  by  white  candidates,  let
alone suggested calling a faculty member to look behind a grade.  Interview  with Professor Wilkins.
228.  See STEPHEN  L CARTER,  REFLEcriONS  OF AN  AFFIRMATIVE  ACTION  BABY  53-54  (1991).
See generally,  Chamy and Gulati, supra note 9, at 22-23.  This dynamic  may  have  shifted  over  time.
For example, Chief Judge Harry Edwards of the U.S.  Court of Appeals  for  the District of  Columbia
Circuit is quoted  in a recent  article,  as  remarking:  "Kids  like  my son face  constant  pressure,  The
assumption starting out is  that they're  affirmative  action and  that someone  put them there,  whereas
the assumption with me was I must be smart as hell."  Herman, supra note  171,  at 60.WHY ARE THERE SO FEW  BLACK LAWYERS
blacks  suffer  no  competitive  disadvantage.  Once  we  take  into  account
the additional fact that the number  of black  lawyers  already  working  in
a particular firm  is positively  correlated  with  that  firm's  likelihood  of
hiring  additional  black  attorneys,  the chances  of  moving  beyond  this
equilibrium  seem  daunting.19
Ironically,  these  structural  features  of the  recruiting  process  also
lead us to predict that the blacks who are hired  will tend,  on  average,  to
be clustered in the  superstar  range.2 no  In  light of the rampant  discrimi-
nation during  the "golden  age,"  it is not  surprising  that the few black
lawyers  who  were  hired  during  this  period  had  superstar  qualifica-
tions.2 nI  We suspect, however, that something similar may  be continuing
today.
In order to investigate  this proposition,  we asked  250  elite firms  to
tell us the law school  attended by each member  of their  most recent  en-
tering class of associates  and to indicate which of these  lawyers  is black.
The results  of this survey,  although far from conclusive,  suggest that the
blacks who are hired by elite firms tend to come from  the superstar end
of the distribution in terms of the key  variable of law school status.  The
percentage of black associates  identified by this survey who were  gradu-
ates from  elite schools  is only  5%  higher  than  the percentage  for non-
black  associates. 2   However,  the black  associates  tend  to come  from
schools at the top of the elite range.  Thus,  graduates  from  Harvard  Law
School constituted  24%  of all of the  blacks  in  our  law  firm  survey.23
Even  if we  limit the universe  of qualified  African-American  applicants
to the graduates  of the schools from which the firms in our  survey  actu-
ally  hired  during  the  year  in  question,  this  percentage  is  nearly  four
times  greater  than  the  percentage  of  black  Harvard  graduates  in  the
available pool.'
The numbers are even more striking  in  New York and  Washington,
the two cities with the largest concentration of elite firms.  In  New York,
Harvard graduates constitute  15.6%  of the total number of black  associ-
ates hired.s  However,  when  we  add  black  graduates  from  Columbia
229.  See supra note 171,  and accompanying text.
230.  As a  reminder,  we  assert  that this  is  the  result  that  would  obtain  in  the  absence  of
affirmative action.
231.  See SEGAL, supra note  14,  at 77-78,  218-19  (documenting  the extraordinary  qualifications
of the first generation of blacks to enter into elite law firms).
232.  Appendix, Table 3, (reporting that 57.3%  of the entering  black associates  were  from  elite
law schools as compared to 51.7% of non-black associates).
233.  Id.
234.  Id. (indicating that 24%  of the total number  of blacks  hired  graduated  from Harvard  and
that Harvard's  graduating  class  of black  students constitutes  6.1%  of all  black students  graduating
from any law school from which any black student was  hired  by one  of the firms responding  to our
survey).  Table 4 lists all of the law schools from which the firms in our sample hired black associates
and the number of these lawyers that were hired from each school.
235.  Appendix, Table 3.
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and  New  York University,  the percentage  rises  to  5 1.1 .6  Similarly,  in
Washington, D.C., black Harvard  graduates  account for 32%  of the total
blacks  hired. 7  When we include  black  graduates  from  Georgetown,238
these two schools  account for 52% of the total.2 39
Admittedly,  there are problems  with  this data, as  well as alternative
hypotheses  that can  also  explain  these  results.  Only  one-third  of  the
firms responded to our survey (although  the response rates  in New  York
and Washington,  D.C. were 51%  and 50% respectively).  In addition,  the
number of blacks in the  survey is small, and the results  are  only  for one
year.24  Moreover,  because  of affirmative  action  in  law  school  admis-
sions, it is possible that Harvard and other similar schools  have  a dispro-
portionate share of the talented black students.  Although this  would still
mean that firms tend to hire blacks from  the superstar  end  of the distri-
bution,  it would  weaken  the  corresponding  implication  that  the  black
graduates  from other  elite schools  that are  less  well represented  are  be-
ing  unfairly  overlooked  in  favor  of  white  graduates  from  those  same
institutions.  For affirmative  action  in  law school  admissions  to  account
for  these  differentials,  however,  the  gap  between  the  quality  of  black
students from, for example,  Harvard  and  the  University  of Michigan  or
the University  of Pennsylvania  (two elite schools  that  contributed  only
two black associates  apiece  to our  sample),  must  be  substantially  larger
than that between  white students  from  these  same institutions.24'  So  far
as we know, there is no evidence  to support the existence of a gap of this
magnitude.
Moreover,  to the extent  that these  considerations  overstate the  im-
portance  of top  echelon  schools  like  Harvard  in  our  sample,  there  are
other forces  that  seem likely  to pull  in  the opposite  direction.  For ex-
ample, a comparison  between  the percentage  of black  associates in  our
sample  and  the latest information  about  blacks  in  corporate  firms  sug-
gests that  the  firms  that  chose  to  respond  to  our  survey  have  more
236.  Id.
237.  Id.
238.  Id.  Although  Georgetown  is  not  one  of our  elite  schools,  it  is  the  best  law  school  in
Washington,  D.C.  Not surprisingly, most of the black and  white  associates  from  Georgetown  in  our
sample were hired by Washington,  D.C. firms.
239.  Id.
240.  Our  difficulty  in  getting  firms  to  respond  to  even  this  simple  request  for  information
underscores  why there is so little hard data in this area.  As for the  small  sample  size  for  blacks,  this
is, of course,  due  in  part  to the  very  problem  we  are  studying-the  small  number  of  blacks  in
corporate  firms.
241.  To the extent that attending a law school at  the top of the elite  range  is no noisier a  signal
for blacks than it  is for  whites, in  the absence  of a  systematic preference  for  average  whites  over
average blacks, we should expect to see both groups hired at the same  rate  that they  appear  in their
respective pools.
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blacks  than  average."'  In addition,  given  recent  initiatives  to  increase
minority  hiring  undertaken  by  bar  associations  around  the  country
(including those in New York and Washington,  D.C.),  it seems likely that
firms responding to  our survey have engaged in more affirmative  action
in  hiring  this  class  of  incoming  associates  than  in  previous  years. 243
Both  of these factors  seem  likely  to  increase  the  chances  that  average
blacks, that is, those  without  superstar credentials  like attending  an elite
law school, would make it into our sample.
Indeed, when we look back  to  a period  when  by  all  accounts  there
was less affirmative action than there is today,  we find  evidence that  go-
ing to an elite law school was  even more  important  for  blacks.  Table  5
compares  the law schools  attended  by  all of the identifiable  black part-
ners listed in the Minority Partners  Handbook  with  the credentials  of all
partners in five national  law firms.2"  The results  suggest that the current
generation  of black  partners  are  much  more  likely  to  have  graduated
from an elite law  school then their white counterparts.  Thus, 77%  of all
black partners  attended one of the eleven elite law  schools  where corpo-
rate  law  firms  have traditionally  done  most  of  their  recruiting. 245  In
contrast,  the combined  percentage  of elite graduates  at  five  of  the  na-
tion's most  elite firms  is 70%,  with firms  such  as  Atlanta's  Kirkpatrick
and Cody drawing less than half of their partners  from  these  schools.246
When we narrow our focus  to graduates from Harvard  and  Yale, the  two
schools generally considered  to be at the top of the status  hierarchy,  the
results  are  even more  dramatic. 47  Fourty-seven  percent  of  the black
partners  at elite firms attended  Harvard  or Yale, a percentage  only  sur-
prassed by Boston's Ropes & Gray.  None  of the other  firms  has more
than 41%  of its partners from these two  institutions, and  the average  for
the five firms is only 33%.248  More importantly, if we remove  graduates
of  Howard  Law  School  from  the  percentage  of  black  partners  from
non-elite  schools,  a reasonable  supposition  in light of the unique  posi-
242.  Blacks  constitute  7.6%  of the  associates  hired  in our survey  as compared  to the  national
average of 2A% of all associates who are black.  Compare Appendix, Table 3 with Davis,  supra note
15.  at 1.
243.  See id. (reporting that the jump in minority  associates  was  due in  part to  firms agreeing  to
goals and timetables to increase minority participation).
244.  The  information  on  black  partners  was  gathered  from  CONFERENCE  ON  MINORITY
PARTNERS  IN  MAJORITY/CORPORATE  FIRMS,  AMERICAN  BAR  ASSOCIATION,  MINORITY  PARTNERS
IN  MAjoRtTY/CORPORATE  FIRMS:  PROFESSIONAL  PROFILES (1992-93  ed.).
245.  Appendix,  Table 5.
246.  Id.
247.  For example,  the  1995  U.S.  News and World Report ranking  of  American  law  schools
places Yale and Harvard as numbers one and two,  respectively.  See The Top 25 Law Schools,  U.S.
NEws  & WORLD  REPORT, Mar. 20, 1995,  at 84.
248.  Appendix,  Table 5.
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tion  that  Howard  holds  for  black  lawyers, 249  the  liklihood  of  a  black
partner  attending  a non-elite  school  is approximately  a  third  less than
that for the general  population of partnes  at the sampled firms.25
Once  again,  this  comparison  is  not  definitive.  To  highlight  the
most obvious  complication,  we do not know  whether  the population  of
black partners  is representative  of the other blacks who might have been
hired at the same  time but who  did not  win the tournament.  Neverthe-
less, the fact that  so  many  of the current  generation  of black  partners
attended elite schools at a time when  law school  affirmative  action  poli-
cies were less entrenched  then they  are  today  suggests  that  the  similar
effects  we observed in our survey of associates reflect a tendency  for the
black associates who are hired by elite firms  to come disproportionately
from  the superstar  end  of the  distribution.  Anecdotal  descriptions  of
the recruiting  process by  some black  partners  provide  further  support
for this assessment.5'  If this is correct,  however, it brings  up  a  further
paradox:  if black  associates are  disproportionately  clustered  in  the  su-
perstar  range,  why  are there  so  few black partners?  This  brings  us  the
question of retention.
B.  Retention, Promotion, and Survival
Virtually all the blacks  who  start at a given  elite  law firm leave be-
fore  becoming  partner."s2  In  this  Section, we examine  how  the  institu-
tional  characteristics  of  elite  firms-high  salaries,  pyramiding,  and
tracking-affect  a black  associate's  partnership  prospects.  Unlike  oth-
ers who have addressed this issue, however, we concentrate on more  than
partnership  rates.  To  understand  why  there  are  so  few  black  partners,
one must investigate what happens  both before and  after the partnership
decision-and what opportunities  are available for those who  leave.
249.  Until the mid-1970s, Howard was virtually the only law school with a significant  number  of
black  graduates.  Even  after  other  schools  began  admitting  blacks,  Howard's  reputation  for
excellence and its connection to the civil rights movement  combined  to attract  black  students  whose
credentials would have allowed them to attend  an  elite  law  school.  In  recognition  of these  factors,
Howard is  the only historically black law school  from which elite firms recruit with any frequency.
250.  Appendix, Table 5.
251.  For example,  Davis reports a black partner at Chicago's Sidley & Austin  as  contending that
firms "set higher standards  for minority  hires  than  for whites"  and  contending  that "[i]f you're  not
from Harvard, not from Yale, not from the University of Chicago,  you're  not adequate.  You're  not
taken seriously."  See Davis, supra note  15, at 22.
252.  See supra note  170, and  accompanying  text.  Our  data  on  black  Harvard  Law  School
graduates supports this conclusion.  For example,  only 14% of our sample of black graduates  from the
classes of 1981  and 1982 were still affiliated  with the  law firms  at which  they  started their careers.
Assuming both that these lawyers all became partners and that those who  left did not become partners
at another elite  firm, the partnership  rate  for  black Harvard  Law  School  graduates  is substantially
below the average  for any  major  metropolitan  city-including  New  York.  See  Appendix,  Table  I
and Figure 3.  Although  both of the assumptions  underlying  this comparison  are  controversial  (i.e.,
some of the 14% still at their original finms are "of counsel"or  non-equity  partners  just as  some  who
left undoubtedly made partner at other elite firms) the comparison  is nevertheless instructive.
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1.  Monitoring, Mentoring, and Marketing: Getting on the Training
Track
Elite firms make few formal distinctions among entering  associates.
The  implication  is that associates in  a class are part  of a unified  group
operating on a level playing field. In Part II, we argued that the reality  is
otherwise.  Although  firms maintain few formal  distinctions, the inevita-
ble scarcity  of training  opportunities  pushes  associates  along  informal,
but nevertheless  identifiable, career paths  almost from  the moment  they
arrive.  The few associates who get on  the training  track  will receive in-
teresting  work,  meaningful  training,  supervision,  and  supportive  men-
tors.  The  others  will end up  as flatliners  drowning  in  a sea  of  routine
paperwork.
Empirical  and  anecdotal  reports  about  the  practices  of  elite  law
firms  support this account.  From the "golden  age"  forward,  associates
have been lured to join big firms by the promise of excellent training.  13
For the reasons  outlined  above, these promises  are  difficult  to  keep.'
As a result,  "associates  voice strong concerns  about  the lack of on-the-
job  training, delegation,  supervision,  and feedback.""5
These complaints,  although pervasive,  are not uniform  even among
associates  at a single  firm. 6  Instead,  some  associates  report  that  they
253.  For the role that promises about training continue to play in associate  recruitment,  see,  e.g.,
CYNTHIA  F. EPSTEIN,  WOMEN  IN  LAW  181  (2d  ed.  1993)  (reporting that many  young lawyers join
large law firms because they expect to be trained);  Allison Frankel,  What Ever Happened  to the Class
of '83?, AM.  LAw.,  Oct.  1993,  at  53,  54  (reporting  that  associates  join  Paul  Weiss  for  training,
contacts, and the allure of the firm's name).
254.  See Joel F. Henning & Mindy  A.  Friedler, Training  Senior Lawyers to be Better Trainers,
LAW  PRAC.  MGMT.,  Mar.  1993, at 60, 61 ("The practice of law has changed  dramatically  in the past
10 years, and one of the casualties  has been associate training and development.").
255.  Id.  The  following  comments  from  the  American  Lawyer  1994  survey  of  mid-level
associates are representative of these complaints:
Life and prospects for nineties  associates [at Los  Angeles'  Lewis,  D'Amato]  are  not rosy.
Before they fired all the human, tutorial partners, training here  was  above  average.  Since
[the] firings, partner files  have been transferred to associates,  who are forced  to fly  by the
seat of their pants.  Now there is much more responsibility but less mentoring.
Midlevel  Associates Survey:  Seeking  Quality of Life,  AM.  LAW.,  Oct.  1994,  at  43  [hereinafter
Associates Survey].
"Life  at [New York's Cleary, Gottlieb] does not seem to include any training, feedback,  or
guidance  that would  foster  one's  development  as  a  lawyer."  Id. at  65.  "No  one  [at Washington,
D.C.'s Shaw, Pittman] takes an interest in my legal  development,  and when  I inquire  about a higher
level of work-that involving more responsibility or litigation experience-I  am ignored."  Id. at  88.
"[Tiraining  [at  Washington,  D.C.'s McKenna  and  Cuneo]  is  so poor  that  [associates]  are  highly
unmarketable."  Id. at 89.
256.  For  example,  compare  the  following  comments  from  two  mid-level  associates  at
Washington,  D.C.'s  Howrey  and  Simon:  "There  is very  little opportunity  for associates  to get  into
court or get any significant litigation responsibility ....  Thus, even for mid-level  associates,  much  of
the  work  is  brief-and  motion-writing-perhaps  with  some  depositions-and  little court  or  client
contact."  Id. at 87.  "The firm is  a true meritocracy.  Associates  who  do good work are  rewarded
with greater responsibility regardless of where they went  to school,  how  long they  have  been  at the
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receive  valuable  training  opportunities  while others  do  not.2 57   In  addi-
tion,  once  an  associate  acquires  a reputation  as being  well-trained,  she
will continue to receive  training in the form  of demanding  work.28   Al-
though  managing  partners  understandably  continue  to  deny  that  firms
track incoming  associates,2s9  more detached  observers,2
1  as well  as part-
ners  in more candid moments,26' report  the contrary.
An  associate's  perception  about  which  track  she  is on  will  have  a
substantial impact on how long she decides  to  stay  with the firm.62  As-
sociates  know  that  firms  look  for  two  things  when  they  select  part-
ners:  legal ability and  marketing  potential.2 63  An  associate who  has  not
been trained  cannot credibly  signal  either of these  capacities.  Training
is the Royal Jelly that enables  associates to  develop  the job-related  skills
257.  The  American  Lawyer  reports  on  Cleveland's  Baker  &  Hostetler  and  Philadelphia's
Morgan, Lewis and Bockius underscore  these differences.  "The key to receiving topflight training at
Baker  & Hostetler,  according  to the  16 associates  (out of 54 eligible)  appears  to  be  finding  good
mentors.  Written comments indicated that the quality of associate training depended entirely upon the
partners and senior associates  overseeing them."  Id. at 37.
The written comments provided  by 20 associates in various offices  of [Morgan,  Lewis  and
Bockius]  suggest that  associates'  experiences  vary widely.  One  Philadelphia  third-year
complained that  "mentoring  is almost nonexistent,"  but another  contended  that  "the  firm
makes a strong effort to overcome the types  of problems that typically  arise  for  associates
in a large firm  (e.g., limited courtroom exposure) by providing  extensive training."
Id. at 73.
258.  See  id. at 44  ("The  partners  at  Jones,  Day  are  willing  to  give  associates  as  much
responsibility as  they  demonstrate they  can  handle.  This  is a positive aspect-but  also  turns  into  a
negative one.  Once you demonstrate your ability, you are a valuable commodity,  and  the  pressure  to
work with various partners becomes  intense.").
259.  See,  e.g.,  id. at 88  (quoting a management  committee  member as  stating,  "I  think  this  is
evidence of generalized  anxiety.  It's always wrong, but it's  nonetheless  persistent  that there's  some
group of pre-ordained  superstars.").
260.  See Henning & Friedler, supra note 254, at 61 (noting that "[o]nce  partners  find  associates
they like who can  do  the  work,  they're  more  than  happy  to continue delegating  work  only  to those
associates").  The  authors point  out that  this can  sometimes  hurt even  those  who  get  this  kind  of
responsibility by "pigeonhol[ing]  them in narrow responsibilities"  which may result in their becoming
lawyers  who charge  "senior-level fees for junior-level  work."  Id.
261.  See  Chambliss,  supra note  7,  at  94  (quoting  a  senior  partner  who  acknowledges  the
existence of an informal tracking system for associates).
262.  We  use  the word  perception  advisedly.  Firms  give  associates  relatively  little  concrete
information about their progress  and  what is said  is often  unreliable.  See,  e.g.,  Associates Survey,
supra note 255, at 64 (quoting a  mid-level  associate  at  Cleary,  Gotlieb  as  reporting  "the  formal
evaluations  are  generic  in tone and  completely  unhelpful").  This is hardly surprising.  Given  that
firms  rely on both the "carrot"  of winning the partnership tournament  as well  as  the  "stick"  of losing
this scarce  high-paying job to motivate their associates,  they  have  an  incentive  to keep  associates  in
the dark as long as possible about their partnership prospects.  As a result,  a  flatlining associate  may
not know that she is in trouble until it is too late.  This is particularly  true  because,  as Figure  1 makes
clear,  a flatlining associate may be working quite hard in her early  years--often  harder  (and  making
more money for the firm) than  an associate who is receiving Royal Jelly.  It is only when  she  realizes
that  others  are  getting  more  responsibility  while  her  own  work  both  diminishes  and  continues
unchanged  that she will begin to suspect that her career has stalled.
263.  See  CAPLAN,  supra note  67,  at  263-74  (describing  the  criteria  for  making  partner  at
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partners  expect  to  see  in  those  who  will be  elevated  to  their  rank.2
4
Similarly,  although an associate  may have business contacts  independent
of  the  firm,  the  most  likely  way for  an  associate  to  demonstrate  her
rainmaking  skills  is  through  contact  with  the  firm's  existing  clients.
Such contact  is one of the commodities  that training can  help  an  associ-
ate accrue.
25
The  effect  on  lateral  movement  is  equally  plain.  The  implicit
promise that big firm associates are well trained  lies at the heart  of their
marketability. 266  Associates  therefore  work  to  avoid  sending  any  signal
that might tend to refute this presumption.  Being fired is,  of course,  the
ultimate negative signal,  but failing to  receive  the  same  training  oppor-
tunities as one's peers  may  also  adversely  affect  one's  lateral  mobility.
The fact that others  are getting better work experience  will not only  lead
an  associate  to doubt her  own  partnership  chances,  but  may  also  lead
her to believe that she will have less  success in signaling  to other  poten-
tial employers  that she  is well-trained.  Whether  or  not  these  fears  are
justified, 267  they are  likely  to  increase  the pressure  to  look  for  another
job.
Associates  who do  not find  themselves  on  the  training  track  have
three  options:  (i) they  can  leave  immediately;  (ii)  they  can  attempt  to
move themselves  onto the training track;  or (iii) they  can stay at the firm
but invest their time  and  energy  in developing  non-firm-specific  skills
that  will help  them  get another job.  Which of  these  strategies  a  given
associate  will  pursue  depends  upon  both  the  likelihood  that  she  can
change her reputation  within  the firm  and her  prospects  in the external
employment  market.  We believe that African-American  associates  face
important barriers  on both of these fronts.  We  therefore  turn  our  atten-
tion to the particular experiences  of black lawyers.
264.  In  addition,  because  skill  and  rainmaking  potential  are  difficult  to  observe  or  evaluate
without  investing  substantial  time, partners  are  likely  to rely  on the opinions  of those  partners  who
have had  first-hand  experience  with the  candidate.  An  associate who  has  not entered  into  one  or
more  of the complex  mentoring/training  relationships  described  above  is  less  likely  to  have  such
knowledgeable  advocates among the partners.
265.  In addition, partners are also likely to favor trained  associates even in circumstances  where
it might not be in the firm's interest to do so.  When the existing partners of a firm decide on  which  of
their eighth-  to tenth-year  associates  to elevate  to their own  ranks, each  partner  has  an  interest  in
promoting his or her proteges.  The proteges owe their mentors allegiance because the mentors  chose
to invest in them.  This presumably means that the proteges will repay their mentors by providing them
with clients or voting not to fire them when the proteges are at their most productive and  the mentors
are older and less productive.
266.  See,  e.g.,  Kordana,  supra note  106,  at  1932  (arguing  that  government  and  business
enterprises  want to hire  associates  "because  a large  law  firm  is such  a  good  training  ground  for
young attorneys").
267.  As  we argue above, potential  employers may be less able to distinguish between trained and
untrained  lateral  candidates  than  those  candidates  might  suspect.  See  supra  note  148  and
accompanying text.
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2.  Concrete Ceilings and Slippery Floors: The Black Experience in
Corporate  Firms
Black  associates  face  three  significant  barriers  to  getting  on  the
training track.  First, they are less likely than whites to find mentors  who
will  give  them  challenging  work  and  provide  them  with  advice  and
counseling about how to succeed at  the firm.  Second,  they  face  higher
costs from  making  mistakes than  their  white peers.  Third,  their  future
employment prospects  with  other elite firms  diminish more rapidly  than
those of similarly situated associates.
a.  Mentoring and Irrationality"
In order to  get on the training  track,  an  associate has  to  have men-
tors among the firm's partners  or senior  associates who  can  provide  the
Royal Jelly of good  training.  Blacks  consistently  report  that they  have
difficulty  in  forming  these  supportive  relationships.  For  example,  in
our  survey  of black  Harvard  Law  School  graduates,  less  than  40%  of
those  surveyed,  and  only  24%  of the pre-1986  graduates,  stated  that  a
partner  had  taken  interest in their  work  or  their  career. 269  Sixty-eight
percent of those who did not find a mentor,  including  79% of the post-
1986 graduates,  stated that this was a significant  factor  in  their decision
to leave the firm. 27  Although we do not have comparable  data  on  white
associates,  our hypothesis  that  blacks  have  an  especially  difficult  time
finding  mentors  in  consistant with the  views of others  who  have exam-
ined  the issue.27'  There  is reason  to  believe  that  the  situation  is  even
bleaker for black women,  who confront gender  as  well as racial  barriers
to forming meaningful  mentoring  relationships. 272
268.  We  borrow  the  phrase  from  David  Thomas.  See  David  A.  Thomas,  Mentoring  and
Irrationality:  The Role of  Racial Taboos, 28 HuM.  RESOURCE  MGMT. 279 (1989).
269.  Appendix,  Table 2, Part B.
270.  Id.
271.  Bar associations reports  on the problem  of minority retention  consistently  emphasise  that
black  lawyers  have  difficulty finding  mentors.  See,  e.g.,  S.F. REPORT,  supra note  33,  at  14;  N.Y.
REPORT, supra note  12,  at  84-85; see also Caroline  V. Clarke,  The Diversity Dilemma, Am.  LAW.,
Oct. 1992, at 31  (reporting that "African-Americans  perceive more race-related  barriers to obtaining
adequate  mentors,  challenging  work,  direct  client  contact,  and  partnership"  than  either  whites  or
members  of other  minority  groups); Alexander  Stille, Little Room at the Top for Blacks, Hispanics,
NAT'L L.J.,  Dec. 23,  1985, at 1, 9 (reporting that blacks have a harder time finding  mentors than  their
white counterparts).
272.  A  number  of important studies  have  documented  the difficulties  women  face  in entering
meaningful mentoring relationships.  See, e.g.,  EPSTEIN, supra  note 253, at 287-88;  Grace  M. Giesel,
The Business Client Is  a Woman: The Effect of Women as In-House Counsel on Women  in Law Firms
and the Legal Profession,  72 NEB.  L REv. 760,777-79 (1993).  In  light of both the added  complexity
that racial difference adds to interactions  between women and men,  as  well  as  the greater  difficulty
that women face in creating supportive mentoring relationships across  racial lines, these problems  are
likely to be even  greater  for black  women.  For discussion of the manner  in which  race  and  sex
intersect  to form  unique "taboos"  that inhibit mentoring  relationships,  see Thomas,  supra  note  268.
See  also HARRINGTON,  supra note  168,  at  101-02  (reporting  that black  women  have a  particularly
[Vol.  84:4931996] WHY ARE THERE SO FEW  BLACK LAWYERS
A  number  of  factors  contribute  to  this  problem.  Chief  among
them is  the bias that  potential  mentors  have  for  proteges  who  remind
them  of themselves 3   Studies  of cross-racial  and  cross-gender  men-
toring  relationships  in  the  workplace  repeatedly  demonstrate  that white
men feel  more  comfortable  in  working  relationships  with  other  white
men.4  Anecdotal  evidence suggests that white partners in  law firms  are
no  different  . 5  This natural affinity  makes it difficult for blacks to form
supportive mentoring  relationships.
These  problems  are  magnified  in  a  low-monitoring  environment.
Because  partners  have little information  about a new  associate's  actual
skils, the decision  about who  is  a  superstar  worthy  of  training  will  be
made as an initial  matter in  the same  way  as it is done  at the recruiting
stage-based  on  a  few  easily  observable  signals  such  as  law  school
status, academic  honors,  and  grades.  Indeed,  since partners  not on  the
recruiting  committee  will probably  not have met the  great  majority  of
incoming  associates  (nor  seen their  credentials)  decisions  about  which
of these lawyers are superstars will be even  more  loosely correlated  with
these signals than  typical  hiring decisions.  Under  these  circumstances,
difficult  time  "desexualizing"  their  bodies  and  therefore  face  additional  barriers  to  forming
supportive relationships with white male superiors).
273.  This point was first made by Rosebeth Kanter in her  study of women  in corporations.  See
KANTER,  supra note 7, at 47-49;  see also CYNTHIA  F. EPSTEIN,  WOMAN'S  PLACE:  OPTIONS  AND
LIMITS  IN  PROFESSIONAL  CAREERS  168-70  (1970)  (finding  that  women  had  difficulty  finding
mentors; older male colleagues tended  not to take  on young  female  protegees  because  they did  not
see women associates  as younger versions of themselves in the way  that they  saw  some young male
associates).  But see  Cynthia  F. Epstein  et  al.,  Glass  Ceilings  and  Open  Doors:  Women's
Advancement in the Legal Profession, 64 FORDHAM L.  REV. 291, 353-56  (1995)  (reporting  that some
women  partners  expressed  ambivalence  about  mentoring  women  associates,  both  because  they
themselves  had  succeeded  without  mentoring  and  because  they  feared  that  strong  support  of a
woman  associate  would  be  seen  as  self-interested).  Needless  to  say,  this  latter  problem  further
disadvantages  women protegees by removing one possible avenue for making up for the lack of male
mentors.
274.  Professor David Thomas has been a leader  in this research.  See,  e.g.,  David  A.  Thomas,
Racial Dynamics  in  Cross-Race  Developmental  Relationships, 38  ADMIN.  SCI.  Q. 169  (1993)
[hereinafter  Thomas,  Racial Dynamics]; David  A.  Thomas,  The  Impact of Race  on  Managers'
Experiences of Developmental Relationships (Mentoring and Sponsorship):  An  Intra-Organizational
Study,  11 J.  ORGANIZATIONAL  BEHAV.  479  (1990);  David  A. Thomas  & Clayton  P. Alderfer,  The
Influence of Race on  Career  Dynamics: Theory and Research on Minority Career  Experiences, in
HANDBOOK  OF  CAREER  THEORY  133,  141-43  (Michael  B.  Arthur  et  al.  eds.,  1989).  Thomas
emphasizes  that despite these  difficulties,  blacks  and  whites  can,  under  certain  conditions,  enter
meaningful mentoring relationships.  See, e.g., Thomas, Racial Dynamics, supra, at 176-77,  192.
275.  For example,  consider the following  report by a black  lawyer  who  went to see  a partner
about a possible assignment only to find the partner already talking to two white associates:
When this partner looks at these guys, he looks for himself back in [the old days],  or for his
son one day.  I thought to myself, "The reason I'm not in this room is because  my world  in
his mind has nothing to do with his world."  And no matter what schools you went to or how
much leverage  you think you have,  or sometimes,  even what the client  says,  people  are
going to work with whomever they feel most comfortable, with who [sic] they  most identify
with.
Clarke, supra  note 271, at 32.CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
background  prejudices  and  preconceptions  can  lead  white  partners  to
believe that black  associates are  more  likely  to  be  average  or  perhaps
even unacceptable."6
As indicated above, blacks may  also  suffer from  a general  percep-
tion  that they  are  "less  interested"  in  corporate  work  than  other  law-
yers.2"  This  sentiment  may  be  reinforced  by  the  fact  that  black
associates  appear  to  be more  likely  than  their  white  peers  to  do  more
than  the  average  amount  of pro  bono  work,  to  hold  skeptical  views
about  the social  utility  'of some of the goals  of  their  corporate  clients,
and to leave corporate  practice  for jobs  in  the  public  sector. 278  As with
recruiting,  black  women  face  an  additional  hurdle,  since  partners  fre-
quently  believe  that  family  responsibilities  will  inevitably  reduce  the
number  of hours  these  associates are  willing  to  commit  to  the  firm.2 79
The  fact that these  generalizations  say  almost  nothing  about  any  indi-
vidual  black  associate's  level of interest  or  commitment  to  the  firm  is
unlikely  to dissuade partners  from  relying  on  such  gross statistical  cor-
relations  when  deciding whom to mentor.
Finally, black  associates  will have difficulty  getting  onto  the  train-
ing  track  precisely  because  the generation  of  black  associates  before
them  did  not.  Partners  have  less incentive  to  invest scarce  training  re-
sources in associates who they  think are  unlikely  to be  at the firm  long
enough  for them to recoup  their investment.  Not only  are  black  associ-
ates less  likely to  make  partner,  but  their  average  tenure  may  also  be
shorter than that of their white peers."'  As a result, black  associates  are
276.  For example, in a Diversity Training videotape distributed  by the San Francisco Bar, a black
woman reports that when a rumor began  circulating  around  her  firm  that one  of the new  associates
had failed  the bar, several partners immediately  assumed that it was her  even  though she  had in  fact
passed not one but two exams. See A  FIRM  COMMITMENT  (Bar  Association  of San Francisco).  The
student who  failed  was  white;  see also Donna Gill,  Lawyers of Color: Encouraging  Diversity, CHI.
LAw.,  July  1992,  at 1 ("'Minorities  do not come  in with  [a]  presumption  of  competence,'  [Lord,
Bissel & Brook partner W. Muzette] Hill said.  'They  come  in having  to prove  themselves.  That in
and of itself sets the tone.  Everything flows  from  that.  Then  human  nature  being  what it is, people
tend to be drawn to, want  to nurture,  or are  more  tolerant of people just like them."');  Campbell  &
Tomkins, supra  note 215.
277.  See supra note 39 and accompanying  text.
278.  For example, in our study of black  Harvard  Law  School  graduates,  86%  reported  doing a
significant  amount of pro bono  work,  while  33%  left their firm  for  a  government  job.  Appendix,
Table 2, Part A.  These numbers appear to differ from what one would find in the general  population.
See Marc  Galanter  & Thomas  Palay, Public Service Implications of Evolving  Law  Firm Size  and
Structure, in  THE  LAW  FIRM  AND  THE  PUBLIC  GOOD  19,  42  (Robert  A.  Katzmann  ed.,  1995)
[hereinafter  PUBLIC  GOOD]  (reporting that less  than  40%  of the associates  at large  firms  did more
than 20 hours of pro bono work in 1994, up  from  30%  in  1993); see also Wilkins, Social Engineers,
supra note 8 (citing evidence that blacks tend to be on average more skeptical about both  the  fairness
and the social utility of the current distribution of wealth  and power than whites).
279.  See supra note 218 and accompanying  text.
280.  In our survey of black Harvard Law School  graduates we found that the average  tenure for
black  Harvard  Law  School  graduates  was  3.04  years  and 2.32  years  for  the  pre-  and  post-1986
samples respectively.  See Appendix,  Table 2, Part C.  These rates appear to be  lower  than  those  for
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doubly  penalized  for  the  firm's  failure  to  retain  and  promote  black
lawyers.
b.  Visibility and Tokenism
Sociologists  contend  that  when  a  group's  representation  in  the
workforce is small, individual  members  face  increased  pressures to per-
form  and  conform. 28 " '  Although  these  pressures  can  work  to  the
"token's"  advantage,  the dominant  tendency  is  for  them  to  magnify
the cost of making  mistakes.  Reports  by black  associates  lend  credence
to this hypothesis.
Black associates frequently  state that they  are judged  more  harshly
when they  make mistakes  than  their white contemporaries.  For  exam-
ple, over 40%  of our  survey respondents  reported  that they  were  criti-
cized more than white associates for making similar mistakes. 2  Even  if
these respondents  are mistaken  about this, the fact that they  believe it to
be true may induce some black associates to embark on  the counterpro-
ductive  career  strategies  we describe  below.  There  is reason  to  suspect,
however, that these reports are not simply a product of the black  associ-
ates'  collective  imagination.  A low-monitoring  environment  amplifies
negative  signals.  For  black  associates  the  problem  is  exacerbated  by
expectations.  If, for the reasons  outlined  above, partners  expect  black
associates to  be average  or unacceptable,  then  any  mistake  will  be seen
as confirming this initial assessment. 2"3  Mistakes by  whites, on  the other
hand,  are  more  likely to be dismissed  as  "aberrational"  or  "growing
the associate population as a whole.  For example, a survey of the Harvard Law School class of  1981
found that 74.52% of those starting at a large  firm  had  not changed  jobs as  of  1985.  See  David  N.
Schultz,  Harvard  Law  School  Graduates:  Where  They  Are  and How  They  Got  There  26  (1985)
(unpublished manuscript  on  file  with  the author)  (analyzing  Harvard  Law  School's  Career  Path
Study).
281.  See  KANTER, supra note 7, at 210, 212 ('The proportional rarity of tokens is associated  with
three  perceptual  tendencies:  visibility,  contrast,  and  assimilation ....  Visibility  tends  to  create
performance pressures on  the token.  Contrast leads  to heightening  of dominant culture  boundaries,
including  isolation  of  the  token.  And  assimilation  results  in  the  token's  role  encapsulation.")
(emphasis omitted).
282.  See  Appendix, Table 2, Part B.
283.  This is a point about calculating conditional probabilities  based upon prior views about what
the distribution of signals from a particular group is likely to be.  Ideally, the evaluation process  works
as follows:  An associate performs  a  task,  that performance  provides  the partner  with a  signal,  and
based upon that signal the partner calculates  the probability that training this  associate  will be  a  good
investment.  The more closely the partner can evaluate the associate's work, the less need  there  is to
base  the  calculation  on information  extrinsic  to  the  actual  performance.  In  a  world  where
information  is expensive  to  collect,  however,  partners  must  make  evaluations  in  light  of  their
background hunches.  The signal  the partner gets is combined  with the partner's  prior hunches  about
the associate to produce an implicit calculation about the associate's  potential.  The vaguer the signal,
the stronger the effect of the hunches in influencing the final calculation.
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pains,"  since these associates are presumed competent  in  the absence  of
conclusive evidence to the contrary.2 4
Finally,  small  numbers  also  increase  the  probability  that  group
members will be tied together in the minds of members of the dominant
group. 2 5  To the extent that white partners think (consciously  or uncon-
sciously)  that "we  had  a  [black]  once  and  he didn't  work  out,"26  the
chances  of any other black lawyer having a successful  career  at the firm
are correspondingly  reduced.
Collectively,  these aspects  of tokenism  encourage  black  associates
to think about outside job  possibilities. 2
1  What they  see  when  they  ex-
amine the lateral job market, however, is likely to make  them  even  more
concerned  about their future.
c.  Bringing the Outside In
The  pyramid  structure  of  the  elite  law firm  ensures  that  the  vast
majority  of  associates  leave  without  becoming  partners.  When  they
leave, however,  depends  in  part  on  their  perceptions  about  the  lateral
market.  Lawyers  wishing to  move  laterally  face  conflicting  incentives.
On one  hand, the longer they stay,  the  more  they  can  claim  to have  ac-
cumulated  valuable skills.  On  the other, the closer  they  are  to partner-
ship, the greater  the danger  that potential  employers  may  presume  that
they  are  leaving  because  they  are  not  "good  enough"  to  make  part-
ner.
288
For black  associates, the decision  is less complex  but  more  draco-
nian.  It is less complex  because  blacks  may not  receive  the  beneficial
284.  See also Herman, supra note  171,  at  13  (quoting  an associate  at Jenner  & Block:  "When
[whites]  make  a mistake,  the reviewing  attorney  might  have  said,  'Well,  maybe  my  instructions
weren't clear enough.'  ...  But with a minority,...  '[s]uddenly that person is incompetent."').  To be
sure, small numbers can  also produce  the opposite  asymmetry  between  blacks  and  whites:  because
of diminished expectations,  a black associate who does an exceptionally  good job may  receive  more
credit than would a  similarly situated white  associate.  Since  we assume  that blacks  are  at least  as
capable  (on average) as  their white peers,  one  might  think that this positive  asymmetry  would  more
than offset the negative  one  described  in the text.  However,  given that  most of the  work  done  by
associates  (particularly  black associates)  in  their  first  few  years  could  be  done  by  anyone  with
average ability, competently performing these tasks will only signal that a black associate  is located in
the average range.  Being considered average,  however, is not generally  enough to secure success  in
the promotion-to-partnership  tournament.
285.  This is what Kanter refers to as contrast.  See KANTER,  supra note 7, at 210-12.
286.  Bates & Whitehead. supra note  12, at 84 (paraphrasing  an  attitude  they  believe  is common
in large law firms).
287.
"A  bright  young  associate  can  analyze  something"  says  [Hogan  &  Hartson  partner]
Vincent Cohen.  "He or she will say, 'Look,  I see what it takes to be a successful partner.  I
am not going to be able to produce the kind of business I  need  to make  it,  so better  I  make
my swing now while I am still employable."'
Keeva, supra, note 2167 at 53.
288.  See supra note 144.
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presumption  that comes from  length  of  service.  Length  of  service  is
only  positively  correlated  with  skill  if an  associate  has  been  trained.
Since making  quality  judgments  is difficult  in the lateral  market,  firms
are  likely to rely  on statistical  approximations.  To  the extent  that firms
are aware of the barriers  faced by  black  associates regarding  getting  on
the training  track, employers looking for lateral hires  may  be less likely
to  believe  that  a  black  lawyer  has  been  well  trained  (even  if  he  has
been).  Given  the large number  of  lateral  applicants,  a  firm  that  hires
fewer average  black  laterals will not suffer  a  competitive  disadvantage.
As a result, a black lawyer will expect  more difficulty  in moving  later-
ally to another large law firm than will his white counterparts.
Our survey  of black  Harvard  graduates  provides  some  support  for
this conclusion.  Only  15%  of the black  lawyers who had  left their first
elite firm went to  another  one.8 9  Instead, the majority  went into  either
government  (33%),  corporate  legal  departments  (20%),  or  small  non-
elite firms  (17 %).ro  This distribution appears  to be  significantly  differ-
ent from that for whites.29'
Given  this  distribution,  we  hypothesize  that  the  optimal  time  for
black  associates  to  leave firms  is  earlier  than  that  for  white  associates
because  whites do  not  face  the  general  market  presumption  that  they
have not been  trained.  Within the first few years, the common  percep-
tion is that no one  has received  much  training,  so blacks  suffer  no  par-
ticular disadvantage.  Indeed,  the only  significant  new  signal  potential
lateral employers have to look  at is the fact that the associate  was hired
by his first firm and has been at least  minimally  competent.  (If a black
associate  were  not  minimally  competent,  he  would  have  been  fired.)
This additional credential,  may  be  even  more  valuable for  blacks,  since
the second firm can rely on the first firm to screen out those  blacks  who
are  in the unacceptable  range.
Blacks, therefore,  have an  incentive  to  make decisions  about  mov-
ing  laterally  even  more  quickly  than  whites.  This incentive  in turn  af-
fects the choices  these associates make  while at the firm.  On  average,
the  strategies  black  lawyers  are  likely  to  pursue  will  decrease  their
chances of succeeding  at the firm even further.
289.  Appendix, Table 2. Part A
290.  Id.
291.  Professors Revesz and Komhauser's study of lawyers from the University of Michigan  and
New York University supports this intuition.  They report that while black  lawyers  are equally  likely,
if not more so, to take elite firm jobs upon graduation,  they  end  up disproportionately  in the not-for-
profit sector.  Komhauser & Revesz, supra  note 23, at 931-34; cf.  S.  Elizabeth Foster,  Comment,  The
Glass Ceiling in the Legal Profession:  Why Do Law Firms Have So Few Female Partners,  42 UCLA
L  REv.  1631,  1682 (1995)  (reporting  that the  discriminatory environment  causes  women  to  leave
"private practice"  in disproportionate numbers).
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d.  Rational Strategies in the Face of Reasonable Fear
Black associates  find  themselves  in  a double  bind.  On  one  hand,
they  understand  that they  are  less likely  to  get  on  the  firm's  training
track.  On  the other, they  face  diminishing  opportunities  in  the  lateral
job market  the longer they  stay at the firm.  This  combination  produces
a level  of fear and  anxiety about the future that  is, even  from  the firm's
perspective,  sub-optimally  high.292  As we argued  in Part  II,  elite  firms
rely  on  the  fear  of job  loss  or  diminished  partnership  prospects  as  a
means  of  inducing  associates  to  work  hard  at  low  monitoring  costs.
Like all motivational tools, however, fear has its own  rate  of diminishing
marginal  utility.  When  fear  levels  are  sub-optimally  low  (in  a  low
monitoring  world),  associates  and  partners  have  an  incentive  to  shirk.
When levels  are  sub-optimally  high,  lawyers have  an  incentive  to adopt
career strategies that reduce their benefit to the firm.
For the forgoing reasons,  black  associates  are especially  vulnerable
to these pressures. 293  As a result,  they  have  strong  incentives  to  choose
career  strategies  that either minimize  the  danger  of sending  a  negative
signal or, conversely,  maximize their  opportunity  for  being  regarded  as
superstars.  Both  strategies,  however,  can  end  up  diminishing  a  black
associate's long term chances  for success  at the firm.
i.  Low-Risk Strategies
An associate wishing  to reduce  the  chance  of making  mistakes  can
either steer clear of demanding  assignments  (because of either  the  diffi-
culty  of the work  or  the  level or  intensity  of the  scrutiny  likely  to  be
given by the partner) or take fewer risks  in completing the  work.  There
is some evidence to suggest that black  associates disproportionately  pur-
sue both  of these strategies.
Considering  the  choice  of  specialty,  many  observers  believe  that
corporate practice  in general  (as  opposed  to  litigation),  and  related  spe-
cialties such  as  tax,  securities,  and  banking  in particular,  require  higher
levels of substantive legal knowledge and technical skill than other fields
of practice. 294  Moreover, these areas (particularly  specialties such  as tax)
tend  to  have lower associate-to-partner  ratios. 2 5  Consequently,  associ-
ates  in these  areas  are  more  closely  supervised,  thereby  increasing  the
odds  that mistakes will be detected.
292.  It goes  without saying  that the  constant  fear  and  anxiety  felt  by  many black  associates  is
harmful to their self-interest.
293.  It bears  repeating  that many  whites are  also vulnerable  to  these  pressures.  The  added
burdens of race-based  disadvantage simply push blacks towards  the extremes.
294.  See HEINZ  & LAUMANN, supra  note 66, at 55-73.  This perception  undoubtedly influences,
and is influenced by, the related view  that law  school courses  in these  subjects  are  among  the most
demanding.  See supra notes 209-210 and accompanying  text.
295.  See Kordana, supra note  106, at 1927-28.
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Blacks  appear to be underrepresented  in  these high-level  corporate
areas.  In  our survey  of Harvard black  alumni,  only  32%  (24%  of  the
pre-1986  graduates)  worked  in corporate  practice. 296  Similarly, our  re-
view  of the  classes  of  1981-1982  and  1987-1988  revealed  a  similar
pattern:  those in corporate practice accounted  for  25%  and 27%  of the
total number who were in elite firms.' 9  Of those  who  were in corporate
practice, few worked in specialty  departments  such  as tax.28   The distri-
bution of black  partners  confirms  this  trend.  Only  14%  of black  part-
ners work in general  corporate practice,  and  less  than  11%  specialize in
technical fields  such as banking  (6%), bankruptcy  (2%), and  tax  (1%).2'
Undoubtedly,  there  are  many  reasons  why  blacks  do  not go  into
these areas, ranging from a genuine lack  of interest to the very  real pos-
sibility that many black associates  believe that specializing in other areas
(particularly litigation) will improve their chances in the lateral job  mar-
ket."°  Nevertheless,  just  as  the  draconian  consequences  of  sending  a
negative signal  during  the recruiting  process  can  lead  black  students to
avoid advanced corporate courses  in law  school, the probelms  associated
with being a token in a particualrly  difficult area of practice  is likely  to
produce a similar pattern  of avoidance when blacks join firms. 3 '
296.  Appendix, Table 2, Part A.
297.  Appendix, Table 1.
298.  For example, only one lawyer in our data on  the class  of  1987-88  specialized  in tax.  See
Appendix,  Table 1.
299.  Appendix,  Table  6 (As  a  very  rough  comparison,  consider  three  randomly  selected  elite
New  York  firms.  At  Jones,  Day,  Reavis  &  Pogue,  22%  of  the  firm's  lawyers  are  engaged  in
bankruptcy  practice  and  14%  work  in tax.  At Kay,  Scholer, Fierman,  Hays  & Handler,  12%  are
bankruptcy  lawyers  and  5%  are  in  tax.  At  Kelley,  Drye  &  Warren,  the  percentages  are  4%
bankruptcy and 5%  tax.); INSIDER'S  GUIDE,  supra  note  147, at 368-74 (The  numbers  for  the banking
departments were  not reported.)  Elizabeth  Chambliss found  that having  a  corporate,  securities,  or
banking department  was positively correlated with  the number  of black  partners  at firm,  Chambliss,
supra  note 7, at  136.  She does not claim,  however,  that black  partners  are  likely to work  in these
practice areas.  Instead,  firms that have these specialty departments  are more  likely  to have  a broad
range  of  other  specialties  as  well,  including  those  that  attract  black  clients.  As  Chambliss
demonstrates,  the racial  composition  of a firm's  client  base  is positively  correlated  with  law  firm
integration, particularly  for black lawyers.  Id. at 141.  We return to this issue below.  See  infra notes
397-400 and accompanying  text.
300.  We return to this latter possibility below.  As for the former, to the extent that many  blacks
who go to elite firms  have  visions of using  their  legal  skills  to  further  the  interests  of the  black
community,  high-level corporate practice may seem further removed  from these concerns  than  other
specialties.  See Wilkins, Social Engineers, supra note  8  (discussing the relative  importance  of civil
rights litigation and corporate  practice to the black community).  The fact that many people now view
the struggle for racial justice in economic  terms, however, may be changing these perceptions.  This
may account for some of the increased  interest in corporate  practice  observed  in later  classes.  On
the other hand, this rise may also be due to the fact that recent graduates are less likely to define their
career choices by their political commitments  than their predecessors.  In  any  event,  for the  reasons
outlined above,  one should always be suspicious of "lack of interest" explanations.  See supra note 43
and accompanying text.
301.  Several black partners working in the corporate  area have told Professor Wilkins that these
concerns make it more difficult for them to recruit black associates  into their departments.  The two
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Anecdotal evidence  also  suggests  that black associates  may,  on  av-
erage,  be overly cautious  when performing  their work.  Thus,  those  who
study  law  firm  interactions  report  that  many  black  associates  tend  to
speak  less  in  meetings  (particularly  with  clients),  ask  more  clarifying
questions when receiving  work,  are  more  likely to  check  (and  recheck)
assignments before handing  them in,  are more reluctant  to  disagree  with
partners  or  express  criticism  of their  peers,  and  construe  their  assign-
ments more narrowly  than their white peers. 02
From  a  black  associate's  perspective,  both  of  these  risk-averse
strategies  are rational  responses to  his environment.  Given  the inherent
subjectivity  of "good  judgment,"  a risky  action  can  be  interpreted  as
either a sign of innovativeness  and independence  or a mark  of stupidity
and  an  inability  to  follow  instructions.3 0 3  Since  black  associates  have
reason to fear that they are more likely  to  be branded  with the negative
description and that this characterization  will be more  difficult  to  shake,
it is not surprising that they tend to be overly cautious  in their choices.
Nevertheless,  both  of  these  risk-averse  strategies  reduce  the  gains
(in terms  of retention and promotion)  that black associates  can expect  to
receive from their work.  Successfully  completing  "difficult"  work  as-
signments  is  the  best  way for  an  associate  to  signal  her  quality  and
therefore  to demonstrate  that she  is worthy  of training.  Since  partners
are  looking for associates  who can  work  effectively  with relatively  little
supervision, traits such as initiative,  creativity,  speed, and  confidence  are
phenomena  (i.e. courses  and job choices)  are,  of course,  connected,  since  associates  who  have  not
taken courses in these areas are less likely to feel comfortable joining high-level practice groups.
302.  See Jacob H. Herring,  Derailed  Over Diversity,  RECORDER,  Nov. 6,  1992,  at  7 (describing
how  non-participation  in meetings  is often  interpreted  differently  based  on  the  race  of  the  silent
individual); cf Lani Guinier et. al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One  Ivy  League
Law School, 143  U.  PA.  L  RE  V. 1, 32-33  &  n.86  (1994)  (reporting  lower  law  school  classroom
participation by women).
303.  Consider the following example of a high risk strategy pursued by a young associate:
As a young associate  with [a]  large  local  law  firm,  Kenneth  McClain  saw  his  dream  of
becoming a  big-time  litigator within  reach  when  he  was  assigned to work  on  the  original
Kansas  City  School  District  desegregation  lawsuit.  But  instead  of  taking  apart  hostile
witnesses  in the courtroom,  he spent  week  after  week  taking  depositions  in  conference
rooms.
Four months into the trial, McClain was to get his shot at cross-examining  a witness  in court.
He carefully set his line of questioning, only to be told the cross-exam they had in mind  was
probably  too  hard  and  that  he  could  question  another,  easier  witness.  McClain  was
disappointed, but quickly  drew up a new set of questions.
"As  I was about to stand  up to do my cross-examination,"  McClain said, reliving as much  as
retelling the story, "a partner passed  me a note that said,  'Ask one question,'  and  it had  the
question written out right there.  And  rather  than  being  a  good  associate,  I crumpled  it up
and put it in my pocket."
The cross-examination  went so well that the firm's partners couldn't reprimand  him.
Brian  Kaberline, A Mind of His Own: McClain's Passion, Social Responsibility, KAN.  CITY  Bus.  I.,
Jan. 28,  1994,  § 1, at 3.  One can easily see how  McClain's  actions might have  been  interpreted  had
his "success"  been less clear or his evaluator less sympathetic.
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highly  valued? ° 0  The  more  risk-averse  one is, however, the more  diffi-
cult it is to signal that one has these qualities.
ii.  High-Risk Strategies: The Litigation Trap
At the opposite extreme,  a black associate may seek out  demanding
assignments  in  order  to  overcome  the presumption  that she  is  "only"
average-or  worse.  For  example,  a black  lawyer  might  volunteer  to
work with  a particularly  demanding  partner  or take  on  a large number
of assignments.  To  the extent  that a black  associate  successfully  com-
pletes these projects,  she has  a better  chance  of  signaling  that  she  is  a
superstar and  therefore  worthy  of training.  The  risks, however, are  also
high.  If the project is particularly  difficult  or the partner  especially  de-
manding,  the black  associate  who  is  in  fact  "average"  has  a  greater
chance  of failing-and failing big."5  Similarly,  the high  effort  strategy
of taking  on a large number  of assignments  can  also  fail if the projects
suddenly  become  due at once.
Our  research  suggests  that a large number  of  black  associates  are
engaged, albeit unwittingly, in a particular variant of this strategy.  Black
associates are  disproportionately  concentrated  in litigation departments.
For example, 45%  of the respondents  to  our survey,  including  52% of
the pre-1986  graduates,  specialize  in  litigation. 3e6   Our  examination  of
the classes of 1981-1982  and  1987-1988  produced  comparable  num-
bers (50% and 39%, respectively)."'  These data are  consistent  with the
results  of other studies."'  As Figures  4A-D  indicate,  these percentages
are higher than the percentage  of lawyers specializing  in  this  area  in  all
but the most litigation  oriented firms."°
304.  As a former partner in an elite firm  who  is now  the general  counsel  to a  major  university
told Professor Wilkins,  what was  most important to  her  in  assigning  work was  that the  associate
displayed a "take  charge" attitude  that gave  her  the confidence  to believe  the assignment  would be
completed successfully.
305.  For a particularly  poignant (and  perhaps egregious) example  in a similar context  of a high
risk strategy gone awry,  consider the strange  career  of Joseph  Jett.  A  black  graduate  of Harvard
Business School, Jett was initially unsuccessful as a securities  trader (he was  fired  from two jobs for
poor performance).  At his third Wall Street firm, however, he developed  a  strategy  for dramatically
increasing the profits of the government trading desk.  After making him a "superstar,"  however,  this
strategy  eventually  caused  losses  of  $350  million.  The  firm  now  claims  that  his  strategy  was
fraudulent-a claim he vehemently denies.  Either way, the strategy was clearly  highly risky, and Jett
is now paying the price.  See  Sylvia Nasar & Douglas Frantz, Fallen Bond Trader Sees  Himself as an
Outsider and a Scapegoat, N.Y. TIM  s, June 5,  1994, at 1.
306.  Appendix,  Table 2, Part A.
307.  Appendix,  Table 1.
308.  See,  e.g.,  McLachlan  & Jensen,  supra note  15  (suggesting  that women  and  minorities are
more highly concentrated in litigation).
309.  Appendix, Figures 4 A-D (Of the four firms shown, only Paul, Weiss has more than  40%  of
its lawyers in litigation.  The other four firms  average  32.33%); see  also Chambliss,  supra note 7,  at
117 (reporting that in her sample of large firms, the "average firm..,  devotes about 30 percent  of its
practice to litigation services").
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Just as with the shortage  of blacks  in  high-level  corporate  areas  of
practice,  many  factors  contribute  to  this  over-concentration. 10  One
factor that is frequently  overlooked,  however, is that going into litigation
is a plausible strategy for maximizing a black lawyer's  career prospects.
As an  initial matter,  litigation  has  been  the  most  successful  avenue  to
partnership  for black lawyers.  Fifty-six percent  of the black  partners  at
elite firms specialize  in  this  area.3 '  Moreover,  the fact that law  schools
tend  to concentrate  on teaching  litigation  related  skills may  make  black
lawyers feel better prepared  to become litigators.12  To  the  extent that a
black  student seeks  to  acquire  additional  signals  to  overcome  the  pre-
sumption  against average  blacks,  the  ones most  readily  available  (such
as moot court,  clerkships,  and  clinical placements)  also  tend  to  be con-
nected  to  litigation.  Finally,  black  associates  might  plausibly  believe
that litigation  practice provides  good  opportunities  for  them  to  demon-
strate  their  talents.  Even  the  largest  firms  generally  have  a  range  of
cases in their  litigation  departments,  including  some  number  of smaller
cases that are being  handled  pro  bono  or at reduced  rates  as favors  for
important clients.  Doing  something  visible in  one  of these  cases might
seem like a good  way to get noticed. 3
In  addition  to  these  benefits  to  an  associate's  career  in  the  firm,
litigation  may  also  appear  to  be the  best way for  black  lawyers  to  de-
velop  marketable  skills.  Although  many  kinds  of  corporate  work  are
handled exclusively by elite firms,  litigators  are  needed  in  many  differ-
ent  settings,  including  government,  small  firms,  solo  practice,  and  in-
house legal departments.  As we reported  earlier, blacks  are  more  likely
to go into these areas when they leave corporate firms.  Our survey  indi-
cates that for a substantial  number  of black  associates,  the possibility  of
310.  Once  again,  it  is  tempting  to  attribute  this  unusual  concentration  to  voluntary  choice.
Litigation, after all, is the field of law most accessible  to first-generation  lawyers.  See  ABEL,  supra
note 38,  at  108 (reporting  that Catholics and  Jews,  many  of whom  were  recent  immigrants,  were
disproportionately  concentrated  in  litigation).  Similarly,  litigation  is  also  the  field  traditionally
associated  with  efforts  to  achieve  social justice  through  law.  See  Wilkins,  Social  Engineers,
supra note 8.  For the reasons set out above, however, the ability of firms to structure  the  demand  for
labor limits the "voluntariness"  of these resulting  choices.  See  AUERBACH,  supra note  66,  at 95-96,
99-100  (discussing how prejudice against recent immigrants limited their career options).
311.  Appendix,  Table 6.
312.  As  many commentators  have  noted, the  typical  law  school  curriculum  is heavily  skewed
towards litigation.  See, e.g., MARY  ANN  GLENDON,  A NATION  UNDER  LAWYERS  224-25  (1993).
313.  See Louise A. Lamothe,  Where Have the Mentors Gone?, in  THE  WOMAN  ADVOCATE  252
(Jean  M. Snyder  & Andra  B.  Greene  eds.,  1995)  (urging women  who seek  mentors  and  valuable
experience  to  work  on  a  pro  bono  case).  The  fact  that  formal  training  programs  tend  to  be
concentrated  in the litigation area is likely to reinforce  this effect.  See Eric  Herman,  Big Firms Join
Forces  to Boost Lawyer Training, Cm.  LAw.,  June 1994,  at I (reporting that formal  training  programs
tend to concentrate on  litigation).  We  return  to the incentives  created  by formal training  programs
below.  See infra notes 362-364 and accompanying text.
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acquiring  marketable  skills is an  important  reason  for  choosing  litiga-
tion in the first instance
4 .3 1
Unfortunately,  what  look  like  advantages  can  turn  out  to  have
negative repercussions  for a black associate's prospects at the firm.  The
lower levels of scrutiny  in litigation  increase  the  risk  that  an  associate
will fall through  the cracks.  On  the typical  case, there  is  a  substantial
amount  of routine  low visibility work.  Because  the teams  are  big, it  is
more difficult for partners  to get any  real  sense of the quality  of junior
associates. 5  Moreover, because  clients tend  to  want "name"  litigators
arguing  their  cases, and because  many  of these  litigators  are  recruited
laterally,  litigation associates  have less opportunity  to develop their skills
and  signal  their quality  to partners. 3 6  These  factors  combine  to  make
litigation  one of the least likely  routes  to partnership  for  associates  as a
whole.1 7   The  prospects  are worse for  black  associates,  given  the  likli-
hood that certain clients  will feel  less comfortable  entrusting  their  cases
to a black lawyer."8  Black women probably face even steeper odds. 319
Moreover, the pro bono and  other  small cases  in  which  a black  as-
sociate  might  be  given major  responsibility  often  do  not  generate  the
kind  of  positive  feedback  that  might  justify  the  risk  and  effort.  Al-
though  many  firms view pro  bono  projects  as  "training  vehicles"  for
314.  Just under 25% of our Harvard  survey  respondents  stated that the possibility  of improving
their marketability was an important reason for doing either litigation or pro bono work.  Significantly,
the percentage was 33%  for post-1986  graduates. See Appendix,  Table 2a.
315.  See  NELSON,  supra note  24,  at  155  (arguing  that  litigation  offers  associates  fewer
opportunities for meaningful work or client contact).
316.  Id.
317.  Id. at 153 (reporting that litigation has  one  of the highest rates  of associate  attrition).  The
fact that black partners are concentrated  in this area may simply have to do with the degree  to which
blacks go into this area in the first place.
318.  See Knapp & Grover, supra note 6, at 303 (reporting  that recruiters for  some firms  express
concern with how minority  candidates will get along with the firm's white clients).  Studies  of bias  in
the court system repeatedly  indicate that blacks and other racial  minorities face  discrimination  in the
courts.  See, e.g., N.Y. REPORT, supra  note  12, at 86-87 (reporting, inter  alia, that black  attorneys  are
often  treated  by  judges  and  other  courtroom  personnel  with  less  respect  than  their  white
counterparts);  Scarnecchia, supra note 33, at 923 (reviewing the findings  and  state  responses  of task
forces in Michigan,  Washington,  New York, Florida, and New Jersey).  Cases in which a client wants
to have a black  lawyer  may  raise  their own  difficulties.  See  WILKINS,  Race, Ethics, and the First
Amendment, supra note 8, at 1042.
319.  Consider the  following  incident  involving  a  female  associate,  recounted  by  Elizabeth
Chambliss:
We  had a  case  where ...  the  star witness from  our side did not get along  at all with  the
woman associate that was assigned to the case ....  I understand  it was because  she was  a
woman.  He had this very macho sort of to hell with them all attitude.  She was  trying very
carefully to be sort of a deliberate lawyer,  and  they just did not get  along at all.  And  the
case sort of rested  on  this guy's testimony,  and  knowing  that he was  going to have  to be
prepared for this trial by this woman, and then  questioned  on  the stand by this woman,  the
chemistry was very important and I think the partner of his own initiative  replaced  her  with
a man.
Chambliss, supra  note 7, at 109-10 n.23.
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young  lawyers,32  this  work  is often  not  supervised  closely  by  partners.
Thus,  even  a good job  frequently  goes unnoticed.  Should  the case be-
come a  serious problem  for the firm, however, it is the junior  associate
who is likely to be blamed.  Moreover, as we indicated above,  black  law-
yers  who do  significant amounts  of pro bono work  run the risk of being
viewed as uninterested in the firm's paying  clients,  further reducing  the
probability  that a partner will see the black associate  as one  worth  train-
ing.
Finally, litigation is generally less stable than corporate  work.  Liti-
gation  is a very  costly way  for  corporations  to  resolve  their  problems.
Not  surprisingly,  corporate  general  counsel  look  for  ways  to  reduce
these expenses.  When litigation  projects  end,  the client  is  likely  to  go
too (or at least to leave the litigation department  and move to  the  corpo-
rate side).  Moreover,  although  some  kinds  of  litigation  are  repetitive
(e.g.,  antitrust  and  securities)  a good  deal  of the  work  done  by junior
associates involves mastering  the facts of the case  and doing  research  on
fact-specific  legal issues.  Unlike  mastery  of the  details  of  a particular
kind  of  corporate  transaction,  this  dispute-specific  knowledge  is  less
transferable  to future cases.  This makes  it harder  for  a litigation  associ-
ate to  become  expert in  a particular  substantive  field  and  therefore  to
provide valuable  services  to the firm during lean economic  times. 32'
e.  The Revolving Door
Given  this  dynamic  between  the  structural  features  of  elite firms
and  the strategic choices  of black  lawyers,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the
turnover rate among  these associates  appears to  be  especially  high.  Be-
cause they are  less  likely to  receive  the Royal  Jelly of good  training  in
core  areas  of the  firm's  practice,  black  lawyers  legitimately  fear  that
they will become flatliners  with no future at the firm. 22  As these lawyers
increasingly  focus on their lives after the firm,  however,  they  simultane-
ously hasten their own departure.3  Not only  is there  likely  to be  a di-
320.  See Paul Jaskunas, How to Make an "A," AM.  LAW.,  July-Aug.  1995, at supp. 20 (describing
how Robert Borton,  head of Heller, Ehrman,  White and McAuliffe's  public  service  program,  "looks
at pro bono work as training for associates").
321.  Of course,  this strategy also  has  risks,  for example,  if one's  specialty  is wiped  out by  a
change in law.
322.  Our survey records the predictable consequences.  Fully 61%  of our respondents  stated  that
they had difficulty getting quality work  assignments.  Sixty-five  percent,  including 71%  of the post-
1986 graduates, reported that the problem  worsened  over  time.  Appendix  Table  2,  Part  B.  As  our
model predicts, those who do not get quality work  will eventually  be  dismissed  by  the  firm; see also
Emily  Barker, Invisible Man, AM.  LAW.,  May  1996, at 65,  67  (reporting  that  a senior  partner  at
Washington, D.C.'s Katten,  Muchin & Zavis justified  cutting a  black  associate's  hourly  billing rate
from $185  to $125  per hour on  the  grounds  that clients were  unwilling  to pay  senior associate rates
for the routine work the lawyer was performing).
323.  In Member of the Club, Lawrence Otis Graham-a black,  Harvard-educated,  former Wall
Street lawyer--suggests that for blacks  in high-end  corporate  and  law jobs, success  can  come  only
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vergence  between  what is likely  to make  a black  lawyer  more  market-
able outside the firm (e.g.,  litigation  training)  and  what leads  to  success
within  the firm  (e.g.,  working  for  partners  in  the  core  areas  of  firm
growth), but by  contracting  the time frame  within  which  they  must de-
cide whether to stay or go, black associates often  forfeit  the opportunity
to be "discovered"  by partners  with an  interest in  the firm's  productiv-
ity.  In a forthcoming  study  of successful  minority  managers  in corpo-
rations,  David Thomas concludes  that even those who ultimately make  it
into  the top  ranks  do  not have the  same  smooth  linear  progression  as
their  white peers. 324  Instead,  minority  managers  frequently  suffer peri-
ods  during  which their  careers  stall, only  to jump  ahead  when a senior
manager  notices  their talents.  This  pattern  of  slow  growth  (and  even
periods  of no  progress)  followed by  relatively  dramatic jumps  in posi-
tion is difficult enough in the general up-or-out world of elite law firms;
it is  virtually impossible  in  a world in which  both  firms  and  associates
make important career decisions within the first one to two years.
There is, however,  a way in which  black  lawyers have been  able to
replicate the success  patterns Thomas  outlines  within the context  of the
current trend towards decreasing  associate  tenure.  Ironically,  it involves
leaving  the firm.  A substantial  percentage  of all black  partners  in  our
data set worked  in government (37%),  in-house  counsel's  office  (28%),
and/or  academia  (11%)  before  becoming  partners.3 25  Similarly,  in  our
survey,  all four black  Harvard  graduates  who  had  become  partners  in
major firms left their first firms  and  went into either  government  (3)  or
a small firm  (1)  before  becoming  partners. 326  This  suggests  that  one
way  for  black  lawyers  to  accumulate  the kind  of human  capital  and
name  recognition  that law firms  look  for  when  making  partners  is  by
going outside the firm where they  may  have better  opportunities  to de-
velop  their talents.27  The  continuing  success of this  strategy,  however,
depends  upon  the  criteria  that  firms  are  likely  to  employ  in  making
from  being myopic  about their work at that firm.  Without this myopia,  blacks  focus  rationally  on
departure, thereby  undermining their chances  for success.  See LAWRENCE 0. GRAHAM,  MEMBER  OF
THE CLUB:  REFLECTIONS ON  LIFE  IN  A  RACIALLY  POLARIZED  WORLD  83-84 (1995).
324.  See David Thomas, Breaking the Glass:  The Making of Minority  Executives  in Corporate
America (unpublished manuscript, on  file with the author).
325.  Appendix, Table 6.
326.  Appendix,  Table 2, Part A.
327.  See, e.g.,  Berkman, supra note  19, at 1 (describing how Chicago's  government  offices  are
much  better  integrated  than large  private  law  firms-particularly  at  the  supervisorlpartner  level).
Joining a firm laterally, however, can also be a risky strategy--particularly  if the lawyer  comes  in as
a senior associate.  Senior lateral  associates  must quickly  develop  good working  relationships with
partners and clients if they expect to make partner.  For all of the reasons discussed  in the text, black
laterals may find this particularly  difficult.  See,  e.g., Barker, supra note 322, at 68  (describing  how  a
black senior associate "fell  through the cracks"  in part because he did not get good work  from senior
lawyers).
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partnership  decisions.  This brings  us to  the problems  encountered  by
black  partners.
f  Unequal Partners
There  are  now  a  handful  of black  partners  at  elite  firms.328  Al-
though firms are quick to point to these modest gains as a  sign of prog-
ress,  the celebration  is premature.  In increasing  numbers,  black partners
are doing  the unthinkable-trading  in their  prestigious  partnerships  for
a variety of other jobs ranging from in-house legal  departments  to  part-
nerships  in  small minority  firms. 329  In  this  Section  we  argue  that the
three  structural  features  of  contemporary  elite  firms-high  salaries,
pyramiding,  and tracking-are partly responsible for this  attrition.
In the golden age,  partnership in a major firm was  the equivalent  of
academic tenure.  Today, to keep their positions,  partners  must compete
for both  business and  political  allies.33°  This  competition  takes  place  in
two markets:  outside  the firm  where  individual  partners  seek  to  attract
clients, and  inside the  firm  where  partners  trade  referrals  and  form po-
litical  alliances.  The  structural  characteristics  outlined  above  make  it
more difficult for blacks to compete  in both  of these  markets.
i. The External Market
Firms have always relied  on  partners  to bring  in  business.  In  the
golden  age, however, most firms  had  room  for partners  who,  although
having few  clients  of their  own, were  excellent  lawyers who "minded"
the clients while the rainmakers were  off making rain.33 " '  With increasing
leverage, higher  associate  salaries, and  the breakdown  of long-term  cli-
ent relationships,  most  firms feel  that they  can  no longer  tolerate  such
"unproductive"  partners.  As  a result, the command  that every  partner
bring  in  a  substantial  amount  of  business  is  now  being  rigidly  en-
forced. 332
This  structure  disadvantages  black  partners  in  two  ways.  First,
black  partners  are  less likely  to  have  personal  contacts  with  corporate
executives  able to bring in matters of the size generally  handled  by  cor-
328.  See supra  text accompanying  notes  15-21.
329.  See, e.g., Clarke, supra note  271,  at 29  (reporting that  eight  black partners  had  left  major
Chicago  law  firms  in the preceding  year);  see  Keeva,  supra note  216,  at 50  (stating that  between
September 1991  and February  1993,  fourteen minority partners left major law firms in Chicago).
330.  See GALANTER  & PALAY,  supra  note 24, at 37; William C. Kelly, Jr., Reflections on Lawyer
Morale and Public Service in an Age of  Diminishing Expectations, in PUBLIC  GOOD, supra note  278,
at 90. 92-93.
331.  See  NELSON,  supra note  24,  at  9  (categorizing  partners  as  "finders,  minders,  and
grinders").
332.  See Generation Gap,  NAT'L L.J., Nov. 21,  1994, at 20 (describing the firing of  unproductive
partners at Cadwalader, Wickersham  & Taft).
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porate  law firms. 333  Second,  these  lawyers  will  also  have  greater  diffi-
culty securing  clients  through  the competitive  marketplace.  Just  as law
firms use high  wages  as a means  of  inducing  effort  without  incurring
substantial monitoring costs,  corporate clients are prepared  (albeit within
increasingly  strict limits)  to pay  high  legal  fees  to insure  that they  get
the best legal representation possible.  Since  even the most vigilant cor-
porate  general  counsel  will have difficulty  assessing  the  quality  of  the
services  she receives,  she  has  an  incentive  to  hire  firms-and  increas-
ingly,  individual  lawyers-with  substantial  reputations  in  the  area  in
question.3"  Although  there  will be  some black  superstar  partners  who
meet this criterion, the average black  partner  is less likely to  be consid-
ered the obvious and  unassailable choice  for  receiving  sensitive  outside
work.
ii.  The Internal Market: Getting the Franchise
Black partners also  compete for  work  from  the firm's  existing cli-
ents, including  referrals from partners  who receive  inquiries  about work
outside  of the  contacted  lawyer's  area of  specialization.  Once  again,
this market  is highly  competitive,  with many  more  qualified  applicants
than  business  to  be  divided.  For  the  reasons  suggested  above,  black
partners  are likely to have a more difficult time competing for this work
than  their  white peers.  Internal  referrals  are  premised  on  notions  of
reciprocity, trust, and politics.  If black partners have less  access  to busi-
ness, a referring  partner may prefer a white partner  better  able to return
the favor in the future.  If black  lawyers have had  fewer mentors  within
the partnership  ranks  as associates,  they  are  less likely  to be  chosen  as
the person entrusted with  one of the firm's  major  clients  when  they  be-
come partners.  Finally, if black partners  are not seen  as powerful  actors
inside the firm, senior partners will be less likely  to  turn  over  clients  for
fear that these black  lawyers will not be  able  to support  them  when  the
senior lawyers are less productive  and influential.
333.  See, e.g.,  Keeva,  supra note  216,  at 50, 51  (describing  the problems  of black  partners  in
Chicago).  This  situation  may  change  as  more  blacks  grow  up  in  middle-  and  upper-income
neighborhoods,  attend elite schools, and move among the nation's movers and shakers.  But see id. at
52  (arguing  that,  even  when  of  equal  economic  status,  minority  lawyers  must  still  overcome
substantial systemic handicaps).  Vincent Cohen, a partner  since  1972 at Washington,  D.C.'s Hogan
and Hartson, states:
equating blacks and whites, regardless of economic status, shows a lack of understanding  of
life in America.  "I sometimes wish that most white  people  could be black  for  a year  and
then return to being white,"  he says.  "People of bad  will would  say,  'Yeah,  I know  it was
hell, but good, let them catch hell.'  But nobody  would  every  say,  'Is  it hell?'  Everybody
would know  the answer to that one."
Id. See generally,  DAWSON,  supra  note 209,  at 29-34  (discussing  differences  between  middle-class
blacks  and whites).
334.  See Keeva, supra note 216, at 53 ("After all,  corporate boards tend to be conservative,  and
no one wants to be blamed for sending business to the wrong attorneys").
1996]CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
Given  these pressures, black  partners  are  likely to  continue  to  exit
elite law  firms  in  search of more  stable  options.  Moreover,  as  we have
previously noted, this  attrition  is likely  to  affect  associate integration  as
well, since black partners will often spur firms to hire more black associ-
ates and  act as  mentors  and  role  models  for blacks  that are  hired.  The
net result, therefore,  is that firms  are  hemorrhaging  black  lawyers  from
both ends.  Unless  this dynamic  is reversed,  the meager progress that has
been made over the last several years is likely to  come  to  a halt, or even
be reversed.  In  the  next Part, we examine  what might  be done  to  stop
this trend.
IV
THE  SOLUTION(S)?:  FINDING  EFFICIENT  RESPONSES TO
EFFICIENT  DISCRIMINATION
Advocates  of greater  workplace  diversity  frequently  point  to  pro-
jections  indicating,  in  the  words of Labor  Secretary  Robert  Reich,  that
"women  and minority men will make  up 62% of the  work force  by  the
year  2005." 3 3 5  These advocates  hope such statistics convey  an important
message  to  corporate  leaders  (quoting  Reich  again):  Maintaining  a
"glass  ceiling"  that inhibits  the progress  of  women  and  minorities  is
simply  "not  good  for  business. 336   Indeed,  diversity  advocates  fre-
quently assert  that "most  business leaders"  are  aware  of the economic
value  of  a  diversified  work  force  and  therefore  recognize  that  "they
simply cannot afford  to rely exclusively  on  white males  for  positions  of
leadership." 337  In  this  respect, diversity  proponents  bear  a striking  re-
semblance  to  the conservative  economists  whose opposition  to  govern-
ment intervention  in  the market  they frequently  condemn:  both  assume
that firms  have an  economic  interest  in  eradicating  employment  prac-
tices that exclude women  and minorities  from the work force.
In  an  important  sense,  we  share  this  assumption.  Elite  law  firms
who use high wages,  tournaments,  and  tracking  will often  lose the  serv-
ices of blacks who either are or could become outstanding lawyers.  Un-
fortunately,  our analysis of the reasons why  firms utilize these  strategies
leads us to be more pessimistic  than  secretary  Reich  about  whether  elite
firms  will inevitably  conclude  that altering  these practices  in  ways  that
might improve the employment prospects  of black lawyers  is so  clearly
335.  Message from the  Chairman: Secretary of Labor Robert B.  Reich,  in  GLASS  CEILING
REPORT, supra  note 4, at 2; see also AMERICAN  BAR  ASSOCIATION  COMMISSION  ON  OPPORTUNITIES
FOR  MINORITIES  IN  THE  PROFESSION,  INCREASING  DIVERSITY:  THE RETENTION  &  DEVELOPMENT
OF MINORrrY  LAWYERS  IN  LAW FIRMS  AND  CORPORATE  LEGAL  DEPARTMENTS  tab  A  (Aug.  5,
1993) (citing statistics in Work Force  2000, a  1987 Hudson Institute analysis of labor force trends  and
projections) [hereinafter  INCREASING  DIVERSITY].
336.  GLASS CEILING  REPORT, supra  note 4,  at 2.
337.  Id.
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"good  for business."  So  long  as  firms  continue  to  generate  both  a
small  number  of  high  quality  partners  and  a  steady  supply  of  hard-
working  associates,  they  have  little  economic  reason  to  alter  the  way
they structure their business  simply to change the demographic  compo-
sition of tournament winners.33
Those who wish to break  this cycle must therefore  alter the incen-
tives that firms presently  face  if they  wish to  convince  these institutions
that  abandoning  their  currently  efficient  employment  practices  is
"good  for business."  Proposals to  alter these incentives  can usefully be
divided  into five  categories:  litigation  under  Title VII  or  other  similar
anti-discrimination  statutes;  race-neutral  institutional  reforms,  such  as
formal  training  or  mentoring  programs;  education  initiatives  such  as
diversity  training;  demand-side  initiatives  designed  to  generate  corpo-
rate  business  for  black  lawyers;  and  supply-side  initiatives,  including
such  traditional  affirmative  action  remedies  as goals  and  timetables for
hiring  and  promoting  black  lawyers.  Assessing  the  overall  merits  of
each of these proposals is beyond the scope  of this Article.  Instead,  we
describe the implications of our analysis for each initiative.
A.  Anti-discrimination  Law339
Many  commentators  have  documented  the  difficulty  of  applying
Title VII and other similar anti-discrimination  laws to  high-level jobs  in
which  quality judgments  are  inherently  subjective.'  Neither  disparate
treatment nor disparate  impact  analysis  is well suited to rooting  out the
kind  of adverse employment  practices  we describe.  For the most  part,
the lawyers  who  prefer  average  whites  to  average  blacks  have  no  dis-
criminatory animus  as that term has been traditionally  defined.  Indeed,
other  things  being  equal,  they  would  probably  prefer  to  hire  and/or
338.  This hard reality may help to  explain  why  progress  in recruiting  w6men into the associate
ranks has so far failed  to produce a corresponding percentage  of women partners.  With 40% of  the
graduating classes  at most law schools  being female, firms have no  choice  but to hire  women  if they
want to satisfy their expanding  need for associates.  See Abdon M. Pallasch, No Place Like  Home  for
Recruiting Minorities and Women,  CH.  LAw.,  May 1995  (reporting that  nearly half the  graduates  of
Chicago  law  schools last year  were  women,  677  out  of  1,455);  Foster,  supra  note  291,  at  1637
(reporting that the percentage of women graduating from law schools has  risen from under 9% of all
students in 1970 to between 40% and 50% today).  So long as there  are  two or three  men among the
new class of associates with the skill and  stamina to become  outstanding  partners,  however, there  is
no necessary  reason  why  a  firm  must  choose  to  invest  scarce  training  resources  in  its  women
associates.  See Note,  Why  Law  Firms Cannot Afford  to  Maintain the  Mommy  Track,  109  HARv.  L
REv.  1375 (1996)  (reporting that a 1994 National  Association  of Law  Placement  Report finding  that
only 13% of large law  firm partners  are  women).  The  Note  argues  that self-interested  firms  have
reasons to work to close this gap.  We examine some of the reasons that this might be true below.
339.  For  a  detailed account  of  why  anti-discrimination  law  is  unlikely  to prevent  firms  that
employ high wages and tournaments from  utilizing employment  practices  that disadvantage  minority
workers, see Charny & Gulati, supra note 9, at 53-61.
340.  See,  e.g.,  Barbara  J.  Flagg,  Fashioning a  Title  VII  Remedy  for  Transparently  White
Subjective Decision Making, 104 YALE  L.J. 2009 (1995); Foster, supra note 291,  at 1668.
1996]CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
promote  (and  indeed  probably  have  hired  and  promoted)  superstar
blacks over average whites.  Nor  are the institutional  practices  that tend
to keep  blacks  off the training  track  likely  to  be  condemned  under  a
disparate impact analysis,  given that changing  these  practices  would  in-
volve a fundamental  restructuring  of the  way  corporate  firms  do  busi-
ness.  Not surprisingly,  when  they  have been  presented  with  claims  of
this type, courts  have generally  refused  to  second  guess  the  subjective
decision  making  of partners  in  the  absence  of  clear  evidence  of  dis-
crimination."'
Moreover, even  if one  could  design  a Title VII  remedy  that could
reach  this  conduct,  it is  not  clear  that  legal  intervention  of  this  kind
would be either appropriate or effective.  The requirement that law firms
justify  objectively every  choice  between  candidates  when  one  is black
and  the other  whitewould place  a substantial  burden  on  firm  decision
makers. 2  In fact, it is difficult  to  state exactly  how  that burden  should
be discharged.  At the hiring  stage,  the  inherently  subjective  and  provi-
sional  character  of judgments  about  the  quality  of  a  given  candidate
would  make  it difficult for firms  to  develop  a set  of  objective  criteria
capable  of  credibly  determining  which  candidates  are  in fact  better
qualified.  Indeed, as  we have argued,  the  fact that firms  place  substan-
tial weight on  objective  signals such  as  law school  status  and  grades  in
the  visible  part  of  the recruiting  process  already  disadvantages  black
candidates.  Precisely  because  they  are  objective, these  criteria  send  the
reassuring-but  largely  false-message  that  those  who  are  being  se-
lected  are demonstrably better than those who are  not.  Getting  firms  to
recognize that these  signals are only  loosely  correlated  with either  valu-
able  substantive  job  skills  or  the  personal  qualities  that  are  likely  to
make  a  candidate  an  effective  lawyer  is  therefore  an  essential  step  in
creating greater  opportunities  for  black  candidates.  If successful,  how-
ever,  this  project  is  likely  to  make  the  recruiting  process  even  more
subjective as firms weigh  a broader  range  of information  (for  example,
leadership  in  community  organizations  or the ability  to  overcome  ob-
stacles) when  evaluating candidates.
Of course,  to  the  extent  that firms  employ  objective criteria  at  the
visible stage, anti-discrimination  law will help  to  ensure that they  do  so
fairly.  However,  if we  also  make  the  plausible  assumption  that  most
white  law  students  do  not  want to  be  associated  with  a law  firm  that
"visibly"  discriminates  by preferring  white candidates  with  lower  cre-
dentials  to blacks  whose signals  are  objectively  higher,  this  is also  the
341.  See, e.g., Ezold v.  Wolf, Block,  Schorr  & Solis-Cohen,  983  F.2d 509  (3d  Cir. 1992),  cert.
denied, 114  S. Ct.  88 (1993)  (refusing  to overturn  a  decision  to deny  a woman  partnership  in  the
absence of clear evidence of discrimination);  see also Foster, supra note 291,  at 165-71.
342.  See Flagg, supra note 340 (advocating that employers bear such a burden of proof).
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kind of discrimination  that  is most likely to  be disciplined  by  the mar-
ket.
343
Applying objective  standards  to the partnership  decision  would  be
even more  complex.  By  the  time  a black  associate comes up  for part-
ner, she may  very well be less "qualified"  precisely  because she has not
received the Royal Jelly that would allow her to  develop  these  qualifica-
tions.  In order to be effective, therefore,  the requirement  that firms  ob-
jectively  justify  choices  between  average  whites  and  average  blacks
would  have to be applied to every staffing  and  mentoring decision  made
throughout the firm.  Even if such a  requirement  were not per se unad-
ministrable, which it probably  is, it would undermine  the kind  of colle-
giality  and informal working  relationships  that are  essential  elements  of
the practice of law.
Nevertheless,  it is important that law  firms do  not feel that they  are
immune from anti-discrimination laws.  The threat  of liability  undoubt-
edly encourages  firms  to pay more  attention  to their  employment  prac-
tices  than  they  otherwise would.'  This vigilance may  help  to  prevent
some  of the  more  egregious  instances  of  discriminatory  conduct.  In
addition,  discrimination  lawsuits  can  sometimes  make  "visible"  the
largely  "invisible"  process  by which  firms  choose  partners.
Consider  the recent case involving  Lawrence Mungin,  a black  Har-
vard Law School  graduate  who successfully  sued  the Washington,  D.C.
office of Katten, Muchin  & Zavis for "constructively  discharging"  him
on the basis of his  race. 345  At the visible level, the firm's  decision  not to
consider  Mungin  for  partnership  seems  unassailable.  When  Mungin
requested that he  be  evaluated  along  with the other  Katten, Muchin  as-
sociates  in his  class,  he  was  working  primarily  on  projects  that  would
normally  have been  handled  by  second  and  third  year  associates.  Not
343.  White candidates who disapprove  of overt racial discrimination  will  lower  their ranking  of
firms that engage in this practice.  As we indicated,  this can hurt both recruiting (to the extent that the
firm develops a bad reputation among law students) and business  development (since clients may  also
not want to be associated with a discriminating  firm,  and  in any  event,  are  also  sensitive  to a firm's
prestige  ranking  among law  students).  See  RICHARD  EPSTEIN,  FORBIDDEN  GROUNDS:  THE  CASE
AGAINST  EMPLOYMENT  DISCRIMINATION  LAW (1992)  (arguing that the market will correct  for  overt
discriminatory  practices  that are not otherwise  efficient).  However,  given  that  law  students  face
substantial obstacles to acquiring accurate information  about even  the visible aspects  of the process
(for example, the  short "institutional  memory"  of law  students  and the low  level  of communication
across schools), this market mechanism can easily break down.  This is one of the many  reasons  why
we reject Epstein's  prescriptive claim that anti-discrimination  law is both unnecessary  and harmful.
344.  Given low monitoring,  partners  will often  be unaware  of discriminatory actions  taken  by
other partners or associates, particularly  if those actions  affect  persons  outside the firm.  The threat
of discrimination lawsuits-even ones that ultimately fail (since the firm  will  still incur  both litigation
and reputational  costs)-gives firms  an  incentive to devote  more  resources  to monitoring than  they
otherwise would be inclined to do.
345.  See Barker, supra note 322, at 66.
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surprisingly,  Mungin's  managing partner informed  him that it would  be
impossible to make  him a partner based  on his current performance. 346
Mungin's  lawsuit revealed, however,  that  a  number  of  actions  by
the firm  plausibly  contributed  to  Mungin's  inability  to get the kind  of
work  that would  have  allowed him  to  demonstrate  his  partnership  po-
tential.  According  to  press  accounts,  when  Katten's  Washington  office
lost most of its bankruptcy  business  (Mungin's  area  of  specialization)
he was told he would  receive  work from  the firm's  bankruptcy  lawyers
in Chicago.  The  work  never  arrived. 7  Nor  was  Mungin  included  in
departmental  meetings  in  either Washington  or  Chicago.,,  Nor  was he
given  a performance  review  during  his  first  eighteen  months  with  the
firm, even though Katten, Muchin's policy was to review  every  associate
twice  a  year. 349  Instead,  in  words  attributed  to  Mungin's  supervising
partner, he simply  "fell  through  the cracks,"  never  becoming  success-
fully  integrated into the firm's practice or culture. 35
Whether all of this constitutes proof of discriminatory  intent  within
the meaning  of the anti-discrimination  laws  is subject  to  dispute.  The
firm clearly went out of its  way to  recruit  Mungin  and  chose  not  to  lay
him off (as it did other associates)  when the Washington  office  lost most
of its bankruptcy  business. 35 " '  Nevertheless,  by shining  light  on the  nor-
mally  invisible  world  of  law firm  staffing  and  work  assignment  deci-
sions,  Mungin's  case  may  encourage  firms  to  pay  more  attention  to
whether black  associates  are  getting  access to challenging  and  produc-
tive work.352
346.  See id. at 68  (quoting Mungin's supervisor  as  stating "I told him...  that he  wasn't  doing
partner-level  work"  and "I couldn't imagine the [partner review committee]  would  have  passed  him
through").
347.  See id. at 67.
348.  See id.
349.  See id. at 68.
350.  See id.
351.  See id. at 71.
352.  See id. at 67 (suggesting that the lesson from Mungin's case is  that "[flirms  must take  steps
to keep, nurture,  and promote their minority  hires  from the day they  walk in the  door"  and  quoting  a
special counsel in an elite New York finn as speculating that "[n]ow  management is going to have  to,
just as in the sexual  harassment  area,  think about  its strategy  in developing  associates  and  working
with associates").  It is important  not to overstate  this effect.  Mungin's case  is  in  many  respects
unique.  Not only  did  Mungin  have  superstar  credentials  (e.g.,  Harvard  undergraduate  and  law
school,  fluent in Russian), but he came in as a lateral with a  demonstrated  record  of success  at other
law  firms.  This, combined  with  the promises  that were  made  to him  when  he  was  hired,  made  it
easier for him to demonstrate that  he was  not being  given  the training and  opportunity  necessary  to
prove his abilities than would be the case for the average  black associate  who  is flatlining  at  his  first
firm.  Indeed, the primary  lesson  from  Mungin's case  is that blacks with superstar  credentials  may
still encounter problems on their way to becoming successful law firm partners.  See  id. at  71  (noting
that one of the jurors believed that Mungin was penalized  because he was  more  qualified  than  many
other Katten lawyers).
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There  may,  however,  be  other  consequences.  As  Mungin's  case
suggests,  the  threat of litigation  probably  decreases  a  black  associate's
chances  of being fired.353  Firms  face  both  defense  and  reputation  costs
from  being  accused  of discrimination  even if the suit is ultimately  un-
successful.3"  These costs, in addition to the firm's desire to have at least
one senior black associate  "visible"  to the outside world (even if he was
"invisible"  to  the firm's  partners  when  it came  to  assigning  work)35 5
may  have been  what stopped  Katten  from firing  Mungin  when  a white
seventh  year  associate who could  only  be  billed  out at second  or  third
year rates probably would have been let go.
The  fact  that  anti-discrimination  law  decreases  a  black  lawyer's
chances  of being  fired will have mixed  effects  on  her  opportunities  at
the firm.  Given this phenominon,  firms may be less likely  to hire  aver-
age  black  associates,  and/or  more  inclined  to  flatline  those  who  are
hired,  thereby  inducing  them to leave "voluntarily."  From  the  black
associate's perspective,  however, a reduction  in the probability  of being
fired  may  help  to  counteract  the  sub-optimally  high  fear  levels  dis-
cussed  in Part ]JJ.356
For all of these  reasons, it is not surprising  that anti-discrimination
cases  are  rarely  brought  in  this  area  and  even  more  rarely  won.357
353.  See  id. at 71  (quoting Katten's  counsel  as  arguing  to the jury that  "[t]he  reality  is,  they
didn't fire him because he was black.  Given the verdict, I feel that they should have fired him").
354.  See Richard C. Reuben, Suing the Firm, 81  A.B.A.  J.,  Dec.  1995,  at 68,  72 (discussing  the
costs to a  firm of having  an  insider/associate  sue  them  for  discrimination).  Actually  bringing  a
discrimination  suit, however, is costly  to the plaintiff.  Since  other  firms  will  have little information
about the merits of the black employee's claim, they are prone to be  sympathetic  to the  firing  firm's
position  (particularly  given  that  both  firms probably  follow  similar  policies  and  practices).  As  a
result, they are likely to view the fired employee  as a "troublemaker,"  as  well  as  someone who  is in
the unacceptable category.  In a low-monitoring  world, such strong negative  signals can be  disastrous
to a black lawyer's future job prospects.  In discussions with black  lawyers  who  have either brought
or contemplated bringing suit, we have  found  that the danger  of being  branded  a troublemaker  has
been a major consideration in their decisions.  See also, Barker, supra note 322,  at 70 (reporting that
the Mungin is currently working as a contract lawyer for the S.E.C. making $14  per hour).
355.  See id. at 66 (describing Mungin as an "invisible man" inside the firm).
356.  Theoretically,  this litigation effect  might  decrease  a black  lawyer's  fear  levels  to such  a
point that she begins  to shirk.  The fact  that black  associates  know  that  partners  can  convey  this
information  to future  employers informally  (even  if the associate  is not fired),  combined  with  the
signficant obstacles that blacks face in the lateral job market even  when  they aren't  burdened  with
additional  negative  signals,  provide a  powerful  disincentive  to engage  in  this kind  of  opportunistic
behavior.
357.  See Ramona  L. Paetzold  & Rafael  Gelu.  Through the Looking Glass: Can Title  VII  help
Women and Minorities Shatter the Glass Ceiling?, 31  Hous. L  REv.  1517,  1528-43  (1995).  There
are, however, probably more discrimination suits than the judicial record  would  lead  one  to believe.
In  light of  the  reputational  interests  outlined  above,  both  potential  plaintiffs  and  firms  have  an
incentive to settle discrimination  law suits quickly and quietly.  Although each  side has  an  interest  in
testing the other side's willingness to put its reputation on the line, eventually  the parties  are  likely to
find  it in their  interest  to  reach  a  confidential  settlement.  (One  black  lawyer  involved  in  such
negotiations  described  them as  a  "game  of  chicken"  in  which  the  firm  waited  until  the  lawyer
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Moreover,  even  if courts  were  more  hospitable  to  such  lawsuits,35  the
practical  consequnces  of applying  anti-discrimination  law  in  this  area
might  be  less than  the proponants  of this  strategy  tend  to  believe.  Al-
though  increasing  Title VII liablity  may  make  firms more  concious  of
these issues, experience  with other  employers  highlights  how  firms  can
structure  their  internal  practices  so  as  to  blunt  the  effects  of  anti-
discrimination  law.359  We return to this issue below. 3w
B.  Institutional  Reform
In Part II, we argued that the key  difference  between  succeeding  at
a corporate  firm  and flatlining  is training.  Formal  training  and  men-
toring  programs  therefore  seem to  be  the ideal  solution  to  the  institu-
tional  dynamics  we  describe.  Moreover,  since  these  programs  are
available  to  every  associate,  they  sidestep  many  of  the  problems  con-
nected with race-conscious  remedies such  as affirmative  action.36 " '  There
are, however,  limitations  on  what these  programs  are  likely  to  accom-
plish.
The widespread  rush to institute formal  training programs  confirms
two key  elements  of  our  model:  that  entering  associates  know  almost
nothing about the practice  of law, and  that  it is no  longer cost effective
for firms  to  train  the  vast majority  of associates  by  giving them  mean-
ingful  access  to good work and  supervision.362  Despite the fanfare  with
which  firms  announce  their  new  training  efforts,  it  is  clear  that  those
wishing to succeed must still gain access to the traditional  training  track.
Although  lectures,  simulations,  and  drafting  exercises  can  help  associ-
ates develop  technical  skill, they  cannot  teach judgment.  Nor  can they
build  the kind  of mentoring  relationships  that are  crucial  to  an  associ-
a lucrative  settlement conditioned  on  the  lawyer's  express  promise  that  the  entire  matter  would
remain  confidential).  Private  settlements  decrease  the  value  of  anti-discrimination  law  as  an
informational tool.
358.  See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S.  Ct. 2742,  2749  (1993)  (holding  that plaintiffs
must demonstrate  not only that the employer's justification for favoring  a  white  worker  is pretextual,
but also that the justification hides a discriminatory motive).
359.  See  Lauren  B.  Edelman,  Legal  Ambiguity  and  Symbolic  Structures:  Organizational
Mediation  of Civil Rights Law, 97  Am.  J. oF  SOCIOLOGY  1531,  1554-56  (1992);  see also Lauren  B.
Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational  Governance:  The Expansion of Due Process in the
American Workplace, 95 Am. J. OF SOCIOLOGY  1401 (1990).
360.  See infra text accompanying  notes 378-381.
361.  See Sunstein, supra note 74 (describing the problems associated with affirmative  action  and
other remedies and arguing that policy makers should have a preference for race neutral  policies).
362.  See,  e.g..  Richard  N. Feferman,  Associate Training: Raising Lawyers for Fun and Profit,
LAw  PRAC.  MOMT.,  July/Aug.  1993, at  28,  30-31  (describing  changes  in  the  legal  profession  that
make traditional associate training programs  obsolete); Herman, supra note 313,  at I (quoting a  name
partner  in a major Chicago  firm  as  conceding  that "no  longer...  can  lawyers  rely  just  on  being
mentored or counseled  by lawyers for whom they always  work").
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ate's  success  at the firm.63  Nor  will  they  provide  client  contact.  Put
simply, what associates need is good work that will help them  to develop
their legal  and personal  skills.  Formal  training  programs  cannot  sub-
stitute for this kind of real experience.
More  importantly,  from  the  perspective  of  integrating  corporate
firms,  there  is no  guarantee  that formal  training  programs  will work to
ameliorate  the problems  faced  by black  associates.  Ironically,  the  fact
that the best formal  training programs  are  in  litigation  may  further  lure
black associates  into investing in this risky (from the perspective  of suc-
cess  in  the  firm)  area  of  practice.3 4  Moreover,  these  programs  say
nothing about who will actually  get  the  type  of work associates need  to
succeed.  If all associates  go through  formal  training, partners  must  still
choose which ones to put on the kind of important  assignments  that de-
velop an associate's skills.  While it is possible that a black  associate  can
use formal  training  exercises  as a platform  to promote  her  skills,  these
programs are  often too brief and  ineffective  to  disrupt the work assign-
ment patterns outlined in Part II.
Formal assignment systems  could breaking these patterns.  As firms
have become  more  bureaucratized,  they  have  attempted  to  rationalize
their  assignment  and  evaluation  systems.365  Although  the  firm's  main
concern  is the efficient  allocation  of resources,  formal  assignment  and
evaluation  systems  can  also  provide  associates  with  some  protections
against the vagaries  of the intra-firm  assignment market.
These  formal  systems, however, often  do  not work  well.  Powerful
partners routinely  bypass the system to grab  superstar associates,  leaving
the assigning partner  (who often  is not  a powerful  partner) 366  to  divide
routine  or unimportant  projects  among  the unlucky  average  associates
who remain  in the pool. 367  Similarly,  formal  evaluation  systems,  while
potentially  providing valuable information  and  feedback,  can also  act as
a diversion  that allows partners  to refrain  from  giving  real feedback  in
the course  of the working  relationship.  We suspect  that this phenome-
363.  Some  firms  have  attempted  to  supplement  their  formal  training  programs  with  formal
mentoring  programs.  See Steven  Keeva,  Good Act  to Follow, A.B.A.  1,  Mar.  1995,  at  74.  The
artificial  constraints  of such  relationships,  however,  hinder their  effectiveness.  Moreover,  to  the
extent that they do not involve  real  work,  they  can never  substitute  for  the  kind  of guidance  and
experience  being  received  by  those  on  the  training  track.  Despite  these  constraints,  however,
meaningful relationships can blossom through these programs, which sometimes give blacks access  to
powerful partners in the firm whom they otherwise would not get an opportunity  to meet.
364.  See Herman, supra note 313, at 20 (noting that litigation lends itself to the kind of hands-on
training exercises that work well in a formal training program).
365.  See generally  NELSON, supra note 24,  at 159-89  (describing  the work  structure  of modem
law firms).
366.  Firms frequently  do  not want to divert  the energies  of powerful  partners,  who  are  most
often rainmakers, into what is often seen as a ministerial duty.
367.  See  Chambliss,  supra note  7,  at  95-96  (giving  accounts  of  partners  "poaching"  good
associates).
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non  particularly  disadvantages  blacks,  since  white  partners  may  either
feel less comfortable giving  genuine  negative  feedback  to  black  associ-
ates  or, conversely,  more  comfortable  allowing  their  background  pre-
conceptions  to guide  their assessments  when  talking to their peers. 36
For all  these  reasons,  formal  training,  assignment,  and  evaluation
systems  are  unlikely  to  rectify  the  most  important  problems  facing
black associates. 369  This  is simply  another  example  of the painful  truth
that  it often  takes  race-conscious  remedies  to  rectify  the  continuing
deleterious  effects  of America's  history of racial  oppression. 37  The  last
three responses  all proceed  along these  lines.
C.  Diversity Training
A  growing  number  of elite  law firms  have hired  diversity consult-
ants.37'  These  consultants  come  into  a  law  firm  and  talk  to  associates
and partners  about  coping  with  a diverse  workforce.  Diversity  consult-
ants  attempt  to educate  lawyers  about  their  colleagues,  by  (a)  alerting
them  to differing  and  sometimes  incorrect  perceptions  they  may  have
about  each  other,  (b)  pointing  out  the  possibility  that  some  minority
lawyers  believe that they  are  being  discriminated  against,  and  (c)  illus-
trating  how  stereotypes  can  often  result  in  discriminatory  behavior.'
One  diversity  consultant  we  heard  speak  boiled  this  all  down  to
"communication. '373
At first, these efforts  seem ideally  suited to  counteracting  the  prob-
lems we describe.  In Part III, we argued  that the preference  for  average
whites  over average  blacks  is due  in  part  to  the fact that  white partners
often  hold stereotypical beliefs  about black lawyers  that lead  them  to  be
368.  Although  we  have  no basis for  comparison,  the fact  that 64% of the  respondents  to  our
survey of black  Harvard  Law  School  graduates  stated  that they  were  told of criticisms  about  their
performance  during  the formal  review  process  that were  not mentioned  at the time the work  was
performed  provides some support for this intuition.  See Table 2b.  Negative feedback  of this kind is
far less useful than constructive criticism at the time the work is performed.
369.  See  Chambliss,  supra  note  7,  at  123  (finding  that,  with  the  exception  of  a  formal
departmental  structure,  bureaucratization  is  negatively  correlated  with  law  firm  integration).
Moreover, to the extent that these institutional  reforms superficially appear to respond to the problems
of unequal  access  and  differing  standards  of  evaluation,  they  may  actually  impede  progress  by
discouraging  firm  leaders  from  doing  more.  Id.;  see  infra  text  accompanying  notes  371-376
(discussing diversity consultants and structuring).
370.  For a theoretical defense  of this point in the  context  of moral argument,  see  Wilkins,  7vo
Paths, supra note 8.
371.  See Dimitra Kessenides, Dealing  With Diversity,  AM.  LAw., July-Aug.  1994, at 40.  As  far
as we know, there are no concrete studies on the effects of diversity training.  Therefore,  this section
relies on anecdotal evidence.  Both of us  have talked with numerous lawyers who  have  been  through
these programs,  and one of us has participated in two diversity training sessions  specifically  designed
for elite firms.
372.  See  Herring, supra note 302,  at 7.
373.  See  Communication  in the Workplace  (promotional  leaflet  for  Organizational  Training,
Inc.,  1995) (on file with authors).
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unduly pessimistic about their future  performance.  Moreover,  since  we
also claim that such beliefs  are  often  unconscious,  a program  designed
to highlight these  attitudes and their effects  should  help  firms  to under-
stand the obstacles that impede black progress.
Whether  diversity  training  actually  fulfills  this  promise,  however,
depends  upon both  its content  and the process by which it is conducted.
Anecdotal  reports  suggest that diversity  consultants  tend  to concentrate
on  exposing  how racist comments,  unintended  slights,  and  cliquish  so-
cial  patterns  marginalize  black  lawyers. 74  Although  undoubtedly  im-
portant,  our  analysis  suggests  that  this  is  not  where  the  most  pressing
problems  lie.  For example,  less than  one  third  of respondents  to  our
survey  indicated  that  what they  considered  to be  explicit  racist  com-
ments  were made  in  their  presence,  and  of  those  who  heard  such  re-
marks,  less than 20% listed the incident  as a major reason  why  they  left
their firm.75  A higher percentage  of respondents (56%)  stated that they
did not feel welcome  in the informal  social networks  within the firms. 76
Nevertheless,  almost half of these  lawyers  (46%)  did not consider  this a
major  factor  in  deciding  whether  to  leave  the  firm.  When  combined
with the 44%  of respondents  who did feel  welcome, the percentage  for
whom  social  relations  are  a  serious  problem  drops  to  less  than  one
third. 7
Moreover, there  is a long  history  of firms  and  courts  subtly trans-
forming  informal  grievance  procedures,  such  as diversity training,  into
mechanisms  for suppressing conflict.
3 7 8  For example,  affirmative  action
officers inside corporations  often  do not provide workers with  important
procedural  protections  and  are frequently  biased  in favor  of  manage-
ment.  Nevertheless,  courts  are increasingly  willing to give the determi-
nations  of  these  officers  preclusive  (or  nearly  preclusive)  effect  in
litigation and to  penalize plaintiffs who do not utilize  these "voluntary"
374.  Interviews  conducted by the authors at three elite New York firms that have hired  diversity
consultants.
375.  Appendix, Table 2, Part C.  See also, Barker, supra note 322, at 69  (noting that Mungin  did
not argue  that there was  overt  racism  at  Katten).  In  any  event,  if white  lawyers  actually  hold
consciously racist  views, it is unlikely  that diversity training  (or anything  else  for  that  matter)  will
dissuade them from these beliefs.  As we indicated above, we do not believe that intentional  racism is
widespread among elite firm lawyers.  We therefore  are inclined to believe that  even statements  that
could fairly be interpreted  as "racist"  will most often be the product of something  less  than  conscious
racism.
376.  Appendix, Table 2, Part C.
377.  Id.  Twenty out of sixty-six respondents (30.3%) stated that they  had  left  their firms  in part
because they felt unwelcome in informal social networks.
378.  See Richard L. Abel, The Contradiction  ofInformal Justice, in THE  POLITICS  OF  INFORMAL
JusTicE  267, 304-07 (Richard L. Abel ed.,  1982)  (describing how informal procedures  are often used
to "cool out" clients and suppress disputes).
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mechanisms. 379  Notwithstanding  the good  intentions  of its  proponents,
diversity  training  may  suffer  the  same  fate.  Diversity  consultants  are
hired  by  the  firm  and  deliver  their  reports  and  recommendations  di-
rectly  to  firm  managers.  Training  sessions  are  often  conducted  with
both partners  and associates  present.  When consultants  interview  associ-
ates  privately,  their  comments  about  the  firm  are  frequently  reported
(generally  "anonymously")  to  partners.30   Not  surprisingly,  many
black  associates  and  partners  are  reluctant  to  discuss their  true  feelings
under these  conditions. 3 8'  To  the extent  that firm  leaders  hear  no  seri-
ous  complaints,  they  may falsely  conclude  that racial  issues  are  not  a
serious problem in their firm.  Moreover, if courts conclude  that a diver-
sity consultant's  report  is  discoverable  in  a  subsequent  discrimination
lawsuit, firms may  structure  their use of consultants  so  as to  avoid  pro-
ducing  negative  information about firm practices--or  perhaps to provide
affirmative  evidence  of their  lack  of discriminatory  intent.  Given  the
development  with  respect  to  affirmative  action  offices,  courts  appear
eager to  accept this kind of evidence.
Finally, diversity training  is likely  to be most  effective  if it concen-
trates on structural  impediments to black  advancement  such  as the  ones
we  have described. 382  Changing  these  structures,  however,  is  difficult.
Supplying  firms  with information  about  how  their  practices  affect  the
career prospects  of black lawyers  can provide  an  important  impetus  for
change.  Nevertheless,  firms need more than  "communication"  to  con-
vince  them  to  change  practices  that have  proved  profitable  for  those
lucky  and  skillful  enough  to  find  themselves  at  the  top  of  the  pyra-
mid. 383  Demand  creation  initiatives  are  designed  to  provide  a profit-
maximizing  reason for change.
379.  See Elizabeth  Chambliss,  Title  VII  as  Displacement  of  Conflict  (1996)  (unpublished
manuscript,  on  file  with author);  Lauren  Edelman,  Howard  Erlanger,  Jonathan  Lande,  Internal-
Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of  Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAw  &  Soc'y Rav.  497
(1993).
380.  Given the small  number of black associates, preserving anonymity is virtually impossible.
381.  For example,  one of us was told by a black lawyer at an elite firm  that the night before  the
diversity consultants were scheduled to interview black associates, the firm's two most senior African
American attorneys called  all of the other black lawyers  to tell  them not to reveal  their true  feelings
or experiences  during the interview.
382.  Indeed, we hope that this paper will make some modest  contribution to these efforts.
383.  We  suspect  that  at  least  some  firm  leaders  are  already  aware  that  their  hiring  and
promotion practices can produce arbitrary decisions  about which  lawyers  succeed  at  the  firm.  See,
e.g., Feferman, supra note 362, at 28.
Years ago, some  lawyers got the idea  for the  pyramid  scheme  that forms  the  skeleton  for
the modern law firm.  They figured out they could hire a bunch of young lawyers  to do  the
legal research they hated doing, and palm off their most unpleasant  matters on  them.  They
paid these junior-level  attorneys chicken feed  and  made  huge profits off their labor.  The
cream rose to the top, the firm dumped the sediment from the bottom, and the whole process
would repeat itself.
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D.  Stimulating Demand
In  1988,  the  American  Bar  Association  initiated  the  Minority
Counsel  Demonstration  Program.  The  Program's  goal  is  straightfor-
ward:  "to  create  opportunity  for  minority  attorneys  to  become  fully
integrated  in  the profession. '""  In  order  to  accomplish  this  goal,  the
Program encourages  participating  corporations  to  retain  minority  firms
and to ensure that minority  partners  in majority  firms  do  some  of their
legal work. 385  By stimulating  demand  for the  services of minority  law-
yers  at large  law firns, the Program  seeks,  inter alia, "to  increase  the
number  of minorities  they  recruit, hire, retain  and  promote  to  partner-
ship .386
The ABA's program, and  other similar initiatives  around  the coun-
try,3n  expressly  target  one  of  the  most promising  avenues  for  getting
firms  to care  about diversity-the  bottom  line.  If  black  lawyers  have
unique  access  to  particular kinds  of lucrative corporate  business,  firms
that fail to recruit and retain these lawyers  will  suffer a competitive  loss.
The essence of this strategy is, therefore, to turn every  black  lawyer into
a superstar  whose  rainmaking  potential  provides  firms  with  a  rational
reason  for preferring these lawyers  to average whites.
By almost any  measure, the ABA's Program is a success.  In its first
three  years,  133  corporations,  39  major  law firms,  and  21  minority-
owned  firms  participated.38   All  together,  minority  attorneys  in  both
large firms  and minority-owned  firms collected  more than  $100  million
in fees from corporate participants. 389  Moreover, the number  of minor-
ity  associates  at  the fifteen  majority  firms  filing  reports  in  1991  in-
creased  by  over  50%  during  the  three  years  that the  program  was  in
operation,  and  the number  of  minority  partners  grew  by  57%.30   Al-
though  the  Project  does  not break  these  results  down  by  race,39'  the
numbers are impressive. 92
384.  AMERICAN  BAR  ASSOCIATION  COMMISSION  ON  MINORITIES  IN  THE PROFESSION,  INTO THE
MAINSTREAM:  REPORT  OF  THE MINORITY  COUNSEL  DEMONSTRATION  PROGRAM  1988-1991,  at  6
(1991)  [hereinafter  PROGRAM  REPORT).
385.  Id.
386.  Id.
387.  For example, the Bar  Association  of San Francisco  has  helped  to establish  the California
Minority Counsel Program, which is similar to the ABA's program.  See S.F. REPORT,  supra note 33,
at 5.
388.  PROGRAM  REPORT, supra note 384, at 5.
389.  Id. at 10.
390.  Id. at 15 (noting that the average number of minority associates  grew  from  8.4 to  12.8  and
the average number of partners  increased  from 2.5 to 3.9).
391.  This is another example of the  difficulty,  described  in Part  III,  of gathering  data  on black
lawyers.
392.  For example, the growth rate in minority associates and partners under the ABA's  program
is substantially larger than the average growth for all minorities  in large firms during this  period.  See
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Nevertheless,  there is reason to be skeptical  about the ability of this
or any  other similar program to affect  substantially  the  opportunities  of
the  majority  of  blacks  in  corporate  firms.  The  Program's  mission
statement provides  an important clue to its limitations.  In  setting  out  its
goals, the Commission states that one of the major  obstacles  "impeding
the full participation  by  minorities  in  the  profession  is  the perception
that corporate  users of legal services  do not desire that minorities  handle
their legal  affairs." ' 393  The Program seeks  to  counter  this  perception  by
encouraging  corporate counsel  to write  letters  to their  outside  law  firms
making  it clear that they  would like minority  lawyers to  work  on  their
matters  and requesting information  about whether the firm is complying
with  its  requests. 39  This  framework,  however,  assumes  that  corporate
leaders  already  recognize  that diversity  is  "good  for  business."  Al-
though  perceptions  are important  as  we  have  already  noted,  the  pre-
sumption  that  this  is  the primary  problem  faced  by  black  lawyers  is
unwarranted.
The claim  that diversity is good for a corporation's bottom  line  has
substantial force  in certain sectors of the economy.  For example,  com-
panies that sell consumer products,  trade  internationally,  or (because  of
affirmative  action  guidelines)  do  substantial  business  with  the  govern-
ment  have long  recognized  the importance  of having  a workforce  that
reflects  the needs  and  concerns  of their  customer  base.  It  is  therefore
not surprising,  as  we noted  in  Part I, that blacks have  made  substantial
inroads  in heavily  regulated  industries  such  as communications  and  in-
surance,  that  Asian-Americans  are  well  represented  in  firms  that  do
business  in  Asia, or that Proctor  & Gamble  (which  markets  household
products)  has  one  of  the  best  records  of  hiring  and  promoting
women.
395
Just because  a corporation sells its products  to  a diverse  population
of customers,  however,  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  it  will  want  its
lawyers  to be  diverse  as well.  When AT&T  is considering  a  new joint
Jensen, supra note  12, at 1, 28 (reporting only slight changes  in the percentage  of minority  attorneys
in surveyed law firms between  1981  and 1989).
393.  PROGRAM  REPoRT, supra note 384, at 4 (emphasis added).
394.  For example, the General  Counsel of General  Motors  sent  a  letter including  the  following
language to all of the law firms doing GM business:
A  matter of great  concern  to me,  and  the entire  bar,  is the disappointingly  slow  pace  at
which minorities are being integrated  into our legal  profession,  particularly  at the  practice
level at which we must engage ....  I therefore  ask you to be certain  that  minority  lawyers
in your firm  able  to provide  service  at the requisite  level  be  included  among  those  who
represent  G.M.  In  addition,  I  am  confident  that  you  agree  with  me  that  we  must  make
certain  we  are  doing all  we  can to introduce  additional able  minority  attorneys  into  our
respective organizations.
Letter from Harry I. Pearce (Feb. 29,  1988), reprinted in  INCREASING  DIVERSITY,  supra note  335,  at
tab E.
395.  See generally  GLASS  CEILING  REPoRT, supra note 4.
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venture agreement, for example,  it wants lawyers  who  know  how  to  op-
erate in the complex world of strategic  planning  and  corporate  finance,
a world that  is still overwhelmingly  white and  male.  The  fact  that  the
lawyer who  has the skills and  connections  to  operate  effectively  in  this
world  may  not  "reflect"  or  "understand"  the  concerns  of  the  com-
pany's customer base  is likely  to be  of little concern  to company  offi-
cials.  Given  this  dynamic,  it  is  not  surprising  that  most  corporate
participants in the ABA Program do little more than send the same  letter
every  year  "requesting  information"  and  dole  out  a few small  projects
that are  often below the pricing  structure for most major firms.396
Advocates of demand creation  strategies  argue  that this dynamic  is
changing.  In  support of this claim, they  point  to  two developments  in
the  corporate  marketplace.  First,  advocates  note  that  an  increasing
number  of positions inside corporate  counsel offices  are  being  filled by
women  and  minorities.  These  new  purchasing  agents,  the  advocates
contend,  will be  more  receptive  to  hiring  minority  lawyers  than  were
their predecessors."  Second,  they  argue  that  growing  black  political
power  on  the  federal,  state,  and  local  level  will increase  demand  for
black lawyers.
There  is merit in both  of these claims.39  Anecdotal  evidence  sug-
gests that black in-house lawyers  are more likely  to  take  an  active inter-
est  in  ensuring  that  work  is fairly  distributed  to  black  lawyers  inside
firms.3"  Similarly, black  political clout  has  frequently  been  translated
into  opportunities  for  black  lawyers.'  While  neither  development  is
396.  Interviews conducted by Professor Wilkins.  This reality  reflects  the fact that the  Program
was  originally  set up to benefit  minority  lawfirms.  Indeed,  one  of  the  unintended  effects  of  the
Program is to encourage black partners  to leave elite firms  for minority-owned  enterprises  that  can
more effectively  compete for this and other similar corporate  work.  See Keeva,  supra note 216,  at
50-51.
397.  See Giesel,  supra note 272, at 799-800  (arguing  that  as  more  women  become  in-house
counsel, women in firms may  enjoy increased  "rainmaking"  ability).
398.  See Chambliss, supra note 7,  at  133-41  (reporting  a  positive  correlation  between  client
demographics  and  law  firm  integration).  Significantly,  Chambliss  found  that  not  every
demographically  connected  variable  was  significant  for every  group.  For example,  she  concluded
that the presence of a foreign  office was positively correlated with the number  of Asian lawyers  but
not the number of blacks.  See id. at 129.  As Chambliss suggests, this is probably  due  to the fact  that
there are  few  foreign  offices  in  Africa  or the  Caribbean.  Id.  This  is yet another  example  of the
danger of making  generalizations  across minority groups.
399.  See  AMERICAN  BAR  ASSOCIATION COMMISSION  ON  OPPORTUNITIES  FOR  MINORITIES  IN
THE  PROFESSION,  SURVIVAL  IN  CORPORATE  LAW  FIRMS  AND  LAW  DEPARTMENTS  IN  AN
INCREASINGLY  COMPETITIVE  ENVIRONMENT  (Aug.  1995)  (panel of minorities  in corporate  counsel
offices discussing their efforts to channel work to minority lawyers).
400.  Thus, when Harold Washington became Chicago's first black  mayor, the number  of black
lawyers  doing substantial  business with  the  city  substantially  increased.  Interviews  by  Professor
Wilkins  with various  black  partners  in  Chicago.  Similarly,  the  Congressional  Black  Caucus  was
largely responsible for  the inclusion  of Section  1216 in the Financial  Institutions  Reform,  Recovery
and Enforcement Act of 1989, which mandates the Office of Thrift Supervision  to "ensure  inclusion,
to the maximum extent possible, of minorities and women ...  including providers of legal  services,  in
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likely  to  change  the  demand  for  black  corporate  lawyers  overnight,03
both  demonstrate  that  as  more  companies  have  a  specific  reason  for
hiring black lawyers,  demand will increase.
This evidence,  however,  also  underscores  the  connection  between
integration  and the  demand  for  minority  lawyers.  Initiatives  in  the  last
category  aim to  achieve this goal directly.
E.  Affirmative Action
Throughout  much  of  this  analysis,  we  have  assumed  that  firms
make no special efforts  to  hire and promote  black lawyers.  We did  this
for two reasons.  The first is methodological.  As we  indicated  in  Part II,
many  commentators claim  that affirmative  efforts  are unnecessary  since
market  forces  will  drive  out  policies  and  practices  that  disadvantage
blacks.  Our analysis  demonstrates  that this  claim  is unlikely  to  be  true
for elite law firms.
The  second  reason  for  bracketing  affirmative  efforts  in the earlier
analysis  is empirical.  Although virtually every firm claims  to be making
special  efforts  to  recruit  and  promote  blacks,  it  is  unclear  how  often
these  programs  actually  reach beyond  competing  for  black  superstars.
Certainly the numbers  do not suggest that firms are engaged  in a  whole-
sale effort to hire average blacks over average whites.r 2
Nevertheless,  at least since  the  1970s,  many  elite  firms  have  hired
black  lawyers  whose rankable  signals  were lower than  the  average  cre-
dentials of the firm's white associates.  Indeed,  many  firm  leaders  claim
that they always hire  black  candidates  when  their  signals  are  roughly
comparable to those of their white peers.  Moreover, the  new task forces
established  in  the late  1980s  to  promote  diversity  in  law  firms  have
made  traditional  affirmative  action  remedies  such  as  goals  and  timeta-
bles  for  hiring,  and  sometimes  promoting,  minority  lawyers  a  central
all contracts  entered into by the agency."  Jose 0.  Seda.  Hiring  of Women  and Minority  Lawyers for
Bank and  Thrift Bailout Work Is the Law, BANK. & THRIFT  L. BUL.,  Aug. 1992, at 1.
401.  Those  who  make  optimistic  predictions  based  on  these  changes  frequently  overlook  a
number of important constraints.  For example,  as we argued in Part III,  corporate  counsel  are  under
tremendous pressure to hire lawyers whose "merit" is  beyond  question to protect  themselves  against
the possibility that something might go wrong.  This pressure may be particularly acute for blacks who
face being accused of favoritism if they hire a black lawyer over an equally prominent white  lawyer.
In  conversations  about  the  Program,  several  black  partners  have  mentioned  that  this  dynamic
substantially limits the ability of black corporate counsel to give good work to black lawyers.
Similarly, the Supreme Court's recent decisions striking down various government set-aside programs
highlight the risks  of tying one's  success  to the  political  arena.  See Adarand  Constructors,  Inc.  v.
Pena, 115 S.  Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995)  (holding that race-based  federal  set-aside program  must satisfy
strict scrutiny).  The fact  that many  of the lawyers  who  were  hired  by the  City of  Chicago  when
Harold Washington was mayor lost this  business when  he  died  underscores  this danger.  Interviews
with Professor Wilkins.
402.  See Davis, supra note  15 (critiquing the "hard  to find  good help"  rationale  for  the limits  of
current  law firm recruiting efforts).
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feature  of their agendas. 3  These  programs  appear  to  have  increased
the presence of black lawyers  in the elite firms.
Despite this success, affirmative  action  programs  in  this  area  are  in
danger.  Affirmative  action  is now  a  controversial  topic  in  the  United
States. 4 ° 0  From  a doctrinal  standpoint,  recent  cases  cast  doubt  on  the
legality  of  voluntary  affirmative  action  programs  that  make  choices
between  equally  qualified  applicants  solely  on the  basis  of  race.'  In
addition, critics  on both  the right  and  the left raise questions  about  the
fairness,  efficiency,  and  efficacy  of  making  employment  decisions  on
the basis of race. 7
We do  not propose  to  resolve  this  complex  dispute.  Our  analysis,
however, does shed light on three of the most common  objections  raised
to  voluntary  affirmative  action  programs  in  elite  institutions:  that  af-
firmative action lowers  standards,  that it reduces  worker effort,  and  that
it stigmatizes  its intended beneficiaries.  Although  these  arguments  may
have force in  other contexts, they  do not provide  persuasive  grounds  for
abandoning  the kind of affirmative  action programs  in use at elite firms.
403.  One  of  the  most  ambitious  programs  has  been  established  by  the  San  Francisco  Bar
Association.  In  1989,  the Association adopted  a  goal  that  participating  firms  have  15%  minority
associates  and 5% minority  partners  by December  31,  1995.  By December  of 2000, the goal  is to
raise these percentages  to 25%  and  10%,  respectively.  See S.F. REPORT,  supra note 33,  at  1.  By
comparison,  the Los Angeles County Bar  Association  is committed  to hiring each  year  a number  of
minority lawyers that is equal to 10% of the total number of attorneys hired during the years  between
1992 and  1996.  See Faye A. Silas, Bar,  Law Firms Develop Statements of Goals to Increase Hiring,
Retention and Promotion  of  Minority  Lawyers, BAR  LEADER,  July-Aug.  1993,  at 21,  24.  New  York
has  pledged  to achieve  a  level  of 10%  minority associates  by  1997.  Adams, supra note  50,  at  4.
Many  other groups  either  have  established similar goals  or have  urged  firms  to hire  and  promote
minority attorneys.
404.  For example, in a study of large San Francisco firms, the number of black associates (105  to
122)  and  partners  (21  to  32)  rose  significantly  in  the  first  three  years  of the Bar  Association's
minority hiring program.  See S.F. REPORT,  supra  note 33, at 8.  Similarly, a survey of New  York law
firms  conducted  after  the  Association  of  the  City of  New  York  adopted  voluntary  goals  and
timetables  showed  increases  in  hiring  and  promotion  rates  for  blacks  as  well  as  an  increase  in
retention.  See Adams, supra note 50.  See also, Davis, supra  note  15 (linking  recent  increases  in  the
number of minority associates to these programs).
405.  See,  e.g.,  B.  Drummond Ayres  Jr.,  California Acting  on  Affirmative Action,  N.Y.  TIMrs,
Mar. 26,  1995, at 24; B.  Drummond Ayres  Jr.,  California Governor Vows to Cut Affirmative Action,
N.Y. TImES, June 1, 1995, at A15; Molly Ivins, Race Does Matter,  BOSTON  GLOBE,  Apr.  19,  1996, at
19; Jeff Jacoby, Counting by Race, BOSTON  GLOBE, Apr. 25,  1996, at 21,  Gene  Kratz,  Less Diversity
at B-Schools, Bus. WK., Apr. 29, 1996, at 26.
406.  See Don Munro, Note, The Continuing Evolution of  Affirmative Action Under Title VII:  New
Directions  After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 81  VA. L.  REV.  565, 582-85  (1995).  See  also, Hopwood
v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, cert denied, 116  S. Ct. 2580, 64 USLW 3868 (1996).
407.  See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Pursuing  Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action
at the FCC Increased  Auction Competition, S.  CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming  1996)  (manuscript at 60-65,
on file with author) (describing the competing positions on affirmative action).CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
1.  Standards
Affirmative  action  opponents  frequently  claim  that  such  policies
inevitably  reduce  standards.  The  argument  sounds  in  efficiency.  If
employers  hire workers  with lower signals,  the argument  goes, the qual-
ity of the final  product  will suffer.  Even  when  taken  on  its own terms,
the standards critique misconstrues  the dynamic  of the  law firm  recruit-
ing  process.  In  Part  III, we  argued  that  stereotypes  and  unconscious
bias lead firms to favor whites over blacks with functionally equal quali-
fications and  to  discount  the  signals of black  superstars.  To  the  extent
goals and timetables  or other  affirmative  recruiting  measures  give firms
a reason to detect  and  prevent  practices  that favor  whites, and  therefore
increase the incentives of black lawyers, these measures will in  fact  serve
rather  than  weaken  the goal  of "standards."" t
Moreover,  the standards  critique  rests on  an unrealistic  view about
both the content of the signals used by  elite firms  and  their relationship
to job  related  skills.  Even  if we  confine  ourselves  to  the  criteria  that
seem to play the largest role in the recruiting process-law  school  status
and  grades-the  standards  critique  ignores  the  tremendous  growth  in
the size and  quality of the  law school  applicant  pool  over  the  last few
decades.  Compared  to  the  "golden  age"  when  most  of  today's  law
firm partners  went to  law  school,  competition  for  law  school  places-
particularly  at elite schools-has  become  much  more  intense.re  Given
this change,  the claim  that hiring  a black  student  who has  survived this
competition  and  secured a place at a good  law  school  lowers the quality
of  a  firm  that  has  many  partners  whose  own  academic  performance
while in college  might  not have been  sufficient  to have earned  them  a
place in that same  school  today  is  flatly  inconsistent  with  the  timeless
value that those who  endorse these  kinds of arguments  generally  give  to
standards.
408.  By tying a law firm's reputation to making  progress  on  hiring  and  promoting  blacks,  goals
and timetables give firms a reason  to pay attention  to how their lawyers  choose  between  black  and
white candidates in the average range.  Assuming, as the advocates of standards must, that firms care
about getting the applicants with  the best  signals,  the easiest  way  for  firms  to  meet  this  goal  and
protect their reputation is by ensuring  that the actual  skills of black  applicants  are  fairly  appraised.
Since  the  prior  practice  of  preferring  average  whites  causes  no  efficiency  loss,  this  added
reputational  interest  gives  firms  an  incentive  to  monitor  these  decisions  more  closely  than  they
otherwise would.
409.  See NoTE,  DANIEL R.  HANSEN,  Do  We  Need  The  Bare  Exam: A  Critical Examination, 45
Case W. Res. L. Rev.  1191,  1235 nn.131-32 (1995)  (documenting the rising quality  and quantity of the
law  school  applicant  pool).  Needless  to  say,  a  similar  phenomenon  has  been  happening  in
Universities,  prestigious high schools,  and  even  in  elementary  schools.  See  Bruce  Webber,  The
Harvard Class of '00, N.Y.T.  MAG.,  April  27,  1996,  at 44 (describing  the intense  competition  to get
into Harvard  College  and  reporting  that even  with  affirmative  action,  the blacks  who  are  admitted
have  superstar credentials).
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This  last point  underscores  the  loose  connection  between  signals
such as grades and law school  status and the skills that go  into making  a
good  lawyer.  The  argument  that hiring  blacks  with  lower  credentials
will hurt productivity  assumes that there is a direct  relationship  between
these signals and quality.  As  we argued  above,  however, no  such direct
relationship  exists.  As a result, it is not surprising that firms  consistently
demonstrate  by  their actions  that  they  are  uninterested  in  making  the
kind  of refined  judgments  about  skills  upon  which  the  standards  cri-
tique  ultimately  rests.  Not  only  do  firms  fail  to  seek  out  information
about a candidate's  skill (as  opposed  to  her  signal)  level during  the re-
cruiting  process,  but  when  it  has  been  economically  profitable,  they
have shown themselves  to be  willing to jettison  standards  arguments  al-
together.  Consider  the  explosion  in  the  use  of  paralegals  at  large
firms. 4"'  In  the "golden  age"  firms  maintained  that keeping  track  of
documents,  drafting letters  and motions,  and routine  legal research  were
the  "practice  of law"  and  therefore  could  only  be  handled  by  highly
trained  (and  expensive)  associates.  Today,  much  of this  work is  done
by people who have no legal education whatsoever.
Once again, the point is not that judgments  about skill  are impossi-
ble or that the traditional standards  are meaningless.  As we have argued,
firms  have  an  incentive  to  seek  out  superstars,  no  matter  how  imper-
fectly  measured,  and  to protect  themselves  against  unacceptable  work-
ers.  In  the middle,  however, they  are  (at  least  on  efficiency  grounds)
indifferent  since  they  know  that  differences  among  candidates  in  this
range are not worth the trouble of investigating!"  Given what we know
about the work these associates will do when  they  arrive  at the firm, this
middle/average  range is much broader and much  less differentiated  than
the standards  critique  would lead  one  to believe.  So  long  as the black
lawyers  being  hired  under  an  affirmative  action  program  come  from
this middle/average range, any claim that the quality  of the firm's  work
will diminish,  lacks credibility.
Indeed,  goals  and  timetables  like the  ones  established  by  the  San
Francisco  bar  may  help  firms  to  avoid  any  potential  reputational  loss
from being seen  by their clients  or competitors  as "lowering  standards"
to recruit  blacks.  By creating  a visible competition  for  blacks  (among
others), these programs  establish  a  new  signal  by  which  firms  can  be
ranked  alongside  their  competitors.  Paradoxically,  even  in  a  world
where some find the standards  critique persuasive, the firm that hires  the
most black  lawyers  ought  to be the one  whose reputation  among  these
skeptics suffers the least.  Thus, firms such  as San Francisco's  Morrison
410.  See supra  note 192.
411.  See Selmi, supra note 49  (making a similar argument about slight differences  in employment
test scores).
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& Foerster  and  New  York's  Cleary,  Gottlieb,  Steen  &  Hamilton  (two
firms that have dramatically  increased  their  minority  hiring)  can  credi-
bly  claim that they  are  among the "best" firms  for black lawyers.  This,
in  turn, should  signal  to  their  clients, their  competitors,  and  the general
population  of law  students, that the black  lawyers  hired by  these firms
are likely to be the best in  the available pool.  Moreover,  in  addition  to
solving the firms'  collective  action problem  regarding  the standards  is-
sue, these policies also signal to black law students that  they  have a real-
istic  chance  of  being  hired  and  promoted  by  an  elite  firm.  This
highlights the issue of investment.
2.  Effort: Lowering the Price of the Ticket to the Tournament 1 2
Opponents of affirmative  action assert that it reduces  socially bene-
ficial  incentives for both  black  and  white employees.  Specifically,  the
argument is that because employees  have  to  exert lower amounts  of ef-
fort to  obtain jobs or promotions,  they  have reduced  incentives  to work
hard  and  invest in human  capital."3  This argument is implausible  in  the
elite law firm context.  Indeed,  our analysis  suggests that the opposite  is
more likely to be true.  At present, black lawyers  at elite firms  have very
little chance of becoming partners.  As a result, the average  black  asso-
ciate has inadequate incentives  to invest in human  capital  strategies  that
might lead to success  at the firm.  If affirmative  action  provides  the  av-
erage black associate, who  today faces a low  probability  of success,  with
a somewhat  greater  probability,  this  can  only increase her  incentive  to
work.  Moreover, none of the programs  we are  discussing would  in any
way guarantee  that any particular black lawyer  will be  hired  or  become
a partner.  Since black lawyers  still know  that they face  countless  barri-
ers to success even with affirmative action, they  have plenty  of incentive
to continue  to work hard  and invest in human  capital.4
412.  We borrow the phrase  from James  Baldwin's masterful collection  of essays.  See JAMES  W.
BALDWIN,  Tim PRIcg  OF THE TICKET:  COLLECrED  NoN-FICTION,  1948-1985  (1985).
413.  Glenn  Loury  describes  an  economic  model  where  affirmative  action  results  in
supervisorslemployers  holding blacks  to lower standards  in order  to satisfy institutional  pressures  to
promote and hire blacks.  In  turn,  he  argues,  these lower  standards  result in rationally  lower  effort
levels by blacks.  See  LouRY,  supra note  36,  at 114.  Ward  Connerly,  the  black  member  of  the
University of California's Board  of Regents  who led  the  charge  against  affirmative  action  at  the
University,  also  makes  this  argument.  See William  H.  Honan,  Regents  Prepare for Storm  on
Affirmative Action, N.Y.  TIMES, July  19,  1995, at B7.
414.  See  Jonathan  S.  Leonard,  The  Impact  of  Affirmative  Action  Regulation  and  Equal
Employment  Laws on Black Employment, 4  J. ECON.  PERPs.  47,  61  (1990)  (finding  little  negative
effect  of  affirmative  action  on  productivity  in  the  context  of  federal  contractors);  Jonathan  S.
Leonard, Antidiscrimination  or Reverse Discrimination:  The Impact of Changing Demographics,  Title
VII, and  Affirmative Action on Productivity, 19 J. HuM.  RESOURCES  145  (1984)  (same).  One  might
argue that black superstars face reduced incentives since they know that they  have a good chance  of
being hired and making partner even without  affirmative  action.  However,  accounts  by even  those
black  superstars  who  are skeptical  about  the  value  of  affirmative  action  once  again  point  in  the
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To the extent that our conservative colleagues perceive  the problem
with affirmative action to be that it reduces incentives to invest in  human
capital  (specifically  skills), our  model  speaks  to  their concerns.  In  the
sectors  of  the  economy  where  signals  are  relatively  uncorrelated  with
skill, that worry  should  be  put  to  rest.  Associates  are  choosing  some
combination  of signals and  skills to help  them  both  get  a  ticket to  the
tournament (where the price of the ticket is the level of signals  the firm
requires) and then have a chance  of winning the tournament (where  ini-
tial  skills  are  necessary  to  help  one  be  chosen  by  a  partner  for  the
training track).  If as a result of affirmative  action,  blacks  have to spend
less of their scarce resources on purchasing  the ticket, they  can  use that
time to acquire skills to win the tournament. 15  This  result, as conserva-
tives should agree, is a benefit both to individual blacks  and to society  as
a whole.
41 6
Arguments  about  reduced  incentives  for  whites  are  similarly  un-
convincing.  Here, the claim is that if whites see their chances  of success
reduced  as a result of affirmative  effort for  blacks,  they  will no  longer
have as much  of an  incentive to  exert  effort. 4"7  Given  the  institutional
dynamics  inside elite law  firms, this theoretical  possibility  is unlikely  to
develop  into a serious problem.  In light of the enormous  rewards  asso-
ciated  with  corporate  law practice,  it is  not  plausible  that  whites  will
forego the opportunity  to compete for these jobs  simply  because  a firm
has committed to hiring blacks to fill ten, twelve,  or even fifteen  percent
of its needs.  From  the perspective  of average whites, this  reduction  in
their chances  of receiving a lucrative offer from an elite  firm  is minimal
in light of the high odds facing average  white candidates  in the absence
of affirmative action."'  Indeed,  to the extent  that affirmative  action  has
any effect, it may increase  the effort exerted  by  whites to  secure  one  of
these coveted places. 419  In addition, to the extent  that hiring  blacks  with
opposite direction; these superstars believe  that they  have  had  to work  twice  as  hard  as their white
colleagues to overcome the stigma that they do not deserve their superstar status.  See,  e.g.,  CARTER,
supra  note 228.  We return to the issue of stigma below.
415.  The only scenario in which black  student or associate would  not transfer  her  resources  to
investing in skills is where she is already confident enough of winning the partnership tournament that
she believes  that she  needs  no  more  skills-an  unlikely  eventuality,  especially  for  a  risk-averse
individual.
416.  See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 88 (suggesting that excessive  reliance on  education  as  a  signal
may encourage socially wasteful  investment).
417.  Cf  J.  Hoult  Verkerke,  Note,  Compensating  Victims  of  Preferential  Employment
Discrimination  Remedies, 98 YALE L.J.  1479 (1989)  (arguing in favor of monetary  compensation  for
whites  whose chances of success  are lowered  as a result of affirmative action).
418.  Opportunities  available to superstar  whites  will  not diminish at all,  since they  will still  be
given  preference  over both average  blacks and  average whites.
419.  Ian  Ayres  argues  that affirmative  action  and  the  resultant  higher  barrier  for  whites  to
succeed  would  in  fact  produce  higher  effort  levels  from  white  workers  because  of  increased
competition.  See  Ayres,  supra note  407,  at  63;  see  also  Andrew  Schotter  &  Keith  Weigelt,
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fewer traditional  signals convinces  firms  to  abandon  or  relax  these  hir-
ing standards for all candidates,  some average  whites whom  firms  might
not otherwise consider will have a better chance of being  hired.  Finally,
once  they  join  the  firm,  white associates  will be  motivated  by  the  same
combination  of  fear  and  future  rewards  that  currently  produces  high
effort  levels  among  all  associates.  If a  firm  detects  a  white  associate
shirking, the fear of an  anti-discrimination  lawsuit will not  keep ,it from
firing her and  hiring an easily  available  replacement.
3.  Stigma
Evidence that affirmative  action does not lower standards  or  reduce
effort would be cold comfort if these  programs  actually  ended  up  hurt-
ing their intended  beneficiaries.  Those  who press  the  stigma argument
make just this claim.  The logic  is straightforward  and  compelling.  If it
is widely  known  that  at  least  some  significant  number  of blacks  have
benefited  from  affirmative  action,  employers  will  rationally  discount
any  particular  black  candidate's  credentials  by  the  amount  they  think
she has  benefited. 420
Given our analysis, this is a serious concern.  In a world where deci-
sions  on the assignment  of projects  are  made  on low amounts  of infor-
mation,  the perception  that blacks on  average  have  lower skills will hurt
them.  The danger is that in deciding which projects  to  give  to  white as-
sociates  and which ones  to  give to black  associates, partners  will  choose
to  give  routine  projects  to  the  black  associates  and  analytical/training
related  ones  to  the white associates.  This,  as  we have  documented,  re-
sults  in  blacks  perceiving  less  of  a  future  at  the  firm  and  adopting
strategies  that end up justifying the partners'  decisions  in  not  choosing
them.42'  In  short,  affirmative  action  could  end  up  exacerbating  the
problems black associates  are already  facing at elite firms. 22
Asymmetric  Tournaments, Equal Opportunity Laws  and Affirmative  Action:  Some  Experimental
Results, 107 Q.J. EcoN. 511  (1992).
420.  For a discussion of statistical discrimination,  see David A.  Strauss,  The Law  and Economics
of Racial Discrimination in Employment:  The  Case for Numerical Standards, 79  GEO.  LJ.  1619
(1991).  A  related  stigma  argument  is  that affirmative  action  causes  blacks  to  suffer  excessive
amounts of self-doubt, since they  are unsure of their own qualifications for a job.  While  this may  be
true, we think it is relatively  unimportant when compared  to the problem of the employer doubting the
employee.  After all,  employees know their own skill levels better than anyone else.  For a  discussion
of this problem, see LOURY,  supra note 36, at 238-41.
421.  Perceiving a reduced  set of opportunities  vis-a-vis  one's  competitors  reduces  incentives  to
work.  See Richard  B. Freeman,  LABOUR  MARKETS  IN  ACTION  128  (1989)  (suggesting that youths
who perceived  their employers  as discriminatory  were more likely to  be  absent  from their jobs); see
also  Rowlett  v.  Anheuser-Busch,  Inc.,  832  F.2d  194,  202  (1st  Cir.  1987)  (recognizing  how
discriminatory  behavior by an  employer  can  influence  the incentives  of an employee  and  result  in
negative behavior on the part of the employee, such as  a high absence rate).
422.  The harm is even worse for bona fide  black superstars.  Their  superstar  qualifications are
doubted and discounted because of the possibility that they  were  achieved  as a  result of affirmative
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The  solution,  however,  is not to abandon  voluntary  affirmative  ac-
tion in hiring, but to extend it to decisions regarding  the choice  of asso-
ciates  for  projects  and  other  internal  firm  decisions.  Designing
affirmative measures  that will ensure that black associates have meaning-
ful access  to the training  track  is a complex  task.  Goals  and  timetables
for promotion as  well as hiring are a good start, but standing  alone, they
are  unlikely  to  change  the  way  that  partners  assign  work  or  decide
whom  to mentor.  If firms  are truly  serious  about  improving  the pros-
pects  of their black  lawyers,  they must implement  policies  that change
the incentives of partners.  For example,  companies  such  as Proctor  and
Gamble  and  AT&T  rate their  managers  in  terms  of  their  success  in
promoting  the firm's  diversity  goals and  weigh  these ratings  in  setting
compensation  and  determining  promotions.  If elite firms  were to insti-
tute policies of this kind, partners  would  have concrete  incentives  to in-
sure that blacks make it onto  the training track.
CONCLUSION:  CHOOSING  A NEW  PATH
We return, therefore, to where we began.  In  Part II,  we rejected  the
traditional  economic  assumption  that  firms  that maintain  employment
policies that disadvantage black workers  will necessarily  be driven  from
the market.  We argued  that this optimistic projection  is unlikely  to  be
true  in the context  of elite law firms.  These  organizations  have  devel-
oped  a series of interconnected  institutional  practices  to  reduce  moni-
toring  costs  that  insulate  them  from  the  consequences  of  permitting
practices that disproportionately disadvantage  black lawyers.  In Part IV,
we argued that there are measures that firms could take to  alter this state
of affairs.  The question remains, however, why  should firms adopt these
corrective  measures?  From  the outset,  we  have  insisted  that  analyzing
the institutional structure  of firms and the incentives  that those structures
create for black lawyers  is a crucial part of any  comprehensive  explana-
tion of the problem  of law firm integration.  But if high  wages,  pyra-
miding,  and  tracking  are  "efficient,"  what  incentive  could  firms
possibly have to change  these practices?  More  to the point,  by  linking
diversity and efficiency in this way, have we simply  given firm leaders  a
potent  excuse  for  rationalizing  the absence  of black  lawyers  as  simply
an  unfortunate  but inevitable  consequence  of  their Darwinian  struggle
for survival?
action.  Hence, unlike white superstars,  black superstars face  an  extra  burden  of proof to show  that
they really are superstars.  Understandably,  some of these  black  superstars resent  this extra  burden
and find it harmful.  The question  is whether this harm  outweighs  the benefits  of affirmative  action
for the majority of blacks  who  are  not superstars.  See T. Alexander  Aleinikoff, A  Case for Race-
Consciousness, 91  COLUM.  L  REV.  1060,  1091  n.148  (1991)  (stating  that  the  costs  of  stigma
notwithstanding,  blacks remain overwhelmingly  in favor of affirmative action).
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Although  these  arguments  might seem  powerful  from  the perspec-
tive of traditional  law and  economics  theory, 23  we  nevertheless  believe
that they trade on false (or at least highly exagerated)  claims  about  what
it means  to  say  that  a  particular  institutional  structure  is  "efficient."
Standard  law and  economics theory often  speaks  as if the institutions  we
see are the  inevitable result  of an  evolutionary  process  in  which ineffi-
cient  structures  and  practices  are  continually  challenged  and  under-
mined  through  the  process  of  competition  by  those  that  are  more
efficient.  As a result, proponents  of this  evolutionary  model  tend  to  as-
sume that the institutions that we see must be efficient, since if they  were
not, they could not have survived.424  The analogy is to biology, where,  it
is assumed, nature selects for those adaptations  most suited to survival.
As Professor  Mark  Roe  has  recently  argued,  however,  this  evolu-
tionary model is not only bad law, it is bad  biology. 5  Even in the  natu-
ral world,  the process of evolutionary  development  is far more  complex
and  haphazard  than the linear  model  endorsed  by  many  law  and  eco-
nomics  theorists.  Thus,  species  tend  to  develop  through  a  series  of
punctuated  equilibria  rather  than  on  some  preordained  path  towards
optimality.  According  to this view,  species  are  formed  quickly  in  re-
sponse  to  environmental  factors  and  thereafter  remain  relatively  stable,
not adapting  to incremental  changes  that  do not threaten  species  viabil-
ity.  Only  when  there  is a crisis  will this state of affairs  be  disturbed,  in
which case the species will either be destroyed  or  a minority  with  a par-
ticularly  adaptive trait will survive and once  again congeal, freezing  both
its  "efficient"  and  "inefficient"  traits until  the next crisis. 26
Moreover,  as  Roe  argues,  evolutionary  thinking  in  law  and  eco-
nomics  must be  modified  further  to  account  for  additional  aspects  of
the  development  of  social  institutions  that  have  nothing  to  do  with
whether  a firm's  particular  structural  features  are  efficient  in  terms  of
the contemporary  environment.  All social  institutions  develop  at  spe-
cific moments  in  time  and  in  response  to  particular  conditions.  This
creates  two problems  for  traditional  evolutionary  models.  First, condi-
tions  existing  at  the  time  an  institution  is  formed  will  influence  the
functioning  of that institution  far  into  the  future,  often  in  unintended
423.  For example, when writing from a traditional  law and economics  perspective,  one of  us has
come to a more pessimistic conclusion about the possibility of successfully  integrating  low monitoring
workplaces  through a process of incremental institutional  change.  See Chamy  and Gulati,  supra note
9, at 36-38.
424.  The  most famous  example  of this kind of reasoning  is the claim  by  some  of the  original
proponents  of law  and economics  theory  that the common  law  is efficient.  See,  e.g.,  George  L.
Priest, The Common Law Process  and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 65  J. LEGAL  STUD.  65  (1977);
Paul Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 65 J. LEGAL  STUD.  51  (1977).
425.  See  Mark J. Roe,  Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics,  109  HARV.  L  Rav.  641
(1996).
426.  See id.  at 663.
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and unexpected  ways. 4 2 7  Second,  once  an  institution starts  down  a par-
ticular path, the costs of changing structures  and practices  that may  have
been well adapted to the prior conditions  will often  seem  too  great  even
in  cases  where  everyone  agrees  that a new path  is better  suited  for  the
current reality.428  Worse yet, in those instances  in which the path that has
been  chosen  has become  entrenched,  institutional  actors  may  not  even
be able  to imagine alternative paths that might be more efficient.
Collectively, these three  truths  about the development  of social in-
stitutions  should make us hesitate  before  declaring  that the policies  and
practices that we see today  are not only  the most, but perhaps  even  the
only,  "efficient"  adaptation  to  contemporary  conditions. 29  Although
institutions that have survived  and prospered in a reasonably competitive
market cannot be too inefficient,  it is also  likely that they  will incorpo-
rate pockets  of inefficiency  that have been carried  along with  more  effi-
cient practices,  as  well  as  vestigial structures  and  ways of  thinking  that
are largely  the result of historical accidents  and  are no  longer  particu-
larly well suited to today's (let alone tomorrow's) reality.
The story  we have told about the institutional  practices  of elite law
firms  fits  the  pattern  Roe  describes.  In  Part II,  we  argued  that  high
wages, pyramiding,  and  tracking  are  rational  responses  to  the  problem
of monitoring  lawyer quality.  These  practices,  and  more  importantly
the manner  in  which  these  institutional  structures  operate  to  disadvan-
tage black lawyers,  are,  however, the product  of the historical  evolution
of law  firms and this country's  long  and  tragic history  with "the  prob-
lem of the color line. 430
427.  See id. at 642.  Roe adapts this insight from Chaos theory.
428.  See id. at 643-44.  He adapts this insight from theories about path dependence.
429.  In  a recent  series  of lectures  at Harvard  Law  School,  Professor  Roberto Unger  made  a
similar point about what he refers to as the "institutional fetishism" of traditional  American  liberalism
and the "structural fetishism" of the left.  Unger argues that Americans  tend to  assume that  our basic
political  institutions  represent  the  best  possible-and  therefore  the  last-compromise  among  the
competing values at stake in a representative  democracy.  As  a  result,  these  institutions  are exempt
from the fundamental experimentalism that has otherwise characterized this nation's  attitude  towards
solving  social  and  political  problems.  For  its  part,  the  American  left  tends  to  see  these  same
institutions, as well as new ones that might be developed, as the result of an  overarching  and largely
fixed economic and  political superstructure  that inevitably shapes  social  institutions  into  predictable
forms.  Unger rejects both of these fetishes.  The first ignores the fact that our existing  institutions  are
the  product  of  historical  traditions  and  contingencies,  and  may  very  well  be  less  suited  to
contemporary  conditions than  plausible alternatives.  The  second  underestimates  society's  ability,
when  animated  by  a  vision of the  future and  an  energized  politics, to alter  the basic  character  of
social life through incremental changes in the structure  and  functioning of institutions.  Although  we
may  not always  agree  with Unger  about  how  such  a  transformation  might  take  place,  his  basic
rejection of the tyranny of the present is as important an antidote  for the satisfaction of the center  and
the fatalism of the left as Roe's analysis is for the biological determinism of the right.
430.  The reference  is to W.E.B.  Dubois'  famous  and  prophetic statement  that "the  problem  of
the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color line."  See W.E.B. DuBoIs,  THE  SOULS  OF BLACK
FOLK  13 (Donald Gibson ed.,  1989).
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Elite law firms developed  their basic character  in the latter years  of
the nineteenth  century.  Following  Cravath's  example,  firms  began  re-
cruiting  "the  best young  men"  from  the country's  "best"  law schools
to  work as salaried  associates for  a period  of time  at the  end  of  which
they would either become partners  or leave  the firm.4 3'  This  model  was
well  adapted  to  the circumstances  that  confronted  Cravath  and  other
similar firms  at the turn  of the  century. 4 32   Given  the  scarcity  of  high
quality  elite  firms,  long-term  institutional  relationships  between  firms
and  clients,  and  the knowledge  asymmetry  between  lawyers  and  clients
during this period,  firms  could  pass the  cost of training  young  lawyers
on  to  their clients.433  Moreover,  the  social  practices  and  mores  of  the
time made it acceptable,  if not necessarily  optimal,  for  firms  to  confine
their  recruiting  efforts  to  a  narrow  range  of  white  male  Protestant
graduates  from  a few law schools.  The  gap,  in terms  of the quality  of
the students  and faculty,  between  elite schools  such  as  Harvard  and  the
majority  of regional  and local  schools  was probably  large.  At the  same
time,  the  homogeneity  of  the  professional  and  business  class  in  the
United States  during  this period  increased  the economic  importance  of
social  capital  (such  as family  background  and  Protestant  sensibilities)
relative to job  skills.  Finally,  when  it came time  for  those  who did not
make  partner  to  leave, there  were  plenty  of jobs with similar  wages  (in
"lesser"  firms,  in  government,  with  clients,  etc.)  for  them  to  choose
from.
Virtually  all of these underlying  conditions  have  changed  during
the  last  twenty  years.  Predictably,  elite  law  firms  have  attempted  to
adapt to these new realities.  These  adaptations,  however, do  not  deviate
substantially  from  the path  laid  down  by  Cravath more  than  a  century
ago.  Thus, high wages,  pyramiding, and  tracking  are  all ways for  firms
to  respond  to  changes  in  the  market  for  clients  and  labor  within  the
context  of an  institutional  structure  that  is still characterized  by  a  divi-
sion  of  labor  between  "partners"  and  "associates,"  an  "up-or-out"
system  of associate  career  development,  and  a  subtle,  but  nevertheless
powerful,  presumption  in  favor  of  white  male  graduates  of  elite  law
schools.  Although  some firms have instituted policies  that deviate from
each  of these  traditional  practices,  the original  path  continues  to  shape
the debate over the future of elite firms.
431.  See generally  GALANTER  AND  PALAY,  supra note 24 (describing the historical  development
of elite firms).
432.  See Gilson  and  Mnookin,  Coming of Age, supra note  63,  at  571  &  n.14  (describing  the
advantages  of the Cravath  model of associate careers).
433.  See Ronald Gilson,  The Devolution of  the Legal Profession:  A Demand  Side Perspective, 49
MD.  L.  REV.  869  (1990)  (positing a recent  decline  in information asymmetry  between  lawyers  and
clients).
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There is, however,  no  reason  to believe that these  traditional  insti-
tutional  practices  are more  efficient  than  others  that  might  have  been
developed  to respond  to  the problems  elite  firms  presently  face.  Ac-
counting  firms,  for  example,  confront  many  of the same  difficulties  as
law firms.  Yet these organizations  have  developed  in  ways that  differ
materially  from  the practices  of elite law firms.  The  large  accounting
firms typically have many more  categories of employees,  a substantially
longer  "partnership"  track,  and  no  (or  very  relaxed)  "up-or-out"
policies.4'  Similarly,  when  we look  overseas,  we see that the American
model of elite law  practice  is still more  the exception  than the rule.  In
most of Europe, for example,  even  the best law firms remain  small, pay
relatively  low wages,  and  are  characterized  by  intense  training  and  su-
pervision.  More  importantly,  although  there  are  a growing  number  of
European  "mega-firms,"  frequently  modeled  on  their  American
counterparts,  even  these  institutions  are  likely  to  develop  institutional
structures  and practices  that differ substantially from their U.S.  counter-
parts.43  For example,  many  European  firms  do  not bill for their  serv-
ices by the hour, instead relying on a combination  of retainers,  flat fees
tied  to  the value of the project,  and  incentive  compensation  formulas.
They  also tend  to have both  more  categories  of  employees  and  lock-
step compensation  systems  for partners.436
The fact that accounting  firms  and European  law firms  have devel-
oped differing, but no less  successful  solutions  to  the monitoring  prob-
lems  inherent  in  delivering  professional  services  casts  doubt  on  the
claim that the institutional practices of elite firms constitute the sole effi-
cient response  to  these  questions. 437  This  institutional  comparison  is
particularly  significant  in light of the  fact  that  elite  firms  increasingly
compete  with  accounting  firms  and  European  mega-firms  in  a broad
range of corporate transactions.  Indeed,  according  to  some knowledge-
able  observers, it is precisely  because  elite  law  firms  are  locked  into  a
path  that leads  them  to  offer  increasingly  specialized  legal  services  at
ever higher prices that these institutions will eventually  lose out to  inter-
national  accounting  firms  such  as Arthur  Anderson  in the  competition
434.  See  Marc  Galanter  & Thomas  Palay, The  Many Futures of the Big  Law  Firm, 45  S.C.  L
REV.  905,  912  (1994)  ("The  Big  Six  [accounting  firms]  are  generally  characterized  by  taller
hierarchies and  considerably higher associate-to-partner  ratios than the traditional big law firms.").
435.  See  David  M.  Trubek  et  al.,  Global  Restructuring and  the  Law:  Studies  of  the
Institutionalization  of  Legal Fields  and the Creation  of Transnational  Arenas, 44 CASE W. REs.  L. REV.
407 (1994)  (arguing that European  "global  firms"  will develop  along  lines that  differ in  important
ways from American  firms).
436.  See John Flood, Megalawyering in the Global Order: The Cultural,  Social and Economic
Transformation  of Global  Legal Practice,  3 INT'L J. LEGAL  PROF.  169,  177-78 (1996).
437.  See Roe, supra note 425,  at 646 (making a  similar argument  with  respect  to the differing
strategies  for corporate  control in the United States and Japan).
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to  be the premier  providers  of legal  and  business  services  to  corporate
clients.4 38
America's  long history  of discrimination  against  blacks  exercises  a
similar hold  on the problems  we discuss.  As we argued  in Part III,  this
history  is partly  responsible  for  the  fact  that  high  wages,  pyramiding,
and tracking are likely to have  an especially  adverse effect on the career
opportunities  of black  lawyers.  Slavery  set this  nation  on  a  path  in
which  it was necessary  to portray  blacks  as  mentally,  emotionally,  and
spiritually  incapable  of self-determination.  Almost  a  generation  after
the  last  de jure  remnants  of  this  vicious  system  were put  to  rest,  the
stereotypes  and predispositions  that  can be  traced  back  to  this  ignoble
past continue  to shape race relations in this country.  One of the legacies
of this  history  is that discussions  about  race  inevitably  proceed  from  a
set of premises  that make  it difficult  for many  Americans  to  recognize
forms  of racial  disadvantage  other  than  the  kind  of  intentional  racism
that characterized  this nation's past.
There  can  be  little  doubt  that  America  would  be  better  off  if  it
could escape the  grip of this racialized  past.  Although  institutions  such
as elite law firms can adapt to  these  inefficiencies  by  instituting  policies
that insulate  them  from  the  economic  consequences  of  discrimination,
the long-term  effects  on American  society  of failing  to  integrate  "high-
level"  jobs  cannot possibly  be good.  As  we acknowledged  in  Part  I,
many  Americans  place  a positive value  on  diversity,  preferring  to  live
and  work in spaces where they can interact with blacks.  Even  those  who
do  not would  arguably  benefit  from  the  diminution  of  social  conflict
that arguably  would  flow from  spreading  social resources  more  equita-
bly.
Although deviating from the path of the past is never easy,  the tur-
bulent  nature  of both  the  market  for  corporate  legal  services  and  the
current  debate  over  the  continuing  significance  of race  paradoxically
provides  us with an  opportunity  to reassess  and  reshape  our traditional
understandings.  Modem  evolutionary  theory suggests  that it is in  times
of crisis that  species are  most  likely  to  alter  their  basic  developmental
path.  There  can  be little doubt  that elite corporate  firms  are  in  such  a
period.  Numerous  reports  document  that  lawyers  "in  every  type  of
practice and at every level of seniority,  are increasingly  dissatisfied  with
their professional  lives."4"  A good  deal  of  this  dissatisfaction  can  be
traced to the very  structural  mechanisms-high  wages, pyramiding,  and
438.  See Karen Dillon, Accounting  for Success: How Arthur Anderson Quietly Became  the Most
Successful Law  Firm in the World, AM.  LAw.,  March  1994, at 30; see also David  H. Maister,  The
One-Firm Firm: What Makes it Successful, SLOAN  MGmT.  REV., Fall 1985, at 3.
439.  Deborah  K.  Holmes,  Learning from  Corporate America:  Addressing Dysfunction in  the
Large Law Firm, 31  GONz. L. REv.  373, 375-76 (1995/96)  (citing statistics).
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tracking-that firms have developed to cope with the rising  pressures  of
global  competition.' °  In  other  words,  as we have emphasized  from  the
outset,  most  white lawyers  are  also  adversely  affected  by  the  current
structure of corporate practice.
To  address  these  problems,  commentators  and  firm  leaders  have
begun  to  advocate  a  fundamental  restructuring  in  elite  firm  practice.
Reforms  currently  under  discussion  include  replacing  hourly  billing
with fixed  or incentive-based  compensation  systems,  instituting  "Total
Quality  Management"  (TQM)  programs designed  to  foster  better  client
services  through  communication  and  teamwork, and  replacing  partner-
ship  (and  the  current  "up-or-out"  system)  with  a  more  rationalized
management  structure  under  the  control  of  professional  administra-
tors."  If adopted,  these  structural  reforms  would alter the institutional
dynamic we describe.  In a world of fixed fees, flatlining  would  become
a cost to  the  firm  as  opposed  to  a  potential  source  of profit.  TQM's
emphasis  on  teamwork  and  localized  decision  making  would  make  it
more  difficult to leave black  associates  out  of  developmental  relation-
ships while at the same time  giving firms  an  incentive  to recruit  lawyers
with a broader range of interpersonal  skills than  those  reflected  in  such
traditional  signals  as  elite  school  status  and  high  grades.  Finally,  re-
placing  overworked  partners  with professional  administrators  who have
the  authority  and  experience  to  implement  long-range  management
policies would help  to ensure that formal  work assignment  and  mentor-
ing policies  are  applied fairly  and uniformly  throughout the firm.
The explosion  in information  technology  opens  up  additional  pos-
sibilities.  The  path  that has  led  to  the current  pyramidal  structure  that
characterizes  today's  elite corporate  firms  can be traced  to the fact that
at the turn  of the century,  most of the clients  of these  firms  were them-
selves  centralized,  hierarchical,  and  vertically  integrated.  Today,  as  a
result  of the information  revolution,  these  clients  are  more  likely  to  be
characterized  by  a flat, decentralized  management  structure  that  incor-
porates  telecommuting  employees,  a  global  distribution  system,  and
multiple  interlocking  networks  and  alliances."'  At the  same  time, elite
firms now have  access  to an unprecedented  array  of technology  to  assist
them  in the  performance  of  their  work."3  The  combination  of  these
forces  creates  the potential  for  new "efficient"  firm  structures.  Thus,
440.  See id. at 379-87 (attributing lawyer disfunction to a "squeeze"  between  rising costs-most
notably high associate salaries-and reduced revenues produced by growing  competition  that results
in longer hours, less training, and diminished  loyalty and collegiality).
441.  See id. at 387,-410 (describing initiatives).
442.  See Val  D. Hornstein,  Commuting to  the Law  Office  on  the Information Superhighway:
Virtually There, 6:1  STAN.  L. & POL'Y  REV.  99 (1994).
443.  See Ethan  Katsh, Digital Lawyers: Orienting the Legal Profession to  Cyberspace, 55  U
Prr. L.  REV.  1141 (1994).
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some  have  argued  that  lawyers  can  now  form  "virtual  law  firms"  in
which attorneys  using  state-of-the-art  technology  form  loose  relation-
ships  and  alliances  with  other  attorneys  to  perform  particular  client
projects  or  to  open  up  new  areas  of  business.'  Others  assert  that
twenty-first  century  firms  are  more  likely  to  resemble  "diamonds"
rather  than pyramids,  with a large number  of experienced  middle-level
lawyers  doing the bulk of the  work.'5  Another  possibility  is that firms
will  move towards  an  "hourglass"  structure  in  which  technology  would
provide  senior  lawyers  direct  access  to  information,  thereby  reducing
the need for middle-level  lawyers  to  process  and  summarize  data  while
increasing the need for junior  lawyers  and  other paraprofessionals  who
would put the raw information  in a form that senior lawyers  could use."6
All  of these  alternative  structures  would  substantially  alter  the  recruit-
ment and retention issues we described  in Part III.
The  current  "crisis"  in  legal  education  also  has  the  potential  to
transform key elements  of the dynamic we  described  in  Part  III.  In  re-
cent years, the bar has  expressed  increasing  dissatisfaction  with the per-
ceived disjunction between what  is taught  in  the academy  and  the  skills
that lawyers need  to  survive in  the  "real  world.""'7  One  way  that  law
schools  might respond  to  this  pressure  is by  creating  new courses  that
allow  students  to  integrate  experiential  and  theoretical  knowledge. 448
These  new  curricular  offerings  would  provide  students  with  additional
avenues  to demonstrate  their competence,  first  to  their  professors,  and
second  (through either  the grading  process  or the generation  of tangible
products) to employers.  In addition,  to the extent that these new courses
are more  closely tied  to  actual  lawyering  skills,  employers  have  an  in-
centive  to  value them  as more  than  simply a "signal"  of  basic  intelli-
gence  or competency.449
444.  See Bruce  Mitchell,  Using Collaborative Computing Tools  to Build  Virtual Legal Dream
Teams, LEGAL MGMT.,  May/June  1995, at 28.
445.  Gary Griffith, Techshow 95: Dramatic Change in the Practice of Law, INFO.  TODAY,  June
1, 1995, at 22.
446.  See Joseph  L. Kashi,  Technology and Economics Are Changing How  You  Practice Law,
LAW  PRAc.  MGMT.,  Nov.Dec.  1994, at 48.
447.  See MACCRATE  REPORT,  supra  note 97.  This pressure is in part a tacit  acknowledgment  of
our claim that law firms (and other legal employers)  no longer have the time or the inclination  to train
lawyers  themselves.
448.  See Nancy L. Schultz, How Do Lawyers Really Think?, 42 J. LEGAL  EDUc.  57, 73  (1992)
(advocating providing students  with a variety  of "teaching  methodolog[ies],  personal  visions,  [and]
interdisciplinary  concepts"  as  a  solution  to the integration  of lawyering  theory  and  skills).  For  a
description  of one attempt to accomplish  such  a synthesis,  see  David  B.  Wilkins,  Redefining  the
"Professional"  in Professional  Ethics: an Interdisciplinary  Approach to Teaching Professional  Ethics,
58 LAw & CONTEMP.  PROBS.  241 (forthcoming  1996).
449.  For example,  the  State  University  of New York  at  Buffalo  School of Law  has  proposed
radically restructuring  its curriculum "to equip  [graduates] to work like lawyers"  as well as to "think"
like lawyers.  See  The  New  Curriculum:  University  at  Buffalo  School  of Law  (Dean's  Office
description, on file with California  Law Review).
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Finally, even the much publicized  crisis  in American  race  relations
might provide the shock that allows this nation  to  develop  new and bet-
ter pathways between blacks and whites.  A series  of recent events, many
played  out  in the  legal  arena,  make  it painfully  clear  that  blacks  and
whites frequently  see the world  through  different  eyes. 5 0  Although  di-
visive,  these  events  also  focus  attention  on  some  of  the  reasons  why
blacks  and  whites perceive  the  world  so differently.  In  the  hands  of
thoughtful  observers,  the  insights gleaned  from  this  attention  can  open
up new ways of understanding what is wrong with American  society  that
cut across  the traditional  racial  divide.5  As  Jennifer  Hochschild  has
recently  noted,  African  Americans  are  often  "bellwethers"  of  trends
likely to  spread throughout  the wider community.52  The fact  that firms
are hemorrhaging  black  lawyers from  both  the bottom  (in  the form  of
talented blacks who either do not get hired  or find  themselves flatlined)
and the top (in the defection of black partners for other opportunities  in
the public  and  private  sectors)  is  therefore  an  important  warning  sign
for the profession  as a whole.
Of course,  there  is  no  guarantee  that  any  of  these  "crises"  will
produce  positive effects.  Firms  that  adopt  more  rationalized  manage-
ment  structures  may  simply  ghettoize  black  lawyers  in  relatively  low
status positions.  Reform movements in legal  education  may  further  en-
trench  existing  hierarchies  by  insuring  that  blacks  who  attend  lower
status law schools receive an education  that tracks them  into  lower pay-
ing legal jobs.  And,  as is all too apparent from much  of the current  de-
bate over affirmative  action, the crisis in  American  race relations  is just
as likely  to produce  obfuscation  and  demagoguery  as it is to  illuminate
shared problems  and  open pathways  towards new  solutions.
Nevertheless,  one final  aspect of the legal profession's  past makes
us cautiously optimistic about the ability to make  progress  on  these dif-
ficult issues.  Few would dispute that the campaign to end legal  segrega-
tion  culminating  in  Brown  v.  Board  of  Education  is  the  legal
profession's  finest accomplishment-just  as the profession's  complicity
in the regime that this campaign  demolished  was its darkest hour.  The
fact that the country's  most prestigious  law  firms  are  nearly  as  segre-
450.  See, e.g., JENNIFER L  HoCHSCHILD,  FACING  UP  TO THE AMERICAN  DREAM:  RACE,  CLASS
AND  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  NATION  211-12  (1995)  (reporting  that "over  two-thirds  of  black  Los
Angelenos,  compared  with  roughly  two-fifths  of  whites,  Asians,  and  Latinos,  saw  the  uprising
[following the acquittal of the four white police officers  in the  first Rodney  King trial)  as  'mainly  a
protest by blacks  against  unfair  conditions'  rather  than  'a  way  of engaging  in  looting  and  street
crime').  Black and white responses to the O.J. Simpson verdict are similarly divided.
451.  For an  example  of what  can  be  learned  from  a  careful  investigation  of  this  country's
current  struggle to come  to grips  with the political  and  moral  significance  of race,  see  ANTHONY
APPIAH  &  AmY  GUTTMANN,  COLOR  CONSCIOUSNESS:  THE  POLITICAL  MORALITY  OF  RACE
(forthcoming  1996).
452.  See HoCHSCHILD, supra note 450, at xii.
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gated  today  as  the entire  legal  system was  forty  years  ago  stands  as  a
constant  rebuke  to  the profession's  attempt to  claim  the  noble  side  of
this heritage.  At the same time, initiatives  such  as the Minority  Counsel
Demonstration  Program  and  the efforts  by  state and  local  bar  associa-
tions  to  promote  workplace  diversity  demonstrate  that  the  ideals  cap-
tured  by  Brown  can  still  energize  lawyers  to  work  for  institutional
change.  As the legal  profession  confronts  the  uncertainties  of the next
millennium,  it is this energy that holds the best hope  for  charting  a new
path that connects the profession's  future to the best of its past.1996]  WHY ARE THERE SO FEWBLACKLAWYERS  615
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TABLE  1: Data on Black Alumni of Harvard  Law School
Classes of  '81  &  '82  Classes of '87  &  '88
Started Out at Elite Law Firms
(not including  clerkships):  36/60  60%  44/57  77%
Were Still at the Same Law Firm in
1993,  (Classes of  '81  &  '82);
1992, (Classes  of '87  &  '88)  5/36  14%  12/44  27%
Moved  into Government  After
Their Firm Experience:  5/31  16%  4/32  13%
Breakdown  by  Specialty
Litigation  18  50%  17  39%
Corporate  9  25%  12  27%
Real Estate  3  8%  3  7%
Entertainment  0  0%  2  5%
Unknown  6  17%  9  20%
Public Finance  0  0%  0  0%
Patent, Tax, Other Specialty  0  0%  1  2%
36  100%  44  100%
Source: Harvard Law  School Alumni Office
TABLE 2: Results of Survey  of Black Harvard  Law School Graduates
Table  2,  Part  A  Graduated  Graduated
Pre-1986  1986+  Total
#  %  %  #  %
Total  Number of Responses
Responses  from  Women
Employment  History
Percentage Still Employed  at
the firm they joined initially
New  Jobs of those Who Left
Government
Small Non-Elite Firm
In-House Counsel
Private  Practice
Academia
Other Elite Firm
InvestmentBanking/Consulting
Number Who Became Partners at
Elite Firms (3  spent time in
Gov't,  1 in a Small Firm)
100%
24%
0  0%
29%
10%
29%
5%
5%
14%
10%
100%
64%
20  44%
100%
52%
20  30%
33%
17%
20%
4%
7%
15%
4%
4  6%
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TABLE  2: Results of Survey  of Black Harvard Law School Graduates
(Continued)
Graduated  Graduated
Pre-1986  1986+  Total
Elite Firm Work Experience
Litigation  11  52%  19  43%  30  45%
Corporate  5  24%  16  34%  21  32%
Real Estate  3  14%  4  9%  7  11%
Regulatory  2  10%  6  14%  8  12%
Pro Bono Work
Did Pro  Bono Work  18  86%  39  87%  57  86%
Did Pro Bono Work or Litiga-
tion In Part to  Improve Mobil-
ity into Other Employment  1  5%  15  33%  16  24%
Table  2,  Part  B  Graduated  Graduated
Pre-1986  1986+  Total
Training, Supervison & Evalua-
tion at the Large  Law Firm
Had Partners Take Interest in
Their Career  5/21  24%  21/45  47%  26/66  39%
If Not, Number for Whom This
Resulted in Their Departure  8/16  50%  19/24  79%  27/40  68%
Had Difficulty Getting Good
Work  Assignments  12/21  57%  28/45-  62%  40/66  61%
Whose  Difficulty Getting Work
Worsened Over Time  6/12  50%  20/28  71%  26/40  65%
Been Through Formal
Review Process-  15/21  71%  42/45  93%  57/66  86%
Received Negative Feedback at
the Formal  Evaluation  that
Wasn't Mentioned  Earlier (i.e.
when project completed.)  13/21  62%  29/45  64%  42/66  64%
Amount of Criticism Received
Perceived  as Being More than a
White Associate at the  Same
Level Would Have Received  8/21  38%  19/45  42%  27/66  41%
*  Three were too new to have been through it.
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TABLE 2: Results  of Survey  of Black Harvard  Law School Graduates
(Continued)
Table  2,  Part  C  Graduated  Graduated
Pre-1986  1986+  Total
Social Relations
Explicit Racist  Comments
While Present  6/21  29%  15/45  33%  21/66  32%
If So,  Number for Whom This
Was a Major Cause to Leave  0/6  0%  4/15  27%  4/21  19%
Felt Welcome Within  Social
Networks in the Firm  10/21  48%  19/45  42%  29/66  44%
If Not, Number for Whom This
Was aMajor Causeto Leave  3/11  27%  17/26  65%  20/37  54%
More Under Pressure to be Seen
(e.g.,  nights  and on weekends)  4/21  19%  15/45  33%  19/66  29%
Felt Inhibited  Discussing Po-
litical, Social,  or Moral  Views
at the Firm  6/21  29%  23/45  51%  29/66  44%
Average Number of Years Be-
fore Departure From the Law
Firm  3.04  Years  2.32  Years
TABLE  2 QUESTIONNAIRE
Personal  History
Male  _,  Female __;  HLS  Class
Undergraduate  Institution
Were you the first in  your family  to go to law  school?
Employment History
Have  you ever been  employed  full  time  (i.e.,  excluding  summers)  at  a
corporate  law  firm with more than  50 lawyers?  _;  If yes, are you  still
employed  at the firm  you joined  immediately  after graduation?  _;  If
no, how many years did you  stay  at your  first law firm job?  _  ;  Did
you  leave that firm to join another corporate law firm with more than  50
lawyers?  _;  If so, are  you  still with this  second  firm?  _  ; If no,
how many  years did  you  spend  at the second  firm?  _;  If you  did
not join  another  corporate  law  firm  with more  than  fifty  lawyers  after
leaving  your  first law firm job, where  did you  go  (i.e.,  corporate  legal
de-partment,  small  firm,  government,  etc.)?
;  Where  are  you  currently  employed?
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Large Law Firm Work Experience
During your years in  corporate  law practice,  did  you  work primarily  in
one  practice  area?  ;  If  so,  what  was  that  area?
; If you  specialized  in  litigation,  was  the
possibility  of acquiring  skills that might  improve  your marketability  to
non-corporate  law  firm  employers  a  substantial  motivating  factor  in
your  choice  of  field?  _  ;  Did  you  do  any  pro  bono  work?
_  If yes, was the possibility  of acquiring  skills that might  improve
your  marketability  to  non-corporate  law  firm  employers  a substantial
motivating  factor in your decisionto  take on  pro  bono work?
Training, Supervision, and Evaluation
Did any  of the firm's partners take an active interest  in  your  career  (i.e.,
by providing  training, information,  or help  in  selecting  good  projects)?
;  If  no,  was  the  sense  of  this  kind  of  mentoring  an  important
consideration  in your  decision about whether  to stay at the firm?
Did you have difficulty  getting good work assignments?  _  ;  If yes,
did  this  problem  become  worse  the  longer  you  stayed  at  the  firm?
;  Did  you  go  through  a  formal  evaluation/review  process?
; If so, were you ever given  negative feedback  on  your  work that
was not mentioned  at the time the work was completed?  ; In either
formal  or informal discussions  with supervising  lawyers,  have you  been
criticized  for  making  a mistake  that  others  at  your  experienced  level
would  not  have been  criticized  for  making  (or  to  the  same  degree)?
Social Relations
Has anyone ever made an expressly racist statement  either  to your  or  in
your  presence?  ;  If  so,  was  this  a  substantial  factor  in  your
decision  about  whether  to  stay  at  the  firm?  _  ;  Do  you  feel
welcome  in  the mainstream  informal  social networks  inside  your firm?
;  If not, is this a substantial factor in your decision  about  whether
to  stay at the firm? _  ;  Are you under more pressure  to "be  seen"
at  the  firm  on  nights  and  weekends  than  your  white  counter-parts?
; Do you feel inhibited in discussing  your political, moral,  or social
views with other lawyers at the  firm? ___.
Follow Up
If you would be willing to discuss  these issues  further  or  to  learn  more
about  the  project,  please  put  your  name  and  address  below.
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TABLE  3:  Results of Law Firm  Survey  Profile  of Entering  Associates  at
73 Elite Firms
Total  Associates  1,257
Black Associates  96
% of Blacks  in Total  7.6%
Black Associates From Elite  Law Schools  55
% of Black Associates From Elite Law Schools  57.3%
Black Associates From HLS  23
% of Black Associates From HLS  24.0%
Non-Black  Associates  1,162
Non-Black  Associates From Elite Schools  601
% of Non-Black Associates From Elite Schools  51.7%
Non-Black Associates From  HLS  138
% of Non-Black Associates From HLS  11.9%
Number  of  3L  Black  Law  Students  at  Schools
From  Which  Law  Firms  Hired
Number of 3L Black Students at HLS  61
Number of 3L Black Students  at All Schools
From Which Elite Firms Hired  1,003
% of HLS Blacks in Total  6.1%
New  York
Black  Associates  45
Black Associates  From Elite Schools  29
% of Black Associates From Elite Schools  64.4%
Black Associates  From HLS, Columbia, NYU  23
% of Black Associates From HLS, Columbia, NYU  51.1%
Black Associates From HLS  7
% of Black Associates From HLS  15.6%
Washington  D.C.
Black Associates  25
Black Associates From Elite Schools  14
% of Black Associates From Elite Schools  56.0%
Black Associates from HLS,  Georgetown  13
% of Black Associates From  HLS, Georgetown  52.0%
Black Associates From  HLS  8
% of Black Associates From HLS  32.0%
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TABLE  4:  Distribution  of 1995  Entering  Black  Associates
Firms by Law School.
at Elite  Law
American  1
Brooklyn  1
Boston  College  1
Boston  University  4
Catholic  1
Columbia  10
Chicago  1
Duke  2
Duquesne  1
Fordham  2
Georgetown  7
George  Washington  3
Georgia  State  1
Harvard  23
Howard  4
Illinois  1
Iowa  1
Maryland  1
Michigan  2
Northwestern  I
North  Carolina  Central  1
Notre Dame  1
New York University  9
Pace  1
Rutgers-Newark  2
St.  John's  1
Stanford  2
Tulane  1
Vanderbilt  1
Univ.  of California-Berkeley  1
Univ.  of California-Los  Angeles  1
University  of Pennsylvania  2
Univ.  of Southern  California  1
Univ.  of Virginia  2
Yale  2
Total  96
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TABLE 6:  Summary Data for Black Partners In Elite Firms*
Total  87  100%
Breakdown by Specialty
Litigation  49  56%
Real Estate  10  11%
Banking  Regulatory  5  6%
Bankruptcy  2  2%
Corporate  12  14%
Environmental  2  2%
Municipal/Public  Finance  4  5%
Government  Legislation  1  1%
ERISA/Tax  1  1%
Entertainment  1  1%
Breakdown by Gender  62 Men
25 Women
Breakdown by Prior  Work Experience
Worked in Government  Before Becoming  32/87  37%
Partners
Worked In-House or as Associates Elsewhere  24/87  28%
Before Becoming Partners
Were Professors Before Becoming Partners  10/87  11%
Breakdown by Education
From Elite Law Schools  67/87  77%
From Harvard and Yale Law Schools  41/87  47%
Not from Elite Law Schools  20/87  23%
Prior  Work Experience of Partners  Not From
Elite Law Schools
Government  9/20  45%
In-House  Counsel  1/20  5%
Associates Elsewhere  2/20  10%
Rose Through  the Ranks  5/20  25%
Law School Professors  3/20  15%
Source:  ABA  1992-93  Directory  of Partners  at Majority/Corporate  Law
Firms
*  We define elite law firms as those firms surveyed by the Insider's Guide (1993).